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Essays on Economic Liberalisation, Labour Market Flexibility and Employment in the 
Indian Manufacturing Sector (1990-2006) 
Whether economic liberalisation generates employment in developing countries remains a 
matter of debate in academic and policy circles. This thesis explores the labour market 
implications of a series of liberalising product market reforms initiated in India in the 1990s. 
The analysis of Chapter 2 indicates that declines in input tariffs are associated with increased 
formal firm employment across all Indian states, while FDI reform is associated with 
increased (reduced) formal firm employment in states with flexible (inflexible) labour 
markets (1990-1997). The FDI effect holds for permanent employment in both groups of 
states but only affects casual (contract) employment to a significant extent in states with 
flexible labour markets. The evidence is supportive of the baseline results being driven by 
product market competition within the formal sector.  
Chapter 3 reveals that tariff liberalisation is not associated with significant changes in 
employment in informal enterprises, possibly because these enterprises rarely engage in 
international trade. However, on average and ceteris paribus, delicensing (FDI reform) is 
associated with statistically significant increases in informal employment and informal 
enterprise numbers in states with inflexible (flexible) labour markets (1990-2001). There is 
some evidence that the delicensing effect is attributable to increases in product market 
competition in delicensed industries in the post-reform period. The mechanism underlying 
the result associated with FDI liberalisation is more uncertain and could be one or a 
combination of competition and collaborative linkages between informal and formal 
manufacturers. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of a post-1996 policy reform (‘SSI dereservation’), which 
liberalised product markets that had long been reserved for small businesses, on 
employment in informal manufacturing enterprises. On average and ceteris paribus, 
dereservation is associated with increased employment in larger informal ‘establishments’, 
but not in tiny household enterprises (1995-2006), attributable in part to increases in 
product market competition with large formal firms.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 A primer in India’s economic development (1950-1990) 
“The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of opportunity, to the greater triumphs 
and achievements that await us. Are we brave enough and wise enough to grasp this opportunity and 
accept the challenge of the future?” 
- Jawaharlal Nehru, former Prime Minister (1947-1964) of India 
(14 August 1947, “Tryst with Destiny” – Speech on the Granting of Indian Independence) 
As a newly independent developing economy in the 1950s, India adopted economic policies 
that had distinctly socialist leanings. Inspired by the strides made by the erstwhile USSR, the 
young Indian economy was largely geared towards government regulation and national self-
sufficiency (Sivadasan, 2009). Trade policy was extremely restrictive and favoured import 
substitution, with exporters and importers alike facing a wide range of punitive tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. In tandem, domestic industrial policy imposed several constraints on 
businesses – most notoriously in the form of the infamous license policy (the ‘License Raj’) 
– and thereby stifled entrepreneurship and growth (Aghion et al, 2008). Over time, this 
regulatory regime engendered a productivity decline in the 1970s and became a byword for 
red tape, graft, inefficiency and government monopoly in a number of sectors. 
In the 1980s, a few reforms were initiated in an attempt to reverse the productivity decline 
of the previous decade. Until 1985, all manufacturing firms with over 50 employees (over 
100 employees if electricity was not used) and with assets above a specified threshold were 
required to obtain a license from the government. Chari (2011) and Sharma (2008) 
document that this policy was extremely restrictive and discouraged market entry and 
competition. This domestic license regime was partially liberalised in 1985, with roughly one 
in three three-digit manufacturing industries being ‘delicensed’.  In this context, the term 
‘delicensing’ implies that firms in a given industry or industries were no longer required to 
15 
 
obtain such a license. In the domain of trade policy, however, tariffs on manufactured 
imports remained stubbornly high. 
The piecemeal reforms of the 1980s proved inadequate in the face of growing fiscal and 
external macroeconomic imbalances. To worsen matters, a spike in oil prices owing to the 
Gulf War, a decline in remittance inflows from the Middle East, political uncertainty and a 
drop in demand for exports to major trade partners all combined to engender substantial 
capital outflows and, subsequently, a balance-of-payments crisis in 1990-91. 
1.2 Reform forged in the crucible of crisis (1991-1997) 
In August 1991, the Indian government approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to request a Stand-By Arrangement to help it tide over its external payments crisis. The IMF 
agreed to provide the requisite support conditional on the government undertaking a series 
of comprehensive structural reforms, including measures for substantive trade and industry 
policy liberalisation. Against a backdrop of an external payments crisis and global economic 
headwinds, the Indian government had little choice but to initiate these reforms. In one 
sense, this was an episode of ‘reform by stealth’, with wide ranging policy shifts being set in 
motion in a very short span of time that allowed for virtually no lobbying or opposition 
(Jenkins, 1999). Given the circumstances, it may plausibly be argued that these reforms 
constituted an exogenous shock for the economy. Sivadasan (2009) and Topalova and 
Khandelwal (2011) provide additional detail in this context. 
The New Industrial Policy endorsed in 1991 provided a roadmap for reform and the five-
year Export Import (Exim) Policy that came into effect in April 1992 encapsulated the new 
trade policy. Under the trade liberalisation programme initiated in 1992, the import license 
regime applying to nearly all capital goods and intermediate inputs was abolished. Tariffs 
16 
 
were liberalised by capping peak tariff rates and by reducing the number of tariff bands. 
Further, the Indian rupee was devalued relative to the US dollar and a dual exchange rate 
was introduced. 
In the 1991-1997 period, the average Indian final goods tariff (ad valorem) on manufactured 
imports fell from 95 per cent to 35 per cent (Harrison et al, 2013). However, as Table 1 
reveals, the declining trend in final goods tariffs masked considerable dispersion around the 
mean, with peak tariffs remaining prohibitive. Under the terms of the support extended by 
the IMF, the deepest tariff cuts were applied to those industries with the highest pre-reform 
tariff levels. This simplification and harmonisation of the tariff regime was followed by an 
increase in imports, in particular imports of intermediate inputs. 
Table 1: Summary statistics by year: Final goods tariffs, input tariffs, delicensing and FDI 
liberalisation (1985-1997)* 
Year Final goods tariffs (%) Input tariffs (%) % DEL % FDI 
 Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD   
1985 88.97 0.00 203.91 32.83 57.89 23.42 86.82 11.73 35 0 
1986 95.37 0.00 242.22 37.95 60.29 23.97 88.30 11.23 36 0 
1987 94.75 0.00 242.22 37.60 58.63 23.67 79.50 10.25 36 0 
1988 94.86 0.00 248.89 37.53 59.33 23.89 83.09 10.55 36 0 
1989 95.54 0.00 281.25 40.34 59.44 23.89 83.11 10.58 37 0 
1990 95.68 0.00 281.25 40.56 59.45 23.90 83.22 10.57 37 0 
1991 95.68 0.00 281.25 40.56 59.44 23.90 83.22 10.57 84 38 
1992 63.48 0.00 281.25 27.71 39.73 20.54 53.27 5.42 84 38 
1993 63.92 22.50 340.63 31.03 38.53 20.42 54.35 5.31 86 38 
1994 64.46 11.28 400.00 36.06 37.34 8.92 55.42 6.06 86 38 
1995 53.57 12.08 320.75 30.86 30.11 8.64 48.97 5.32 86 38 
1996 42.41 0.00 254.27 24.85 22.76 8.15 42.51 5.15 86 38 
1997 34.15 0.00 176.67 18.59 18.37 6.37 32.95 4.09 89 45 
Source: Final goods tariff data and input tariff data obtained from Nataraj (2011); 132 three-digit NIC (1987) industries 
included     Min: Minimum; Max: Maximum; SD: Standard deviation     * “% DEL” and “% FDI” refer to the proportions 
of industries that were delicensed and FDI liberalised (respectively) up to a given year 
Final goods tariffs declined precipitously in 1992, which was the first year of reform 
implementation following the balance-of-payments crisis of 1990-91. Tariffs on 
intermediate inputs (hereafter, ‘input tariffs’, described in Section 2.3.2) also fell and 
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converged in the post-1991 period, although they display less variance relative to final goods 
tariffs. The scatterplots in Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) capture tariff levels in 1989 and the 
declines that occurred in the 1989-2000 period for final goods and input tariffs , illustrating 
how the highest pre-reform tariff rates were subjected to the largest cuts. This was 
purposefully undertaken in the case of final goods tariffs, with input tariffs consequentially 
undergoing interlinked, albeit not equivalent, declines. The two outliers visible to the right 
of the graph in Figure 1(a) are the wine manufacturing industry and the spirit distillation, 
rectification and blending industry. The final goods tariffs for both of these industries 
amounted to over 250 per cent in 1989, but they were subjected to considerably smaller 
reductions relative to other industries with very high tariff rates in 1989. This might be 
indicative of these industries having enjoyed political protection from the tariff cuts, even 
in the face of the exceptional situation that the Indian economy faced in 1991. Robustness 
checks which drop these ‘outlier’ industries from the relevant baseline regressions are 
discussed in Section 2.6.2 and Section 3.5.1. These checks show that my findings are not 
influenced, both magnitude and direction wise, by the omission of these outliers. 
Figure 1(c) plots pairwise declines in final goods tariffs and input tariffs over the 1989-2000 
period. The resulting scatterplot suggests that while there may be a positive association 
between the shifts in tariff rates1, it is not sufficiently strong for multicollinearity to pose 
major concerns. An alternative way to visualise the pervasiveness of India’s tariff 
liberalisation in the 1991-1997 period is to plot the declines in final goods tariff rates across 
different percentiles in the tariff distribution (Nataraj, 2011), which I undertake for the 
                                                          
1 The correlation coefficient for the changes in final goods and input tariffs over the 1989-1994 period is 0.4144, 
while that for the corresponding changes over the 1989-2000 period is 0.5371. 
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median and the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of final goods tariff rates (1985-1997) in 
Figure 1(d).  
In 1997, a new five-year Exim Policy was endorsed to consolidate the trade liberalisation 
and reform process. Tariff reductions continued in the post-1997 period, albeit with less 
urgency and at a slower pace, as is visible in Figure 1(d). Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) 
argue that endogeneity concerns for this period are likely to be greater relative to the 
immediate post-reform (1991-1997) period, on the grounds that in contrast to the 1991-
1997 period, the later tariff reductions are more likely to have been targeted at protecting 
less efficient industries. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I undertake a number of checks to 
address this concern.  
In addition, domestic economy deregulation, which had been promoted in ‘piecemeal’ 
fashion in the 1980s, received an impetus in the 1990s. This deregulation assumed 
numerous guises, most prominent among which were the quasi-elimination of the notorious 
industrial license regime and increases in the foreign direct investment (FDI) thresholds 
applicable to a number of manufacturing industries. As regards the licensing regime, a 
majority of industries that had not been freed from licensing constraints in 1985 were 
delicensed in 1991, with only a handful liberalised in later years (Table 1). Prior to 1991, 
most industries were characterised by a 40 per cent FDI ceiling. In 1991 and in the following 
years, this ceiling was raised to 51 per cent for a number of industries, with ‘automatic’ FDI 
approval, and other regulations concerning FDI were liberalised (Sivadasan, 2009). In 
tandem with the final goods tariff rate harmonisation of the 1990s, Figure 1(d) captures the 
increase in the proportion of three digit industries (as defined under India’s National 
Industrial Classification of 1987) that underwent delicensing and FDI liberalisation in the 
1985-1997 period. While these domestic reforms were initiated more sporadically relative 
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to the concurrent tariff reductions, they are characterised by sufficient variation across 
industries and over time to enable a firm level analysis for the 1990s. The analyses in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3 use survey data for more than one post-1991 cross-section, which arguably 
facilitates a reasonably comprehensive consideration of the implications of the reforms. 
Figure 1: Economic reform in India (1985-2000) 
(a)   Final goods tariffs (1989) and declines in final goods tariffs (1989-2000)2 
 
(b)   Input tariffs (1989) and declines in input tariffs (1989-2000) 
 
                                                          
 
20 
 
(c)     Declines in final goods tariffs and declines in input tariffs (1989-1994) 
 
(d)     Selected final goods tariff rate percentiles, delicensing and FDI reform (1985-1997)* 
 
Source: Data on final goods tariffs, input tariffs, delicensing and FDI reform in India (1985-1997) from Nataraj (2011); 
the final goods and input tariff data were compiled by Nataraj (2011) on the basis of Government of India estimates 
and India’s Input-Output Transactions Table (IOTT).   * “Px FGT” represents the xth final goods tariff rate percentile 
(for instance, “P5” represents the fifth final goods tariff rate percentile). “Median FGT” denotes the median final 
goods tariff rate. “% DEL” and “% FDI” refer to the proportions of three digit industries (as defined under India’s 
National Industrial Classification of 1987) that were delicensed and FDI liberalised, respectively, up to a given year. 
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On the whole, the reforms of the early nineties resulted in the Indian economy becoming 
substantially more open relative to its position in the first four decades following 
independence. As a proportion of GDP, the share of overall trade increased considerably, 
from 15 per cent in the 1980s to about 27 per cent in 2000 and further to 47 per cent in 
2006 (Alessandrini et al, 2011). In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I analyse the implications of 
India’s tariff liberalisation, delicensing and FDI reforms for employment in firms operating 
in manufacturing industries, which were the targets of this momentous policy shift. 
1.3 Dereservation reform (1997-2010) 
While large business houses have long tended to dominate press coverage of India’s 
manufacturing sector, most manufacturing enterprises in India are small entities. In 
recognition of this fact, beginning in the 1960s, the Government of India sought to 
encourage the growth of small enterprises by reserving a number of products for small scale 
industry (SSI) manufacturing. Initially, a small enterprise was defined as one employing up 
to 50 workers and having fixed assets valued at up to Rs. 500,000 (Martin et al, 2017). With 
the passage of time, only the fixed asset threshold was retained. This threshold increased in 
line with rising historical cost indices and amounted to Rs. 10 million in 1996.  
The number of SSI reserved products grew steadily up to the mid-1990s. This proved to be 
the ‘high water mark’ of SSI reservation, with the list of reserved products accounting for 
approximately 20 per cent of all manufacturing products in 1996. Large business houses 
already operating in the newly reserved product markets were permitted to continue doing 
so, with the proviso that any increases in production or entry into reserved product spaces 
would require them to export 75% or more of their output (Mohan, 2002). In light of India’s 
22 
 
highly restrictive export licensing regime of the time, this is likely to have ensured the 
effectiveness or ‘bite’ of the new reservation regime. 
By the mid-1990s, it was felt that SSI reservation, while well intentioned, had become 
somewhat redundant. With the liberalisation of India’s trade policies and domestic licensing 
regime in the early part of the decade, it was argued that large enterprises could circumvent 
the SSI reservation policy by importing reserved products or by introducing fair substitutes 
that were unreserved. Tewari and Wilde (2014) document how the idea of SSI dereservation 
gradually gained favour in government and academic circles. Eventually, beginning in 1997, 
the hitherto reserved products were dereserved over time, with small groups being 
dereserved in 1997 and 1999 and larger numbers being dereserved in 2001 and the 
following years through to 2010, when only a minuscule proportion of products remained 
on the reserved list (these were dereserved in 2015).  
Importantly, Tewari and Wilde (2014) provide evidence that the timing of SSI dereservation 
was quasi-random across industries and that endogeneity is unlikely to be an issue for 
analysts of this reform episode. By 2006, the share of reserved products had declined 
considerably across industry groups, and in 2010 it was close to zero for most two digit 
industry categories. Figure 2 illustrates the uneven pattern of dereservation for a selection 
of industry categories. In Chapter 4, I explore the extent to which manufacturing sector 
employment responded to the removal of the SSI reservation policy, a question of some 
considerable policy significance in light of Mohan’s (2002) contention that the overall 
development of India’s manufacturing base had, over time, been substantially hobbled by 
this ostensibly innocuous policy. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of SSI reserved products in selected industry groups (1995-2006) 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on data made available by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSME) of the Government of India 
To aid the reader in reference, Figure 3 provides a timeline of the economic reforms outlined 
in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3. 
Figure 3: Timeline of economic reforms undertaken in India (1985-2015) 
 
 
 
1985                                                                                                                                                 2015        
 
Source: Author’s discussion in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 of this thesis 
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Chapter 2: Economic Reform, Labour Market Flexibility and Employment in 
Formal Manufacturing Firms in India 
2.1 Introduction 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, a number of developing economies initiated 
comprehensive economic reform policies. A balance-of-payments crisis necessitating IMF 
assistance, preceded by a period of tepid growth and a growing realisation that the status 
quo was unsustainable, triggered this process in India in 1991. As discussed in Section 1.2, 
the Indian government subsequently implemented a series of far reaching economic 
reforms in the 1991-1997 period. Over two decades later, gaps persist in the literature that 
explores the labour market impacts of this reform programme. A number of studies, Nunn 
and Trefler (2013) and Ahsan (2013) being among the more recent, have documented that 
this impact is likely to be influenced by domestic institutions. However, this view has 
received scant attention in the Indian context, in particular at a ‘micro’ or firm level.  
This chapter contributes to addressing this gap in the literature by analysing the impact of 
India’s economic reforms in the 1990s on employment in formal manufacturing firms. In this 
context, the term ‘formal’ extends to all manufacturing businesses that employ ten or more 
workers and use electricity (for a small number of manufacturers that do not use electricity, 
the employment threshold rises to twenty workers). These firms are ‘formal’ in the sense 
that India’s Factories Act of 1948 requires them to register with the state government, which 
brings these firms under the purview of labour market legislation and other forms of 
regulation, as outlined in Amirapu and Gechter (2017). Although these firms account for a 
tiny fraction of all manufacturing firms in India, government survey data suggest that they 
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produce approximately three-quarters of manufactured output and account for 70 per cent 
of gross value added in manufacturing.  
I also examine the extent to which the impacts of the reforms depend on differences in 
labour market flexibility at the state (provincial) level. This is key, given that inflexible labour 
market regulation is commonly cited as an impediment to investment and growth in 
manufacturing output and productivity (Ahsan and Pagés, 2009). Further, as labour market 
regulation is binding only for the formal sector, any direct effect arising from its interplay 
with economic reform is likely to be focused on formal firms. I capture state level variations 
in labour market flexibility using the ‘FLEX 2’ indicator proposed by Hasan et al (2012). 
Unless otherwise specified, I use the terms ‘states with flexible labour markets’ and ‘states 
with inflexible labour markets’ to refer to states that are characterised as having flexible 
labour markets (score 1) and inflexible labour markets (score 0) by this ‘FLEX 2’ variable. 
Described in detail in Section 2.3.3, this indicator builds on the seminal state level labour 
legislation based measure proposed by Besley and Burgess (2004) by accounting for 
perceptions regarding the effectiveness of implementation of legislation. 
The analysis in this chapter uses survey data compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
through the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for formal manufacturing firms. It benefits 
from the rich cross-industry variation in India’s policy changes in the 1990s, particularly 
visible in the import tariff reductions that were enforced in this period. Moreover, the 
reform package of 1991 was an unanticipated event, which helps to obviate the usual 
concerns inherent in any analysis of the consequences of such measures. This chapter is the 
first to examine the impact of declines in both final goods and input tariffs on firm level 
employment in India. 
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The results are suggestive of substantial employment shifts in the formal manufacturing 
sector in the post-reform period, with input tariffs (described in Section 2.3.2) and FDI 
reform being statistically and economically significant explanatory variables. On average, a 
one percentage point decline in input tariffs is associated with an employment increase of 
0.68 per cent in the average formal firm in states with inflexible labour markets, and an 
employment increase of 0.66 per cent in the average formal firm in states with flexible 
labour markets (1990-1997). Further, FDI reform is associated with average formal firm 
employment falling (rising) by 11.5 (9.3) per cent in states with inflexible (flexible) labour 
markets. These results are highly robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. Given the timing 
of the FDI liberalisation and the extent to which input tariffs declined in India through the 
1990s, these estimates suggest that ceteris paribus, following the reforms, employment in 
the average formal firm increased by approximately 27.3 per cent in states with flexible 
labour markets and by roughly 7.5 per cent in states with inflexible labour markets. These 
findings uphold the notion that the interactions between the reform measures and states’ 
labour market flexibility have implications for employment in formal firms. Overall, no 
significance attaches to reductions in final goods tariffs. Delicensing, while not associated 
with significant firm level employment changes, precedes a significant rise in the number of 
formal firms in the average industry in states with flexible labour markets. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 undertakes a brief review 
of the literature. Section 2.3 describes the data, while Section 2.4 outlines the empirical 
methodology. Main findings are presented in Section 2.5, with further analysis and 
robustness checks discussed in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.2 Context 
2.2.1 Literature review 
2.2.1.1 Impacts of economic reform on firm level employment 
The turn of the millennium witnessed an upsurge in academic interest in the impacts of 
economic reform programmes on firm level employment, both in terms of theoretical 
contributions and empirical work. Substantial ambiguity persists as regards these 
employment effects.  
One or more of a number of mechanisms may underpin any observed impact of economic 
reform on firm level employment. For instance, a reduction in final goods tariffs might be 
expected to result in a more competitive domestic product market landscape, on account 
of an increase in imports. This could induce domestic manufacturers to shed surplus labour 
in a bid to cut costs and remain competitive. On the other hand, in sectors where product 
quality is more variable, domestic manufacturers might seek to employ more labour, 
particularly skilled labour, following a final goods tariff cut.  
Furthermore, as outlined in Section 1.2, a reduction in final goods tariffs across the 
manufacturing sector as a whole implies a decline in input tariffs for the average 
manufacturer. This would arguably lead to lower input prices, not only for imported inputs 
but also, over time and through general equilibrium effects, for indigenous inputs that were 
previously more expensive under the higher tariff regime. Facing lower input prices for 
manufactured items, employers might be incentivised to hire more, rather than less, 
workers in the post-tariff reform period. Whether such employment effects (arising from 
lower input prices in the post-reform period) move in the same direction as any effects 
attributable to final goods tariff cuts is an empirical issue. To the extent that some of these 
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effects might cancel each other out, any impacts of significance that I observe in this study, 
either attaching to the final goods or input tariff reductions, might be taken to be net effects. 
Also, as outlined in Section 1.2, while the final goods and input tariff reductions in India in 
the 1989-2000 period were evidently positively correlated, there is sufficient variation 
between these two variables. The large sample sizes of the datasets used for the analyses 
in Chapters 2 and 3 also go a long way towards mitigating any threat that moderate 
multicollinearity might in theory pose to the statistical significance of the results. 
In considering employment impacts, then, declines in tariffs on intermediate goods (input 
tariffs) are arguably as important to assess as final goods tariff cuts. The question of which 
among the alternative channels discussed above would be dominant is an empirical issue. 
The OECD (2012) provides an excellent overview of the extensive literature that examines 
the links between trade liberalisation and employment. While there is some evidence that 
declines in input tariffs are associated with changes in formal sector employment, the 
direction of the effect does not appear to be uniform (see for instance Menezes-Filho and 
Muendler, 2011; Paunov, 2011; Sharma, 2013; Kis-Katos and Sparrow, 2015; and Groizard 
et al, 2015).  
As regards India’s trade reforms, most studies have tended to focus on tariffs on final goods, 
or final goods tariffs, and their implications for firm level productivity. However, an 
increasing body of evidence suggests that declines in tariffs on intermediate inputs (input 
tariffs) have a greater positive impact on firm level productivity in the formal sector, relative 
to final goods tariffs. Amiti and Konings (2007) arrive at this conclusion in a study focusing 
on Indonesian firms and Nataraj (2011) obtains a similar result for formal firms in India. 
These results make a strong case for simultaneously examining final goods and input tariff 
declines in a study of the implications of trade liberalisation for employment.  
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Moreover, the firm level implications of India’s delicensing and FDI reforms remain poorly 
studied. Aghion et al (2008) establish that delicensing had implications for state level 
employment in India. The principal goal behind the delicensing reform was to slash some of 
the ‘red tape’ that had long been a major barrier to market entry. Therefore, a scenario in 
which delicensing may affect firm level employment, both through the entry of new firms 
and changes in employment in incumbent firms, becomes plausible. Similarly, with FDI 
reform (in terms of liberalisation of existing caps on FDI equity), it could be argued that firm 
level employment might undergo quantitative and qualitative increments on account of a 
greater likelihood of knowledge transfers, technology spillovers and related factors 
(Javorcik, 2015). In tandem with the trade reforms, delicensing and FDI liberalisation might 
also have ‘extensive margin’ implications for market or industry size, on account of 
competition driven effects or collaborative or supply chain linkages between formal firms. 
This chapter contributes to building an evidence base in these areas. 
2.2.1.2 Does labour market flexibility matter? 
A number of studies, including Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Bosch et al (2007), suggest 
that firm level employment is at least as much a function of the degree of domestic labour 
market flexibility as it is of economic policy shifts. Intuitively, the notion that the impact of 
economic reforms on labour markets is affected by domestic institutions is appealing. In 
other words, the impact of economic reforms on domestic labour markets is arguably likely 
to hinge on the interaction between policy change and domestic institutions, in particular 
labour market regulation.  
This interaction could lead to a number of alternative outcomes, which makes the 
evaluation of the net effect an empirical question. For instance, in areas with more flexible 
labour markets, employers are arguably more likely to take on or shed additional labour 
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following any given policy reform, relative to areas with less flexible labour markets. This 
could be reflected both in terms of a greater likelihood of post-reform increases in 
employment on the one hand, and greater variation in observed firm level employment, in 
areas with more flexible labour markets. In this thesis, I restrict my attention to estimating 
the net average effect of the reforms of interest on firm level employment in Indian states 
with relatively more, as opposed to relatively less, flexible labour markets. In this section, I 
summarise the literature that considers the relevance of such a distinction for differential 
employment outcomes. The specific measure of labour market flexibility that I use in my 
baseline regressions is discussed at some length in Section 2.3.3.  
The impacts of labour market regulation on employment outcomes have long constituted 
an area of research interest. Botero et al (2004) study labour laws in 85 countries and 
conclude that more inflexible labour markets (in terms of higher levels of labour regulation) 
tend to have larger unofficial segments and higher unemployment. Given the federal 
structure of its economy and the fact that its numerous states (provinces) have considerable 
autonomy in terms of amending and implementing centrally driven labour market 
regulation, India offers fertile ground in this context. Besley and Burgess (2004) exploit the 
state and time level variation in amendments made to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 
1947 up to 1990 to derive labour market flexibility scores that vary across states and over 
time (these are discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.3). Founded upon these scores, their 
analysis concludes that states that tended to make more ‘pro-worker’ amendments over 
time tended to witness inferior outcomes in terms of employment, output, investment, 
productivity and urban poverty, relative to states that tended to make more ‘pro-employer’ 
amendments over time.  
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Recent research is supportive of complementarities between the nationwide industry level 
reforms undertaken in India and domestic labour market flexibility. Aghion et al (2008) 
argue that manufacturing output in states that made more ‘pro-worker’ amendments as per 
the Besley-Burgess methodology tended to be lower following the delicensing reforms 
undertaken in India in the 1990s, relative to states where amendments tended to be ‘pro-
employer’. Along related lines, Gupta et al (2009) find that after the delicensing reforms 
were initiated, states with more inflexible (‘pro-worker’) labour laws tended to undergo 
slower employment growth, while states with less competitive product market regulation 
registered slower output growth. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), however, use the 
Besley-Burgess measure to suggest that formal firms in states with more ‘pro-worker’ 
legislation experienced higher productivity gains in the wake of India’s tariff liberalisation. 
A recent study by Hasan et al (2012) examines the extent to which final goods tariff 
liberalisation has differential impacts on the unemployment rate in Indian states with 
relatively more flexible and less flexible labour markets, as evaluated using the Besley-
Burgess measure, the measure due to Gupta et al (2009) and an additional measure (‘FLEX 
2’, described in Section 2.3.3). Hasan et al (2012) conclude that labour market flexibility is 
conducive to employment growth in the post-liberalisation period, particularly in industries 
that are net exporters. However, this analysis has limitations. It is conducted at a high level 
of industry aggregation, does not assess input tariff declines, and does not consider 
employment in formal and informal enterprises separately. In comparison, the current study 
focuses on formal firms, uses a more disaggregated industry classification and explores the 
effects of declines in both final goods tariffs and input tariffs, in addition to domestic 
industrial policy reforms. In Chapter 3, I study the implications of India’s economic reforms 
and differences in regional labour market flexibility for informal enterprises. 
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2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Labour market data 
I use repeated cross-sections of data compiled by the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), 
which covers all large firms (defined as having 100 or more employees in the period of my 
analysis) and a sample of smaller firms. The ASI provides inverse sampling probability based 
weights, which enable me to arrive at results that apply to the population of formal firms. 
In the baseline regressions, employment is captured in terms of the total number of paid 
employees, hereafter referred to as ‘paid employment’. The baseline dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of paid employment. 
My dataset comprises formal firms surveyed in the periods 1989-90, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 
1996-97. For convenience, I refer to these periods as 1990, 1994, 1995 and 1997 in this 
chapter. As such, I observe firms in one pre-reform period (1990) and three post-reform 
periods (1994, 1995 and 1997). The ASI adopted the same sampling strategy and the same 
industrial classification, the National Industrial Classification (NIC) of 1987, across these four 
surveys. As the data do not comprise a firm level panel, I am unable to analyse market entry 
and exit, but I discuss the mechanisms through which the effects that are observed might 
operate. 
The pooled distribution of paid employment for the population of formal firms is presented 
in Figure 4(a). The average formal firm has 71 paid employees, a number that registers very 
little variation over the 1990-1997 period. While over 75 per cent of formal firms have less 
than 50 paid employees, large operators with over 100 paid employees account for almost 
70 per cent of paid employment in the formal sector. Figure 4(b) illustrates that on average, 
formal firms in states with less flexible labour markets (the definition of which is discussed 
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further in Section 2.3.3) tend to be a little larger than their counterparts in states with more 
flexible labour markets, but there is no visible increasing or decreasing trend in either 
number over the 1990-1997 period. In this chapter, I explore whether the policy changes 
initiated in the 1990s had differing, and potentially mutually negating, formal firm 
employment effects, which could in theory be masked by the stable average employment 
estimates that are visible in Figure 4(b). 
Figure 4: Employment in formal manufacturing firms in India (1990-1997) 
(a) Formal firm and paid employment shares by firm size (1990-1997) 
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(b) Average employment per formal firm (1990-1997) 
 
Source: ASI survey data (1990, 1994, 1995, 1997)    As inverse sampling probability based multipliers have been used 
to aggregate the raw data, these distributions are representative of the population of formal firms. The measure of 
labour market flexibility used in Figure 4(b) is the ‘FLEX 2’ measure due to Hasan et al (2012) and is described in 
Section 2.3.3.    
The construction of the pooled dataset poses a number of challenges. As the state specific 
labour market flexibility measure used applies to sixteen states, I discard firms located in 
most other states. The exception is the national capital region (Delhi), which accounts for a 
large number of firms relative to the states that are excluded and is assigned an inflexible 
labour market status in the baseline on account of a lack of relevant data. The baseline 
results hold if Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir (which is classified as being a state with an 
inflexible labour market, as discussed in Section 2.3.3 below) are, instead, assumed to be 
flexible labour markets (this is discussed in Section 2.6.3). Restricting the dataset to the 
sixteen states of interest and Delhi does not appear to be a serious concern, as these regions 
consistently account for over 95 per cent of Indian GDP and, further, the firms retained in 
my sample account for over 80 per cent of formal manufacturing employment in each 
period.  
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I exclude firms that are reported to have been closed from my analysis and account for 
extreme outliers by ‘winsorizing’ the employment distribution for each year at the 0.1st and 
99.9th percentiles. This entails setting the values of a selected fraction, in this case 0.1 per 
cent, of observations at the top and bottom end of a distribution to equal the values of the 
corresponding top and bottom percentiles. In circumventing the issues that might arise from 
extreme outliers unduly affecting parameter values, this practice also seeks to address 
possible errors in data entry. Further, I observe that a number of formal firms report 
employing less than ten persons. Some of these firms may have undertaken temporary 
reductions in employment (Nataraj, 2011), while others may have registered to be able to 
trade or raise equity. I therefore include these firms in my analysis while also undertaking a 
check to ensure that my findings are robust to their exclusion. A small number of formal 
firms provide zero or missing values for raw material use and/or physical product 
manufacturing; again, following Nataraj (2011), I drop these firms from the baseline, as they 
are likely to be engaged only in trading activity, but I conduct a check to establish that their 
inclusion does not affect the key results. These checks are outlined in Section 2.6.3. 
2.3.2 Data on the 1990s reforms 
I use annual data on final goods and input tariff rates for the 1985-1997 period, compiled by 
Nataraj (2011) at the three-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) of 1987 level. The 
final goods tariff data are based on the Government of India’s Customs Tariff Working 
Schedules and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – Trade Analysis 
Information System (UNCTAD-TRAINS) database, whereas the input tariff data are 
computed using sectoral final goods tariffs and the Indian Input-Output Transactions Table 
(IOTT). For example, as explained in Nataraj (2011), if leather goods and textiles comprise 
80 per cent and 20 per cent of the inputs used by the footwear industry, the input tariff for 
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the latter equals 0.8 times the final goods tariff for leather goods plus 0.2 times the final 
goods tariff for textiles. I follow Harrison et al (2013) in using input tariffs constructed on 
the basis of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry final goods tariffs, and in 
undertaking a robustness check for which input tariffs constructed using only manufacturing 
industry final goods tariffs are used (the results of this check differ in part from my baseline 
findings in terms of statistical significance, and are discussed in Section 2.6.3).  The IOTT 
classifies industries into only 62 relevant groups as opposed to the NIC (1987) classification, 
for which over 130 industry codes exist for which final goods tariff data are available. In spite 
of this limitation, a considerable degree of variation is observable in input tariffs across NIC 
(1987) industries. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1 (Section 1.2). Final goods and 
input tariffs are measured in terms of fractions in the dataset (so that, for instance, a tariff 
rate of 80 per cent corresponds to 0.80).  
To control for the delicensing and FDI regime reforms undertaken in India in the period of 
interest, I use industry and time varying indicator variables that are also due to Nataraj 
(2011). These data were first used by Aghion et al (2008). The delicensing and FDI reform 
variables assume a value of ‘1’ for a given industry in a specific year if that industry was 
delicensed or FDI liberalised by the year in question, and are otherwise equal to ‘0’. As 
discussed in Section 1.2, approximately one-third of three-digit NIC (1987) manufacturing 
industries (and a little over one-third of the industries represented in my dataset) had been 
delicensed in 1985. After the 1991 reform episode, the proportion of delicensed industries 
increased to almost 90 percent, while approximately 40 per cent of industries were FDI 
liberalised.  
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2.3.3 Measure of labour market flexibility 
The measure of state level labour market flexibility used in this study, labelled ‘FLEX 2’, is 
due to Hasan et al (2012). This measure is founded upon the workhorse measure developed 
by Besley and Burgess (2004).  
Besley and Burgess (2004) use the IDA of 1947, passed by the central government, as their 
baseline. They exploit the fact that fifteen major Indian states made a series of amendments 
to this Act in the 1958-1990 period to develop an econometric strategy that accounts for 
state level regulatory variation. Besley and Burgess (2004) consider sixteen states in their 
analysis, but the state of Jammu & Kashmir made no amendment to the IDA in the 1958-
1990 period. In total, the other fifteen states made 113 amendments. Besley and Burgess 
(2004) assign a code of ‘1’ to each amendment they deem to be ‘pro-worker’, a code of ‘-1’ 
to amendments they find to be ‘pro-employer’ and a code of ‘0’ to ‘neutral’ amendments. 
Following this, they assign to each state a score of ‘1’, ‘-1’ or ‘0’ in each year when the state 
passed at least one amendment, based on the dominant direction of amendments passed. 
For instance, a state which passed three pro-worker amendments (‘1+1+1’) and one pro-
employer amendment (‘-1’) in 1965 gains a score of one (for having been predominantly 
pro-worker, in the sense that ‘1+1+1+(-1)’ exceeds zero) for 1965. The year specific scores 
assigned to each state are then cumulated over time for all relevant years (those years in 
which the state made at least one amendment) to arrive at a final state specific score for 
1990, on the basis of which the state is classified as being pro-worker, pro-employer or 
neutral in any given year.  
Gupta et al (2009) modify the Besley and Burgess (2004) measure to account for a number 
of suggestions offered by Bhattacharjea (2006) and for OECD (2007) survey research that 
assesses areas in which states have undertaken measures pertinent to the implementation 
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of labour laws (including but not limited to the IDA). The labour market flexibility indicator 
developed by Gupta et al (2009) is labelled ‘FLEX 3’ by Hasan et al (2012), who construct an 
additional measure that they refer to as ‘FLEX 2’. The Besley-Burgess measure, with a minor 
correction incorporated for the state of Madhya Pradesh, is labelled ‘FLEX 1’ by Hasan et al 
(2012). Also rooted in the Besley-Burgess measure, the ‘FLEX 2’ index inverts the final 
Besley-Burgess scores of three states: Gujarat, Kerala and Maharashtra. Hasan et al (2012) 
point out that World Bank (2005) research supports the view that Gujarat and Maharashtra, 
assigned overall scores of ‘1’ (pro-worker status) by Besley and Burgess, are generally 
regarded favourably by business representatives, whereas Kerala, although designated to 
be pro-employer by Besley and Burgess, is perceived to have a ‘poor investment climate’. 
Gujarat and Maharashtra are typically considered to be prime business locations by Indian 
businessmen, whereas Kerala is not. The World Bank’s (2005) research presents firm level 
survey findings in which managers rank Maharashtra and Gujarat highly, labelling them to 
be ‘Best Investment Climate’ states more consistently than other states. Kerala, conversely, 
attains a ‘Poor Investment Climate’ ranking. Small and medium-sized firms report having 
been subjected to twice as many factory inspections in ‘Poor Investment Climate’ states as 
in ‘Best Investment Climate’ states, suggesting that the enforcement of ostensibly ‘pro-
worker’ amendments to the IDA is likely to be less stringent in the latter type of state. 
Further, firms perceive that ‘over-manning’ (the gap between optimal and actual 
employment levels given current output levels) is on average less visible in Maharashtra and 
Gujarat than elsewhere. In ‘Poor Investment Climate’ states (such as Kerala), restrictive 
labour regulations were considered to be a primary driver of ‘over-manning’, whereas in 
‘Best Investment Climate’ states, ‘over-manning’ (lower than in other states in the first 
place) was perceived more favourably, in the sense that it was considered to occur when 
firms expected higher future growth. In summary, the ‘FLEX 2’ index assigns scores of -1, -1 
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and 1 to Gujarat, Maharashtra and Kerala respectively. Table 2 summarises the ‘FLEX 1’ 
(Besley and Burgess’ index), ‘FLEX 2’ and ‘FLEX 3’ scores for each state. 
Table 2: Summary of labour market flexibility indices* 
State Measure of labour market flexibility* 
 FLEX 1 FLEX 2 FLEX 3 
Andhra Pradesh 1 1 1 
Assam 0 0 0 
Bihar 0 0 0 
Gujarat 0 1 0 
Haryana 0 0 0 
Karnataka 1 1 1 
Kerala 1 0 0 
Madhya Pradesh 0 0 0 
Maharashtra 0 1 0 
Orissa 0 0 0 
Punjab 0 0 0 
Rajasthan 1 1 1 
Tamil Nadu 1 1 1 
Uttar Pradesh 0 0 1 
West Bengal 0 0 0 
Source: Besley and Burgess (2004) – FLEX 1; Hasan et al (2012) – FLEX 2; Gupta et al (2009) – FLEX 3 
*Recoded scores: 1 = flexible labour market regulation, 0 = inflexible labour market regulation 
In this study, I use the ‘FLEX 2’ indicator as the baseline measure of labour market flexibility, 
as it takes account not only of the nature of labour market regulation but also of business 
managers’ perceptions regarding the enforcement of the same in terms of state specific 
investment environments. Dougherty (2008) notes that there were no major state level 
amendments to the IDA between 1990 and 2004. There were only eight state level IDA 
amendments in the post-1990 period, of which the only amendments of relevance for 
labour market outcomes were made by the state of Gujarat in 2004, which falls outside the 
period of interest for my analysis. As my analysis is focused on the 1990-1997 time period, 
the ‘FLEX 2’ indicator varies only across states and not over time. 
As I interact the ‘FLEX 2’ measure with the final goods and input tariffs in my regressions, I 
recode the ‘FLEX 2’ index to facilitate the interpretation of my findings. Along the lines of 
Hasan et al (2012), states with flexible (‘pro-employer’) labour markets receive a score of ‘1’ 
(rather than ‘-1’, as is the case in the Besley-Burgess scores), whereas states with neutral or 
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inflexible (‘pro-worker’) labour markets receive a score of ‘0’ (rather than ‘1’ for the states 
with inflexible labour laws, as is the case in the Besley-Burgess index).  
Table 3 provides summary firm level employment statistics for the sample as a whole and 
separately for states with flexible and inflexible labour markets, as defined using the ‘FLEX 
2’ measure. As the ASI surveys all large formal firms (generally specified to be firms having 
100 or more employees in the 1990-1997 surveys) in each year while undertaking sampling 
for smaller formal firms, the sample employment distribution is skewed to the right in 
comparison with the population employment distribution (the latter is illustrated in Figure 
4, Section 2.3.1, for the pooled dataset). The average firm in the sample has 115 paid 
employees. While this figure is slightly higher in states with inflexible labour markets (120) 
than in states with flexible labour markets (113), it is quite stable over time in both groups 
of states. Median paid employment for the sample is also stable and amounts to 
approximately 25 across all states. 
The final column of Table 3 also shows that the total weighted numbers of paid employees 
in the population represented by these firms increased over the 1990-1997 period, both in 
states with more flexible labour markets and less flexible labour markets. These totals 
account for less than 20 per cent of overall employment in the Indian manufacturing sector, 
with the remainder being accounted for informal enterprises. Nonetheless, as stated in 
Section 2.1, formal firms have long accounted for over 70 per cent of output and gross value 
added in Indian manufacturing. Together, these observations underline the fact that Indian 
formal firms are substantially more productive than their informal counterparts, and 
strengthen the case for an analysis of the extent to which the reforms of the 1990s affected 
employment in these firms. In this chapter, I attempt to estimate the extent to which the 
‘macro’ level formal employment increase is attributable to each major policy reform 
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undertaken in India in the 1990s, at the firm and industry level. The analysis explores 
whether the observed net employment increase masks varying responses to individual 
policies in states with more and less flexible labour markets.  
Table 3: Summary statistics for paid employment* in formal firms (1990-1997) 
Year Observations Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Weighted 
total** 
 
Overall 
       
1990 41463 116.50 24.00 407.02 1 7479 4830441 
1994 47576 116.81 25.67 387.67 1 7619 5557393 
1995 48435 114.71 25.00 369.14 1 6715 5556124 
1997 48724 116.52 26.00 357.97 1 6192 5677288 
Overall 186198 115.12 25.00 379.83 1 7619 21621246 
 
States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
 
1990 23109 114.45 23.00 386.95 1 7282 2644720 
1994 27325 113.21 25.00 367.54 1 6869 3093462 
1995 27830 110.80 25.00 347.13 1 6125 3083672 
1997 28312 113.49 26.00 341.98 1 6192 3213061 
Overall 106576 112.92 25.00 360.04 1 7282 12034915 
 
States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
 
1990 18354 119.09 25.00 430.96 1 7479 2185721 
1994 20251 121.67 27.00 413.25 1 7619 2463931 
1995 20605 119.99 26.00 396.88 1 6715 2472451 
1997 20412 120.72 27.00 379.01 1 5975 2464228 
Overall 79622 120.40 26.00 404.76 1 7619 9586331 
Source: ASI data (1990-1997)   The data are unweighted and apply only to the sample of formal firms surveyed in each 
year.   * The employment distribution for each year has been ‘winsorized’ at the 0.1st and 99.9th percentiles.                     
** This refers to the total number of paid employees in the population represented by the formal firms in the sample 
dataset, derived using the survey weights provided for each firm surveyed in the sample dataset. 
2.4 Method 
The analysis in this chapter harnesses the variation in policy change over time and across 
industries to identify the impact of economic reform on employment, while accounting for 
state level differences in labour market flexibility. 
The preliminary regression that I employ is of the form: 
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛼4𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡         (1)                                                                                                                                      
where ln(emp)ijkt is the natural logarithm of paid employment in firm i in industry j and state 
k at time t; TARjt-2 and INTjt-2 are two year lags of final goods and input tariffs; DELjt-2 and 
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FDIjt-2 are time varying indicator variables capturing whether industry j underwent 
delicensing and FDI regime reforms two years prior to year t; and δt, δj and δk are year, 
industry and state fixed effects. To explore any overarching associations between the 
reforms and average firm level employment, irrespective of variations in state level 
flexibility, I use equation (1) as a primary firm level specification.  
I also use a variant of equation (1) to undertake panel fixed effects analysis at a broader, 
three-digit industry level, for the economy as a whole as well as separately for states with 
flexible and inflexible labour markets. This analysis, discussed in Section 2.5.2, considers the 
implications of the reforms for the ‘extensive margins’ of firm numbers and aggregate 
employment at the industry level (in logarithms). These industry level regressions are 
weighted by the pre-reform (1990) industry levels of the dependent variable in each case. 
Following Martin et al (2017), this analysis is restricted to industries that have ten or more 
firms in each weighted cross-section, a step which omits only a small number of industries. 
The expanded baseline specification that I use to examine the implications of differences in 
state level labour market flexibility is similar to that used by Hasan et al (2012): 
ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡−2𝐿𝑀𝑘 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑡−2𝐿𝑀𝑘 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑗𝑡−2 +
𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑗𝑡−2𝐿𝑀𝑘 + 𝛼4𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡−2𝐿𝑀𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡                                                   (2) 
where LMk is a time invariant indicator variable capturing the degree of labour market 
flexibility in state k (the ‘FLEX 2’ measure) and the other variables follow the description 
provided for equation (1). As LMk is time invariant, its level effect is subsumed within δk, the 
state fixed effects term. 
In the specification presented in equation (1), the overall impact of the reforms on 
employment is the sum of the coefficients α1, α2, α3 and α4. In the expanded specification of 
equation (2), this impact derives from the sums α1 + β1 (for final goods tariff liberalisation), 
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α2 + β2 (for input tariff liberalisation), α3 + β3 (for delicensing) and α4 + β4 (for FDI reform). 
In each instance, the first term captures the direct impact linked with the reform in question, 
whereas the interaction term (involving LMk) presents a measure of the indirect effect 
associated with the interplay between the reform and state level labour market flexibility. 
The sum of the two coefficients thus yields a measure of the net impact of each reform 
measure on average firm level employment. This varies across states, with the interaction 
based effect amounting to zero for states with inflexible labour markets (as the ‘FLEX 2’ 
variable equals zero for these states). 
As discussed in Hasan et al (2012), significant interstate migration flows could pose a threat 
to my identification strategy, by resulting in overestimation of the β coefficients. Although 
my tariff measures are state invariant, it could be argued that substantial tariff declines 
might result in larger numbers of workers moving out of states with more flexible labour 
markets, relative to states with less flexible labour markets. However, as Hasan et al (2012) 
document, work undertaken by Dyson et al (2004), Anant et al (2006), Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2009) and Topalova (2010) suggests that migration within India has tended to 
be insubstantial in recent decades, with interstate migration levels having been particularly 
low. This indicates that any worker flows engendered by the trade reforms were limited, 
with spillovers straddling state borders likely to have been rare. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Baseline regressions: Firm level 
To begin, I assess whether the reforms are associated with statistically significant 
employment shifts at the firm level, irrespective of variations in regional labour market 
flexibility. In the first three columns of Table 4, I therefore run variations of equation (1) 
44 
 
presented in Section 2.4. As specified in Section 2.3.2, all the tariffs are entered into the 
dataset in fractional form (for instance, a tariff of 80 per cent is entered as 0.80). As a result, 
given that the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, we may directly interpret the 
coefficients attaching to the tariff variables as proportional changes associating with a 
percentage point change in the tariffs, without having to multiply them by 100.  
Final goods tariff reductions are associated with a weakly statistically significant reduction 
in paid employment. However, this coefficient is unstable and substantially outweighed by 
the coefficient attaching to the input tariff variable. A one percentage point decline in input 
tariffs is associated with paid employment rising by approximately 0.74 per cent on average 
(Table 4, Column 3), with this result being highly statistically significant across specifications. 
Controlling for final goods and input tariff changes, delicensing and FDI reform are not 
associated with statistically significant changes in paid employment. When I use the natural 
logarithm of total employment as an alternative dependent variable, all the above 
mentioned findings are virtually unchanged (Table 4, Columns 4 to 6). 
Table 4: Economic reforms and employment in formal firms (1990-1997) 
 Dependent variable:  
ln (Paid employment) 
 Dependent variable:  
ln (Total employment) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Final goods tariffs 0.063* 0.055 0.061*  0.061* 0.052 0.059* 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Input tariffs -0.753*** -0.706*** -0.737***  -0.675*** -0.619*** -0.653*** 
 (0.168) (0.170) (0.174)  (0.162) (0.163) (0.167) 
Delicensing 0.019  0.020  0.021  0.023 
 (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
FDI reform  0.005 0.009   0.007 0.012 
  (0.024) (0.025)   (0.023) (0.024) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 160883 160883  160984 160984 160984 
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.204  0.203 0.203 0.203 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees (Columns 1, 2, 3) and natural logarithm of total 
number of persons engaged (Columns 4, 5, 6)   'FE' denotes fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at 
the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
In Table 5, I explore the extent to which state level differences in labour market flexibility 
have a bearing on the effects of the reforms, using alternative forms of the expanded 
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baseline specification of equation (2) discussed in Section 2.4. I focus on the results that are 
statistically significant at the significance level of 0.05. First, I confirm that final goods tariff 
reductions are not associated with significant changes in paid employment in all states, with 
the weakly significant negative effect visible in Table 4 being restricted to states with flexible 
labour markets, as defined using the ‘FLEX 2’ indicator described in Section 2.3.3 (Table 5, 
Row 1 and ‘Row 1 + Row 2’). On the other hand, lower input tariffs are associated with 
significantly increased paid employment in all states. More precisely, in states with inflexible 
labour markets, a one percentage point reduction in input tariffs is associated with paid 
employment rising by 0.68 per cent (Table 5, Column 3, Row 3). In states with flexible labour 
markets, a one percentage point reduction in input tariffs is associated with paid 
employment increasing by 0.66 per cent (Table 5, Column 3, ‘Row 3 + Row 4’). The 
corresponding p-value of 0.001 indicates that this result is highly statistically significant even 
at the 0.01 significance level.  
As the delicensing and FDI reform variables are indicator variables and are not rescaled in a 
manner similar to the tariffs, the coefficients that attach to them must be multiplied by 100 
for appropriate interpretation, given the logarithmic form of the dependent variable. Table 
5 reveals that delicensing is not linked with significant changes in paid employment in all 
states. Interestingly, however, labour market flexibility appears to matter in terms of the 
response of paid employment to FDI reform. In states with inflexible labour markets, FDI 
liberalisation is associated with a significant fall of approximately 11.5 per cent in paid 
employment (Table 5, Column 3, Row 7). Conversely, in states with flexible labour markets, 
FDI liberalisation is associated with paid employment being significantly higher by an 
average of 9.3 per cent (Table 5, Column 3, ‘Row 7 + Row 8’). Again, these results are upheld 
when I use the natural logarithm of total employment as an alternative dependent variable 
(Table 5, Columns 4 to 6). 
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Table 5: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-1997) 
 Dependent variable:  
ln (Paid employment) 
Dependent variable:  
ln (Total employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Final goods tariffs -0.030 -0.037 -0.020 -0.023 -0.031 -0.014 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.070) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.154 0.161 0.132 0.138 0.147 0.117 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.108) 
Input tariffs -0.609*** -0.729*** -0.680*** -0.531** -0.646*** -0.597*** 
 (0.214) (0.202) (0.211) (0.207) (0.195) (0.205) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.182 0.044 0.021 -0.170 0.041 0.018 
 (0.228) (0.211) (0.216) (0.218) (0.204) (0.209) 
Delicensing 0.046 0.021 0.084 0.054 0.024 0.089 
 (0.059) (0.024) (0.061) (0.057) (0.023) (0.059) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.040  -0.098 -0.047  -0.101 
 (0.081)  (0.083) (0.080)  (0.081) 
FDI reform 0.010 -0.105** -0.115** 0.013 -0.092** -0.103** 
 (0.026) (0.045) (0.045) (0.025) (0.043) (0.043) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2  0.191*** 0.208***  0.174*** 0.192*** 
  (0.066) (0.067)  (0.063) (0.063) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.124* 0.124* 0.111* 0.115* 0.116* 0.103* 
Std Error 0.066 0.066 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.059 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.061 0.059 0.078 0.065 0.060 0.082 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.791*** -0.684*** -0.659*** -0.701*** -0.605*** -0.579*** 
Std Error 0.209 0.202 0.199 0.199 0.192 0.190 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.007  -0.013 0.007  -0.012 
Std Error 0.037  0.036 0.036  0.036 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.854  0.707 0.854  0.737 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8  0.086** 0.093**  0.082** 0.089** 
Std Error  0.038 0.039  0.036 0.037 
p-value (combined effect = 0)  0.022 0.017  0.022 0.016 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 160883 160883 160984 160984 160984 
R-squared 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.203 0.204 0.205 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees (Columns 1, 2, 3) and natural logarithm of total 
number of persons engaged (Columns 4, 5, 6)   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered 
at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
To summarise, these results suggest that on the whole, paid employment in India’s formal 
manufacturing firms in the 1990s responded primarily to reduced input tariffs and FDI 
regime changes, and did not register significant changes in response to reductions in final 
goods tariffs and the delicensing reforms. Lower tariffs on inputs go hand-in-hand with 
significantly higher paid employment across all states. FDI reform is associated with a 
significant rise in paid employment in states with flexible labour markets, and a significant 
reduction in paid employment in states with inflexible labour markets.  
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The absence of significance for the baseline final goods tariff coefficients aligns with the 
findings of Kambhampati et al (1997) and Kambhampati and Parikh (2005), which suggest 
that India’s final goods tariff reductions may have had mutually offsetting positive and 
negative impacts, and therefore an insignificant net impact, on formal sector employment, 
on account of their potentially double-edged effects on firm level markups or profitability. 
Employing the alternative, ‘macro’ level techniques of factor content analysis, growth 
accounting and labour demand modelling, Sen (2009) draws broadly the same conclusion. 
Moreover, recent work by De Loecker et al (2016) points to marginal input costs having 
declined more substantially than final output prices following India’s trade liberalisation, on 
account of significant markup increments. Input tariff declines may therefore be a more 
prominent driver of changes in firm level input cost allocation, including for labour input, 
relative to final goods tariff cuts. 
2.5.2 Industry level results 
The results discussed in Section 2.5.1 may be driven either by actual changes in average firm 
level employment in response to the reforms or, alternatively, on account of shifts in the 
‘extensive margins’ of industry level firm numbers or employment. While I am unable to 
study firm entry and exit owing to the lack of firm level panel data, I explore the potential 
for extensive margin shifts by constructing industry level data on firm numbers and 
employment, using the survey weights provided in the firm level data for aggregation. 
Following the discussion in Section 2.4, having thus obtained an industry level panel dataset, 
I regress the natural logarithm of industry level employment or firm numbers on the reform 
variables, controlling for industry and time fixed effects. 
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 6. Input tariff declines and FDI reform, as 
well as final goods tariff reductions, are not associated with significant changes in industry 
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level employment or firm numbers across all states. This suggests that the effects associated 
with the former two reforms in Section 2.5.1 may be restricted to subsets of formal firms, 
or to firms operating in specific industries. Importantly, Table 6 reveals the delicensing 
reform to be associated with significantly increased formal firm numbers in states with 
flexible labour markets, but not in inflexible labour markets. Specifically, over the 1990-1997 
period, delicensing is associated with the number of formal firms rising by between 8 per 
cent and 9 per cent in the average delicensed industry in states with flexible labour markets, 
ceteris paribus. As delicensing is not associated with significant changes in firm level 
employment (Section 2.5.1), this appears to be an effect working purely on the ‘extensive 
margin’ of industry expansion. As delicensing facilitated business creation in industries that 
were previously regulated to a great extent (Section 1.1), this effect may be driven by shifts 
in the product market landscape. I explore this point further in Section 2.5.4. 
Table 6: Economic reforms and formal sector employment: Industry level effects (1990-1997) 
A: All states Dependent variable (in natural logarithms): 
 Paid employment Total employment Number of firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Final goods tariffs 0.042 0.039 -0.057 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.045) 
Input tariffs -0.544 -0.518 0.151 
 (0.363) (0.357) (0.249) 
Delicensing 0.052 0.056 0.079** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.036) 
FDI reform 0.026 0.017 0.019 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.034) 
Observations 556 556 556 
R-squared 0.240 0.215 0.379 
 
B: States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
Final goods tariffs -0.026 -0.043 -0.068 
 (0.118) (0.115) (0.059) 
Input tariffs -0.610 -0.551 0.003 
 (0.441) (0.431) (0.300) 
Delicensing 0.068 0.069 0.086** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.042) 
FDI reform 0.012 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.056) (0.036) 
Observations 520 520 520 
R-squared 0.234 0.213 0.386 
    
C: States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
Final goods tariffs 0.100* 0.113* -0.041 
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.052) 
Input tariffs -0.363 -0.364 0.271 
 (0.412) (0.406) (0.291) 
Delicensing 0.022 0.029 0.045 
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 (0.057) (0.057) (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.035 0.024 0.052 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.038) 
Observations 484 484 484 
R-squared 0.116 0.098 0.169 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of industry level paid employment/ industry level total employment/ number 
of formal firms (Column 1/ Column 2/ Column 3)   All regressions include a constant and industry and year fixed 
effects, and are weighted by pre-reform (1990) levels of the dependent variable. Standard errors, in brackets, are 
robust to heteroscedasticity.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
2.5.3 Implications for the Indian labour market 
The discussion in Section 2.5.1 implies that the changes in paid employment associated with 
the reforms of the 1990s are of a substantial magnitude. The average declines in final goods 
and input tariffs in the manufacturing industries in my dataset for the 1988-1995 period 
amount to 41.3 percentage points and 29.2 percentage points. The median declines in final 
goods and input tariffs for the 1988-1995 period are very similar, amounting to 41.5 
percentage points and 27.8 percentage points respectively. Given these numbers, the 
results discussed in Section 2.5.1 indicate that if other variables are held constant over this 
period, paid employment in formal firms in industries that underwent the median input 
tariff decline increased by approximately 19 per cent in states with inflexible labour markets, 
and by approximately 18 per cent in states with flexible labour markets (I restrict my 
attention to those results that are statistically significant at a significance level of 0.05). As 
an example of how these numbers are arrived at, since a one percentage point fall in input 
tariffs is associated with average paid employment increasing by 0.68 per cent in states with 
inflexible labour markets, the median input tariff reduction of 27.8 percentage points would 
be associated with paid employment increasing by 19 per cent on average in those states 
(27.8 multiplied by 0.68).  
At the same time, as discussed in Section 2.5.1, being in an FDI liberalised industry is 
associated with paid employment decreasing by 11.5 per cent in states with inflexible labour 
markets, and increasing by 9.3 per cent in states with flexible labour markets. Taken 
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together with the above mentioned effects relating to the input tariff declines, this indicates 
that on average and ceteris paribus, paid employment in formal firms in FDI liberalised 
industries that underwent the median input tariff decline increased by 7.5 per cent in states 
with inflexible labour markets. The corresponding effect in states with flexible labour 
markets was substantially higher and amounted to 27.3 per cent, on account of the input 
tariff declines and FDI reforms both being associated with positive employment shifts. Given 
that the mean and median for formal firm employment in the 1990-1997 period amount to 
74 and 20 respectively (Section 2.3.1), these are economically meaningful effects, in 
particular for states with flexible labour markets, where the number of formal firms also 
increased in industries that were delicensed in the 1990s (Section 2.5.2). 
2.5.4 Increases in product market competition 
The reforms of the 1990s arguably led to increased product market competition over time. 
In particular, the sharp reductions in final goods tariffs, as discussed in Section 1.2, resulted 
in Indian manufacturers facing increased import competition. This may have engendered 
domestic product market compositional changes of the type described by the Melitz (2003) 
model, with larger, more productive domestic firms expanding and gaining market share at 
the expense of less productive incumbents. In addition, the delicensing reform streamlined 
the process of setting up a large registered business, thereby creating a more conducive 
environment for new entrants to challenge incumbents in several manufacturing industries. 
While a thorough examination of this potentially crucial driver of employment changes in 
formal firms in the 1990s is perhaps outside the scope of the current study and its data, I 
analyse some of its implications in this subsection. 
First, I exploit the fact that one key manufacturing sector policy was left untouched up to 
1997. This policy instrument, the small scale industry (SSI) reservation policy, is outlined in 
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Section 1.3. Under this policy, Indian policy makers had, over time, reserved specific 
manufactured products for production in small firms, defined in terms of an investment 
threshold. Product information is provided by approximately 85 per cent of the formal firms 
in my dataset. A subset of these firms, accounting for 25 to 30 per cent of formal 
manufacturers in the 1990-1997 period, produce at least one of these reserved products, 
while the rest manufacture products that were never reserved. Firms producing at least one 
reserved product are consistently and significantly smaller than those producing items that 
were never reserved: on average, firms in the former category employ 79 paid persons, 
whereas their counterparts in the second category employ 144 paid persons. 
As the SSI reservations were only lifted in 1997 and thereafter (and for the most part, as 
discussed in Section 1.3, in the post-2000 period), firms producing SSI reserved items are 
likely to have experienced a lower degree of product market competition than other firms. 
I explore this possibility in Table 7. Column 2 of Table 7 contains results that apply to firms 
producing at least one SSI reserved item, which register a general loss of significance relative 
to the baseline. For these firms, declining input tariffs are associated with large and 
significant employment enhancing effects only in states with flexible labour markets. 
Further, the baseline FDI effects lose significance for firms in these less competitive product 
markets (as defined by products that were SSI reserved). In states with inflexible labour 
markets, final goods tariff reductions are associated with a significant increase in 
employment in these firms on average and ceteris paribus, with no corresponding 
significance being obtained for states with flexible labour markets. On the other hand, the 
results of the baseline specification for firms producing items that were never SSI reserved 
(Table 7, Column 3) are very similar to the overall baseline numbers (Table 7, Column 1), 
both for input tariff declines and for FDI liberalisation. This indicates that the competition 
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channel may be relevant to the current analysis, with firm level employment in less 
competitive industries potentially being somewhat less responsive to the reforms. 
Table 7: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-1997): 
Exploring product market competition through the lens of SSI reservation 
 Baseline (All firms) Firms producing at least 
one SSI reserved item  
(less competitive) 
Firms producing 
(only) items that were 
never SSI reserved 
(more competitive) 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 -0.373** 0.089 
 (0.075) (0.179) (0.055) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.132 0.677** -0.037 
 (0.115) (0.321) (0.077) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.131 -0.698*** 
 (0.211) (0.401) (0.221) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.021 -0.759 0.198 
 (0.216) (0.486) (0.236) 
Delicensing 0.084 0.127* 0.067 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.062) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.098 -0.087 -0.129 
 (0.083) (0.088) (0.091) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.022 -0.098** 
 (0.045) (0.068) (0.039) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.208*** 0.094 0.164*** 
 (0.067) (0.081) (0.054) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.305* 0.052 
Std Error 0.063 0.183 0.057 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.078 0.096 0.362 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.891** -0.500** 
Std Error 0.199 0.406 0.215 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.001 0.029 0.020 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 0.040 -0.063 
Std Error 0.036 0.062 0.043 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.707 0.516 0.143 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.072 0.066* 
Std Error 0.039 0.057 0.036 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.017 0.205 0.071 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 41529 94764 
R-squared 0.205 0.171 0.235 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
An alternative measure of competition in three digit industries in the formal sector is the 
four firm concentration ratio (CR4), which captures the proportion of each industry’s output 
that is accounted for by the four largest firms in that industry. The lower the CR4 estimate, 
the more competitive an industry may be perceived to be, as the largest firms account for a 
relatively small share of industry output. Conversely, industries with higher CR4 ratios are 
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arguably less competitive, with the largest firms commanding a more substantial market 
share. The data reveal that the CR4 estimate declined in most (90 per cent of) three digit 
manufacturing industries in the 1990-1995 period, which is suggestive of increases in 
product market competition driven by the economic liberalisation of the 1990s.  
I compute the CR4 statistic for every three digit industry in 1990, with output measured in 
terms of gross sale values, and run the baseline specification separately for industries with 
concentration ratios above and below the 1990 median. The results are presented in Table 
8. I find that the employment enhancing effects of lower input tariffs apply to firms in both 
groups of industries in states with inflexible labour markets, but hold only for more 
competitive industries (characterised by a CR4 ratio below the 1990 median) in states with 
flexible labour markets. The baseline FDI effects are robust only in the case of more 
competitive industries. Further, in states with flexible labour markets, delicensing is 
associated with significant increases in firm level employment only in less competitive 
industries, a finding that I discuss further below. 
Table 8: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-1997): 
Analysis based on four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in 1990 (the proportion of industry level output 
accounted for by the four largest firms in 1990) 
 Baseline (All 
firms) 
Firms in industries with 
CR4 above median in 1990 
(less competitive) 
Firms in industries with 
CR4 below median in 1990 
(more competitive) 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 0.226** -0.053 
 (0.075) (0.110) (0.083) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.132 -0.136 0.157 
 (0.115) (0.127) (0.127) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.915** -0.626*** 
 (0.211) (0.450) (0.230) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.021 0.877** -0.021 
 (0.216) (0.346) (0.236) 
Delicensing 0.084 -0.057 0.093 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.071) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.098 0.212*** -0.129 
 (0.083) (0.074) (0.097) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.106 -0.123** 
 (0.045) (0.069) (0.049) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.208*** 0.208** 0.222*** 
 (0.067) (0.097) (0.072) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.089 0.104 
Std Error 0.063 0.113 0.070 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.078 0.431 0.139 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
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Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.039 -0.647*** 
Std Error 0.199 0.423 0.223 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.001 0.927 0.004 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 0.155*** -0.036 
Std Error 0.036 0.058 0.041 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.707 0.007 0.385 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.103 0.099** 
Std Error 0.039 0.078 0.042 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.017 0.190 0.020 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 23244 137639 
R-squared 0.205 0.210 0.206 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Further, in Table 9, I undertake industry level regressions separately for industries 
characterised by higher and lower CR4 ratios as defined for Table 8, to explore whether the 
results discussed in Section 2.5.2 are different for these industry groups. The finding that 
delicensing is associated with a significant ceteris paribus increase in the number of formal 
firms in the average industry in states with flexible labour markets, holds only for more 
competitive industries (in other words, industries with lower CR4 ratios). This is supportive 
of the notion that the effects which I observe in the baseline are driven, at least to some 
extent, by product market competition.  
Table 9: Economic reforms and formal sector employment: Industry level effects for firm numbers 
(1990-1997) based on four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in 1990 
A: All states Dependent variable: ln (number of formal firms in three digit industry) 
 All industries Industries with CR4 
above median in 1990 
(less competitive) 
Industries with CR4 
below median in 1990 
(more competitive) 
Final goods tariffs -0.057 0.097 -0.064 
 (0.045) (0.078) (0.054) 
Input tariffs 0.151 -0.922* 0.208 
 (0.249) (0.489) (0.291) 
Delicensing 0.079** -0.046 0.096** 
 (0.036) (0.078) (0.044) 
FDI reform 0.019 0.015 0.019 
 (0.034) (0.061) (0.038) 
Observations 556 252 304 
R-squared 0.379 0.167 0.458 
 
B: States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
Final goods tariffs -0.068 -0.023 -0.054 
 (0.059) (0.081) (0.069) 
Input tariffs 0.003 -0.890* -0.050 
 (0.300) (0.528) (0.360) 
Delicensing 0.086** -0.042 0.112** 
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 (0.042) (0.087) (0.051) 
FDI reform -0.005 -0.032 -0.011 
 (0.036) (0.085) (0.041) 
Observations 520 224 296 
R-squared 0.386 0.139 0.472 
    
C: States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
Final goods tariffs -0.041 0.166 -0.062 
 (0.052) (0.132) (0.060) 
Input tariffs 0.271 -0.727 0.367 
 (0.291) (0.612) (0.322) 
Delicensing 0.045 -0.018 0.051 
 (0.037) (0.102) (0.042) 
FDI reform 0.052 0.122 0.046 
 (0.038) (0.081) (0.041) 
Observations 484 184 300 
R-squared 0.169 0.110 0.217 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of industry level number of formal firms   All regressions include a constant and 
industry and year fixed effects, and are weighted by pre-reform (1990) levels of the dependent variable. Standard errors, 
in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
In Table 9, delicensing is not associated with significant shifts in formal employment and 
enterprise numbers in less competitive industries. Viewed in light of the results in Table 8, 
which suggest that delicensing is linked with increased employment in the average firm in 
less competitive industries, this may be interpreted as a sign of less competitive industries 
having been more vulnerable to Melitz (2003) type structural changes, with smaller, less 
productive formal firms exiting the market following increased competition in the post-
reform period. In the absence of a firm level panel, however, caution is warranted in this 
context. 
2.5.5 Composition of employment 
The baseline regressions discussed in Section 2.5.1 focus on the implications of the 
economic reforms of the 1990s for overall firm level employment, with paid employment 
being the key dependent variable. This variable comprises workers who are directly 
employed by firms, workers hired through contractors (or ‘contract workers’), supervisory 
and managerial employees and other paid personnel (such as staff working on sales, 
marketing and administration issues). I proceed to analyse whether the impacts of the 
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reforms differ across these employee categories.  
This exercise yields a number of nuanced findings. Given that directly employed male 
workers tend to account for a majority of paid employees in most firms in the dataset, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the baseline results apply most prominently to this group (Table 
10, Column 1). Approximately one third of firms report having directly employed female 
workers, but the only result of significance for this category is increased employment in 
firms in states with flexible labour markets, in response to the input tariff declines (Table 
10, Column 2).  
Although employed by a little less than 20 per cent of firms in the sample, contract workers 
constitute a case of some interest in this context, as state level labour market laws do not 
apply to them. As such, firms may have sought to hire more contract workers, relative to 
direct hires, in the post-reform period. I find that across all states, input tariff declines are 
not associated with significant shifts in contract employment (Table 10, Column 3). 
However, FDI reform is associated with a significant rise in the average number of contract 
workers hired by firms in states with flexible labour markets, with no effect of significance 
visible in states with inflexible labour markets.  
In essence, in states with flexible labour markets, FDI reform is on average associated with 
increases in the number of directly employed adult male workers and contract workers, as 
also other staff (Table 10, Column 5),  at the firm level. In states with inflexible labour 
markets, FDI reform is associated with reduced employment of directly hired adult male 
workers, supervisory or managerial employees and other staff (Table 10, Columns 1, 4 and 
5). On the other hand, the baseline employment enhancing effect associated with lower 
input tariffs is reflected in significant increases in firm level employment of directly hired 
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adult male workers in all states, with no corresponding significance attaching to contract 
employment.  
Table 10: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Results by employee type 
 Directly 
employed 
adult male 
workers 
Directly 
employed 
adult female 
workers 
Contract 
workers 
Supervisory/ 
managerial 
level 
employees 
Other 
employees 
Final goods tariffs 0.059 -0.114 -0.138 0.098** 0.031 
 (0.059) (0.143) (0.107) (0.047) (0.057) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.016 0.225 0.245* -0.018 -0.001 
 (0.088) (0.167) (0.129) (0.063) (0.084) 
Input tariffs -0.676*** -0.222 0.025 -0.275 -0.323 
 (0.212) (0.369) (0.412) (0.196) (0.206) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.223 -0.552* -0.204 -0.034 0.405** 
 (0.198) (0.331) (0.378) (0.190) (0.192) 
Delicensing 0.032 0.225* 0.204 0.019 -0.018 
 (0.039) (0.125) (0.144) (0.049) (0.034) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.055 -0.208 -0.202 -0.067 -0.020 
 (0.053) (0.143) (0.178) (0.059) (0.044) 
FDI reform -0.117*** -0.191* 0.035 -0.094*** -0.106*** 
 (0.041) (0.109) (0.081) (0.035) (0.032) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.180*** 0.211 0.196** 0.105*** 0.193*** 
 (0.055) (0.132) (0.088) (0.039) (0.046) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.043 0.111 0.107 0.080* 0.030 
Std Error 0.055 0.072 0.106 0.045 0.054 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.428 0.126 0.313 0.078 0.578 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.452** -0.774*** -0.179 -0.310* 0.082 
Std Error 0.205 0.265 0.430 0.182 0.176 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.027 0.004 0.677 0.089 0.641 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.023 0.017 0.001 -0.048* -0.037 
Std Error 0.029 0.049 0.083 0.028 0.026 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.430 0.729 0.987 0.087 0.148 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.062** 0.021 0.231*** 0.011 0.087*** 
Std Error 0.032 0.049 0.078 0.026 0.029 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.049 0.674 0.003 0.667 0.003 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 153284 51979 30221 122368 131267 
R-squared 0.219 0.312 0.187 0.149 0.181 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of employees of the relevant type (as specified in column headings)   
'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 
1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
An additional possibility is that the number of firms employing contract workers or using 
imported inputs, or both, may have increased in the post-reform period. Saha et al (2013) 
find that rises in import penetration in India in the 1998-2004 period went hand-in-hand 
with increased employment of contract workers, particularly in states with relatively 
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inflexible labour markets. Table 11 examines this question at the industry level and indicates 
that FDI reform is associated with a significant increase in the number of firms hiring 
contract labour at the industry level. In line with the firm level results presented in Table 10, 
this increase is restricted to states with flexible labour markets. No significance attaches to 
the tariff variables and delicensing, which suggests that the findings of Saha et al (2013) may 
be restricted to the post-1997 period. As regards the number of firms using imported inputs, 
no significance is visible for any of the reform variables in Table 11.  
Table 11: Economic reforms and formal sector employment: Industry level effects for the number 
of firms employing contract workers / using imported inputs (1990-1997) 
A: All states ln (number of firms employing 
contract workers) 
ln (number of firms using 
imported inputs) 
Final goods tariffs -0.082 -0.148 
 (0.117) (0.194) 
Input tariffs -0.739 1.986 
 (0.518) (1.251) 
Delicensing 0.087 -0.215 
 (0.082) (0.262) 
FDI reform 0.135* -0.320 
 (0.077) (0.260) 
Observations 544 479 
R-squared 0.251 0.507 
   
B: States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
Final goods tariffs -0.168 -0.316 
 (0.143) (0.237) 
Input tariffs -0.539 2.231 
 (0.629) (1.477) 
Delicensing 0.103 -0.160 
 (0.097) (0.243) 
FDI reform 0.219** -0.176 
 (0.097) (0.261) 
Observations 504 440 
R-squared 0.224 0.433 
   
C: States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
Final goods tariffs -0.096 -0.208 
 (0.117) (0.247) 
Input tariffs -0.318 1.181 
 (0.707) (1.264) 
Delicensing 0.001 -0.298 
 (0.097) (0.202) 
FDI reform 0.065 -0.095 
 (0.085) (0.191) 
Observations 467 378 
R-squared 0.144 0.384 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of formal firms employing contract workers/ using imported inputs   
All regressions include a constant and industry and year fixed effects, and are weighted by pre-reform (1990) levels of 
the dependent variable. Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: 
Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
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2.6 Further analysis and robustness checks 
2.6.1 Trade orientation 
Employment shifts at the firm level in the post-reform period may have varied across 
industries characterised by different degrees of trade orientation, in terms of export 
intensity or import competition. The first two columns of Table 12 present results for export 
oriented industries and other industries as classified by Nouroz (2001). In this context, it is 
important to note that the industries considered by Nouroz (2001) follow the industry 
classification used in India’s Input-Output Transactions Table (IOTT) of 1990, which uses 
broader industry headings relative to the NIC (1987) industry codes, so that over 130 NIC 
industries correspond to 62 IOTT industry groups (Section 2.3.2). Nevertheless, in Table 12, 
I find that the baseline significance attaching to FDI reform is upheld only for firms in 
industries not classified as being export oriented by Nouroz (2001). As regards the input 
tariff coefficients, significance is lost (at the 5 per cent significance level) for firms in export 
oriented industries, but is retained for other industries. In summary, employment in firms 
in export oriented industries appears to have been less responsive to the reforms.  
As only a fairly small number of industries are classified as being export oriented by Nouroz 
(2001), I use data on industrial exports and imports, obtained from India’s IOTT of 1990, to 
undertake an alternative check in this direction. I compute export-output and import-output 
ratios for each IOTT industry group and divide the firms in my sample into groups defined 
by whether these ratios are above or below the median for their industry of operation. The 
results obtained using this mode of industry grouping are presented in the final four columns 
of Table 12. As regards export orientation, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 12 confirm that input 
tariff declines are associated with significant employment shifts in non-export oriented 
industries (with export-output ratios falling below the 1990 median). However, the baseline 
60 
 
findings associated with FDI reform appear to be restricted to firms in export oriented 
industries (with export-output ratios exceeding the 1990 median). 
In terms of import-output ratios, I find that all my baseline results of significance hold for 
industries where these ratios are below the 1990 median (Column 5 and Column 6, Table 
12). Conversely, as might be expected, the coefficients attaching to final goods tariffs are 
larger (although still not statistically significant) in the case of industries with import-output 
ratios exceeding the 1990 median. This provides further suggestive evidence that 
collinearity between the final goods and input tariffs reductions is unlikely to be an issue for 
this thesis. 
Table 12: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-1997): 
Results by trade orientation of industry of operation 
 Export 
oriented 
(Nouroz 
2001) 
Non-
export 
oriented 
(Nouroz 
2001) 
Export-
output 
ratio 
above 
median 
(1990 
IOTT) 
Export-
output 
ratio 
below 
median 
(1990 
IOTT) 
Import-
output 
ratio 
above 
median 
(1990 
IOTT) 
Import-
output 
ratio 
below 
median 
(1990 
IOTT) 
Final goods tariffs -0.723 -0.017 -0.318* 0.127** -0.071 -0.002 
 (0.573) (0.075) (0.167) (0.051) (0.072) (0.087) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.349 0.126 0.539** -0.074 0.200** 0.076 
 (0.587) (0.115) (0.247) (0.075) (0.094) (0.137) 
Input tariffs -1.742** -0.620*** -0.121 -0.898*** 0.167 -0.773*** 
 (0.837) (0.217) (0.390) (0.257) (0.294) (0.254) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.293 0.044 -0.388 -0.057 -0.266 0.018 
 (0.428) (0.228) (0.432) (0.244) (0.213) (0.289) 
Delicensing -0.208* 0.123* -0.024 0.076 0.029 0.141* 
 (0.123) (0.067) (0.051) (0.080) (0.050) (0.079) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 0.178 -0.145 0.033 -0.058 0.003 -0.164 
 (0.154) (0.092) (0.060) (0.121) (0.068) (0.108) 
FDI reform -0.061 -0.119** -0.153*** -0.020 -0.041 -0.151** 
 (0.110) (0.048) (0.058) (0.055) (0.044) (0.065) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 -0.029 0.255*** 0.253*** 0.014 0.058 0.249** 
 (0.129) (0.071) (0.077) (0.072) (0.048) (0.097) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs    
Row 1 + Row 2 -0.374 0.109* 0.221* 0.053 0.129* 0.075 
Std Error 0.439 0.064 0.114 0.061 0.074 0.080 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.394 0.089 0.052 0.383 0.081 0.353 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs    
Row 3 + Row 4 -2.035*** -0.576*** -0.509* -0.955*** -0.099 -0.755*** 
Std Error 0.776 0.207 0.299 0.288 0.284 0.250 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.009 0.005 0.089 0.001 0.727 0.003 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing    
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.030 -0.022 0.008 0.018 0.032 -0.022 
Std Error 0.075 0.040 0.042 0.056 0.044 0.046 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.692 0.579 0.839 0.750 0.466 0.624 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform    
Row 7 + Row 8 -0.090 0.136*** 0.100** -0.006 0.017 0.099* 
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Std Error 0.082 0.040 0.049 0.044 0.038 0.053 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.276 0.001 0.040 0.892 0.646 0.065 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23887 136996 96814 64069 57795 103088 
R-squared 0.179 0.214 0.179 0.252 0.108 0.257 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
2.6.2 Endogeneity of tariff liberalisation policy 
As explained in Section 1.2, the tariff declines that were phased in during the initial years of 
reform (1991-1997) were arguably an exogenous event, although tariff policy endogeneity 
might be an issue in the post-1997 period, when the pressure to adhere to externally 
imposed guidelines had waned. Bown and Tovar (2011) present evidence which suggests 
that political economy considerations acquired considerable importance in the formulation 
of India’s trade policy in the late 1990s, as opposed to their having been of little relevance 
to the tariff liberalisation episode of 1991-1997. Although my dataset focuses on 
employment shifts in the 1990-1997 period, I explore whether tariff endogeneity poses 
problems for my results in a number of ways.  
First, I regress final goods and input tariffs on lagged industry level employment (in 
logarithmic and absolute terms) and lagged industry employment shares for the formal 
sector in alternative specifications, including year and industry fixed effects throughout. The 
time lags used vary over one to three years. In all instances, as demonstrated in Table 13, 
there is no evidence of any association between formal industry employment levels and 
tariff rates in later years.   
Table 13: Tariff endogeneity check – regression of tariffs on lagged formal industry employment 
Period (dependent variable) t+1 t+2 t+3 
 
Dependent variable: Final goods tariffs 
ln (Formal employment – paid) 0.005810 0.017725 0.025388 
 (0.061842) (0.023411) (0.019702) 
ln (Formal employment – total) 0.004561 0.019872 0.023948 
 (0.061523) (0.022773) (0.019359) 
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Absolute formal employment (paid) -0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Share of formal employment (paid) -4.120364* -0.750120 0.803087 
 (1.600927) (0.924981) (0.895980) 
 
Dependent variable: Input tariffs 
ln (Formal employment – paid) -0.036929 0.000577 -0.000784 
 (0.031397) (0.008518) (0.006740) 
ln (Formal employment – total) -0.032653 0.002355 -0.000268 
 (0.029948) (0.008517) (0.006744) 
Absolute formal employment (paid) -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Share of formal employment (paid) -6.129283** -0.745511 0.048776 
 (2.239942) (0.534617) (0.513832) 
The independent variables are measured in period t. All specifications include period and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroscedasticity.           ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   
*: Significant at 10% 
Second, I run separate regressions of the changes in final goods and input tariffs on the 
lagged changes in formal industry level paid employment, including period and industry 
fixed effects throughout. As evidenced in Table 14, there is no significant association 
between changes in formal employment and tariff changes in subsequent periods. Topalova 
and Khandelwal (2011) report that the changes in final goods tariffs and input tariffs in the 
1987-1997 period are not significantly associated with a wide range of 1987 formal industry 
characteristics, including log employment, log output and the capital-to-labour ratio. In 
Table 14, I also confirm that the period-to-period final goods and input tariff changes are 
not correlated with pre-existing formal industry employment levels. 
Table 14: Tariff endogeneity check – regression of changes in tariffs on lagged changes in formal 
paid employment (industry level) 
Period (dependent variable) t+1 t+2 t+3 
 
Dependent variable: Change in final goods tariffs 
Change in ln (formal employment) 0.097508 0.057736 0.022285 
 (0.076559) (0.044515) (0.035028) 
ln (formal employment) 0.219995* 0.097065 0.074310 
 (0.107854) (0.057578) (0.057011) 
Change in absolute formal employment 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001* 
 (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000000) 
Absolute formal employment 0.000002** 0.000001* 0.000002* 
 (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
 
Dependent variable: Change in input tariffs 
Change in ln (formal employment) 0.019153 0.014280 -0.001239 
 (0.024563) (0.015291) (0.010634) 
ln (formal employment) 0.069189* 0.003984 0.007497 
 (0.031352) (0.016301) (0.013051) 
Change in absolute formal employment 0.000001* 0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.000001) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
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Absolute formal employment 0.000002 -0.000000 -0.000000 
 (0.000001) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
The independent variables are measured in period t. All specifications include period and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroscedasticity.           ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   
*: Significant at 10% 
As an additional check, I drop two industries that were highly protected in the pre-reform 
period, yet were subjected to visibly low tariff declines relative to other industries with 
comparably high tariff rates in the 1991-1997 period3. Figure 2(a) in Section 1.2 suggests 
that some endogeneity may have seeped into tariff policy as regards these two industries 
even in the face of the IMF backed reforms of 1991, given that the high degree of tariff 
protection enjoyed by these industries in the pre-reform period was relaxed to a lesser 
extent in the reform years relative to other industries with comparably high pre-reform 
tariffs. Column 2 of Table 15 reveals that the omission of these outliers leaves the baseline 
results virtually unchanged in terms of both magnitude and significance (the comparison is 
with the figures presented in Table 5, Column 3, which are reproduced in Column 1 of Table 
15 for convenience).  
2.6.3 Additional checks 
To assess whether my results are influenced by state level characteristics other than the 
flexibility of labour market regulation, I run a regression in which I add state-year interaction 
fixed effects to my baseline specification. The results, presented in Column 3 of Table 15, 
indicate that all the baseline results are similar in magnitude and significance following the 
addition of these interactions. This suggests that the baseline statistical significance of the 
interplay between the reforms and labour market flexibility is retained after accounting for 
other state level trends. 
Table 15: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-1997): 
                                                          
3 These industries are the wine manufacturing industry and the distillation, rectification and blending of spirits 
industry. See Figure 1(a). 
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Tariff endogeneity check – Dropping outlier industries (Wine manufacturing and the distillation, 
rectification and blending of spirits) and adding state-year interaction fixed effects 
 Baseline (All firms) Dropping outlier 
industries 
Adding state-year 
interactions 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 -0.085 -0.016 
 (0.075) (0.090) (0.075) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.132 0.241* 0.133 
 (0.115) (0.141) (0.114) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.583** -0.984*** 
 (0.211) (0.228) (0.281) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.021 -0.141 0.445 
 (0.216) (0.254) (0.377) 
Delicensing 0.084 0.085 0.099 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.098 -0.100 -0.118 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.091) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.113** -0.117*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.208*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.070) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs  
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.156** 0.117* 
Std Error 0.063 0.075 0.063 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.078 0.037 0.062 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs  
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.725*** -0.539** 
Std Error 0.199 0.210 0.228 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.001 0.001 0.018 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing  
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 -0.015 -0.019 
Std Error 0.036 0.036 0.040 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.707 0.676 0.641 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform  
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.091** 0.083** 
Std Error 0.039 0.039 0.038 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.017 0.019 0.031 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE No No Yes 
Observations 160883 160255 160883 
R-squared 0.205 0.204 0.207 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Next, as an initial round of delicensing had been undertaken for some industries in 1985-86 
(Section 1.1), it could be argued that firms in these industries may have responded 
differently to the reforms of the 1990s. I therefore examine whether the results differ for 
firms in industries that were delicensed by 1986, as opposed to the remainder (a large 
majority of which were delicensed in 1991). The key baseline results for input tariff declines 
hold for both groups of industries (Column 2 and Column 3, Table 16). However, I find that 
FDI liberalisation had a significant effect on employment in formal firms only in industries 
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that were delicensed by 1986. This may be suggestive of the chronology of different reform 
measures being relevant to future, longer run analyses of reform impacts.  
In light of recent work by Haltiwanger et al (2013) that suggests that young firms may be 
likely to grow faster than older firms in general, I proceed to include a control for firm age, 
captured in terms of the number of years of operation reported by the firms surveyed in my 
dataset (Column 4, Table 16). While this variable is subject to some measurement error, I 
find that my findings are robust to its inclusion. Further, using either of the ‘FLEX 1’ or ‘FLEX 
3’ variables discussed in Section 2.3.3 as an index of state level labour market flexibility, 
instead of the ‘FLEX 2’ indicator used in the baseline, does not lead to substantial changes 
in the results (Column 5 and Column 6, Table 16). While these measures are positively 
correlated, it is reassuring to note that the headline findings do not hinge on the use of a 
particular measure. 
Table 16: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Robustness checks – Accounting for the timing of delicensing, firm age, and alternative 
measures of labour market flexibility 
 Baseline 
(All firms) 
Delicensed 
by 1986 
Not 
delicensed 
by 1986 
Controlling 
for firm age 
FLEX 1 
instead of 
FLEX 2 
FLEX 3 
instead of 
FLEX 2 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 -0.135 0.110* -0.045 0.068 0.071 
 (0.075) (0.096) (0.066) (0.075) (0.054) (0.061) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 0.132 0.392** -0.156* 0.165 -0.011 0.009 
 (0.115) (0.153) (0.083) (0.116) (0.122) (0.120) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.722** -0.823*** -0.600*** -0.846*** -0.961*** 
 (0.211) (0.289) (0.254) (0.203) (0.201) (0.230) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 0.021 -0.014 0.281 -0.049 0.740*** 0.580** 
 (0.216) (0.252) (0.264) (0.210) (0.265) (0.262) 
Delicensing 0.084   0.092 0.061 0.034 
 (0.061)   (0.062) (0.042) (0.050) 
Delicensing * FLEX -0.098   -0.094 -0.103 -0.038 
 (0.083)   (0.084) (0.083) (0.088) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.158*** 0.021 -0.113** -0.071** -0.094*** 
 (0.045) (0.050) (0.067) (0.045) (0.028) (0.035) 
FDI reform * FLEX 0.208*** 0.304*** -0.060 0.208*** 0.200*** 0.230*** 
 (0.067) (0.081) (0.096) (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) 
Firm age    0.008***   
    (0.001)   
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.257*** -0.046 0.120* 0.057 0.081 
Std Error 0.063 0.092 0.063 0.064 0.089 0.080 
p-value (combined effect = 
0) 
0.078 0.005 0.469 0.060 0.517 0.313 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.736** -0.542** -0.649*** -0.106 -0.381* 
Std Error 0.199 0.305 0.266 0.192 0.203 0.203 
66 
 
p-value (combined effect = 
0) 
0.001 0.016 0.042 0.001 0.602 0.061 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013   -0.003 -0.042 -0.004 
Std Error 0.036   0.035 0.053 0.050 
p-value (combined effect = 
0) 
0.707   0.944 0.430 0.937 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.147*** -0.040 0.095** 0.129** 0.136*** 
Std Error 0.039 0.053 0.058 0.040 0.060 0.051 
p-value (combined effect = 
0) 
0.017 0.006 0.495 0.017 0.031 0.008 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 77692 83191 159872 160883 160883 
R-squared 0.205 0.099 0.277 0.211 0.206 0.206 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   The measure of labour market flexibility used in Columns 1, 2, 3 
and 4 is the ‘FLEX 2’ measure, whereas Columns 5 and 6 use alternative measures, as specified in the column 
headings. ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
In all of the results presented so far in this chapter, the reform measures have been lagged 
by two years. In Table 17, I examine the extent to which the baseline figures in Table 5 
(Column 3) are affected if a one-year or three-year lag is used instead of a two-year lag. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 17 suggest that these modifications yield figures that are similar 
in magnitude and significance to the baseline numbers. Further, the exclusion of any one of 
the post-reform cross-sections that I use also leaves the baseline findings largely unchanged 
(Table 17, Columns 4 to 6), which indicates that the results discussed in Section 2.5.1 are 
not heavily reliant on retaining a specific post-reform survey sample in the dataset.  
Table 17: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Robustness checks – Modifying the baseline reform time lag and excluding individual post-
reform cross-sections 
 Baseline 
(All firms, 
time lag: 2 
years) 
Time lag: 
1 year 
Time lag: 
3 years 
Excluding 
1994 
Excluding 
1995 
Excluding 
1997 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 -0.039 -0.084 -0.041 -0.015 0.003 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.065) (0.079) (0.069) (0.070) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.132 0.165 0.126 0.178 0.122 0.120 
 (0.115) (0.123) (0.098) (0.119) (0.103) (0.101) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.574*** -0.306** -0.766*** -0.703*** -0.866*** 
 (0.211) (0.197) (0.154) (0.226) (0.212) (0.225) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.021 -0.090 -0.062 -0.062 0.014 0.261 
 (0.216) (0.199) (0.196) (0.216) (0.199) (0.229) 
Delicensing 0.084 0.085 0.088 0.066 0.078 0.060 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.098 -0.100 -0.115 -0.074 -0.076 -0.057 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.080) (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.112** -0.092** -0.109** -0.118*** -0.123*** 
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 (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.208*** 0.203*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.209*** 0.214*** 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.127** 0.042 0.137** 0.107* 0.122** 
Std Error 0.063 0.061 0.047 0.065 0.061 0.062 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.078 0.037 0.367 0.035 0.080 0.049 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.665*** -0.368** -0.829*** -0.689*** -0.604*** 
Std Error 0.199 0.172 0.153 0.217 0.204 0.202 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.001 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 -0.015 -0.027 -0.007 0.002 0.004 
Std Error 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.037 0.034 0.035 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.707 0.691 0.431 0.841 0.947 0.919 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.091** 0.108*** 0.090** 0.091** 0.091** 
Std Error 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.040 0.038 0.039 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.017 0.017 0.004 0.027 0.018 0.020 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 160883 160883 119735 119075 118602 
R-squared 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.204 0.209 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Results deriving from a battery of supplementary checks are also presented in the Appendix. 
First, Column 2 of Table A1 shows that the baseline findings are robust to changing the ‘FLEX 
2’ indicator value for Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir from 0 to 1 (following the discussion in 
Section 2.3.1). Second, Column 3 of Table A1 shows that dropping formal firms that report 
having fewer than ten paid employees does not affect the headline estimates. Third, Column 
4 of Table A1 establishes that including formal firms that report zero or missing values for 
raw material use and/or physical product manufacturing does not affect the baseline 
results. Fourth, as stated in Section 2.3.2, I find that the input tariff coefficients lose 
statistical significance, although their signs are unchanged, if input tariffs based only on 
manufacturing industry final goods tariffs are used instead of the baseline input tariffs, 
which are based on final goods tariffs applying to both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries (Column 5, Table A1). This is arguably only a minor concern in the 
context of the current study, as the baseline input tariffs are a more comprehensive 
measure of input costs given that they account for changes in the real prices of non-
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manufacturing industry inputs, especially as regards agricultural goods, while the alternative 
‘manufacturing only’ input tariffs do not account for the same. Topalova (2010) presents 
evidence that India’s final goods tariffs on agricultural products excepting cereals and 
oilseeds were slashed in tandem with the manufacturing industry tariff cuts of the 1990s. 
This suggests that a measure of manufacturing sector input tariffs that accounts for real 
price changes in agricultural markets is preferable to an alternative that fails to do so. 
Furthermore, Nataraj (2011) notes that while India’s tariff reductions were applied virtually 
to the entire manufacturing sector in the 1990s, non-tariff barriers (such as import licensing) 
were relaxed more selectively, with protection for consumer goods being maintained for a 
longer period. In Column 2 and Column 3 of Table A2, I explore whether the baseline findings 
differ for firms in consumer and capital (or basic) goods industries, as classified in Nouroz 
(2001). The significance of the input tariff effects is robust for both groups of industries 
across all states. However, in states with flexible labour markets, these effects are 
substantially stronger for firms in capital goods industries, which may be attributable to the 
simultaneous dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers in these industries. Interestingly, 
FDI reform significantly associates with employment shifts only in consumer goods 
industries, which may be an artefact of the sequencing of FDI liberalisation in India in the 
1990s.  
Goldberg et al (2010) document that India’s trade reforms, in particular the lowering in 
imported input prices, led to an increase in output in the manufacturing sector on account 
of firms using a wider range of inputs. As this effect may have been stronger for multi-
product manufacturers, I examine whether employment impacts are stronger for these 
firms, as opposed to single product manufacturers (Column 4 and Column 5, Table A2). This 
reveals that the baseline results are indeed stronger for firms manufacturing multiple 
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products, which is in line with the findings of De Loecker et al (2016). In addition, I confirm 
that my findings are driven by firms that are wholly privately owned, which comprise over 
90 per cent of the sample (Column 6 and Column 7, Table A2). Finally, following Aghion et 
al (2008), I establish that dropping individual states from the analysis leaves the baseline 
findings largely unchanged in magnitude and significance (Tables A3, A4 and A5).  
2.7 Concluding comments 
This chapter exploits the initiation of a quasi-exogenous round of tariff liberalisation and 
concurrent domestic policy reform to examine changes in employment in formal Indian 
manufacturing firms in the 1990s. It also analyses the extent to which differences in state 
level labour market flexibility influence these changes.  
The results point to input tariff declines and FDI reform, hitherto virtually ignored by the 
literature exploring post-liberalisation employment shifts, being associated with significant 
employment shifts in formal firms. Lower input tariffs are associated with employment gains 
across all states, with the average formal firm hiring more directly employed workers 
following declines tariffs in input supplying industries. FDI reform is, on average, associated 
with reduced employment in firms in states with inflexible labour markets, with this 
reduction visible across all categories of permanent (non-contract based) employment. On 
the other hand, in states with flexible labour markets, FDI reform is associated with 
increments in firm level employment, encompassing directly employed workers as well as 
contract workers. At a broader, industry level, the delicensing reform is associated with 
significant increases in formal firm numbers, only in states with flexible labour markets. 
In summary, India’s import tariff reductions in the 1990s affected formal firm level 
employment more on account of cheaper input costs benefiting manufacturers across the 
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country, as opposed to effects driven by changes in final goods tariffs. The latter could be 
surmised to be more dependent on responses from existing and potential importers, which 
might undergo a longer run transition. Future research could examine this question further, 
in addition to probing the implications for FDI policy reform for longer term FDI inflows and 
their employment implications. 
The evidence is supportive of the baseline results being driven by product market 
competition within the formal sector. Both the firm and industry level findings are robust in 
magnitude and significance for industries characterised as being more competitive. In 
particular, the employment changes associated with delicensing and FDI reform tend to be 
restricted to more competitive industries, highlighting the relevance of competition to 
structural change and, potentially, improved formal sector productivity in the longer run. 
While other mechanisms such as value chain linkages involving formal (and possibly 
informal) businesses may also have a role to play, they are beyond the scope of the current 
study and dataset. 
The results of this study derive from a dataset that shows evidence of robustness, as regards 
employment shifts, to tariff endogeneity concerns. They retain significance following minor 
changes to the baseline time lag and dataset composition (in terms of the inclusion or 
omission of specific post-reform survey cross-sections). There is some evidence that the 
employment enhancing effects associated with reductions in input tariffs are more 
prominent in industries that are relatively less export oriented and import intensive. This 
may be indicative of vertical linkages or agglomeration externalities that operate across 
industries characterised by varying degrees of trade orientation, although that remains an 
area for future research. 
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As policy makers in developing economies tend to emphasise increases in formal 
employment as a key goal of economic liberalisation, these findings are of general interest. 
They contribute to the growing literature examining the role of interactions between India’s 
1991 reforms and variations in domestic state level institutional characteristics in driving 
post-reform economic outcomes. The results highlight that an analysis of the implications 
of economic reform for firm level employment is incomplete unless shifts in input tariffs and 
variations in regional labour market flexibility are accounted for. They strongly indicate that 
a consideration of the impacts of economic reform on the formal sector continues to be a 
highly relevant research question, notwithstanding the persistent primacy of informality in 
developing economy labour markets. 
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Chapter 3: Economic Reform, Labour Market Flexibility and Employment in 
Informal Manufacturing Enterprises in India 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the labour market impacts of economic liberalisation and 
variations in domestic institutional features in developing economies remain somewhat 
poorly studied. Existing research on the impacts of the extensive and largely unanticipated 
economic reforms undertaken by the Indian government in the 1991-1997 period (Section 
1.2) largely avoids the issue of economic duality that is typical of developing economies. Put 
differently, the literature rarely distinguishes between registered, or formal, manufacturing 
firms and the unregistered or ‘informal’ manufacturing sector, which encompasses all 
manufacturing firms employing less than ten (twenty) workers and using (not using) 
electricity. Estimated to account for 99 per cent of firms and approximately 80 per cent of 
employment in the Indian manufacturing sector, economic outcomes in the informal sector 
merit as much academic and policy interest as those in the formal sector.  
This chapter seeks to address this gap in the literature by analysing the impact of India’s 
economic reforms in the 1990s on employment in small, informal manufacturing 
enterprises. I also examine the extent to which this impact depends on differences in labour 
market flexibility at the state (provincial) level. Following the analysis in Chapter 1, I capture 
state level variations in labour market flexibility using the ‘FLEX 2’ index proposed by Hasan 
et al (2012), which builds on the seminal measure proposed by Besley and Burgess (2004). 
Informal enterprises rarely engage directly in international trade, were not targeted by 
India’s licensing regime and FDI caps, and are not subject to the labour market regulations 
with which formal firms are legally bound to comply. Any interactions between economic 
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reform and states’ labour market flexibility are therefore arguably unlikely to have a direct 
effect on employment in the informal sector. However, there is some evidence that there 
are linkages between the formal and informal manufacturing sectors in India. On the one 
hand, these linkages may be driven by factors such as vertical integration, outsourcing and 
agglomeration, as suggested by Mukim (2015) and Ghani et al (2013a, 2013b). On the other, 
as posited in recent work by Allen and Schipper (2016), formal and informal manufacturers 
may compete with each other in some industries. The conclusions of Kathuria et al (2013) 
are supportive of the hypothesis that India’s reform programme affected enterprise level 
efficiency in the informal manufacturing sector, with net productivity gains accruing to 
informal manufacturers (albeit, on average, to a lower degree relative to formal firms). 
Accounting for spillover effects in the informal sector, arising from the interaction of 
economic reform and labour market flexibility, is therefore of relevance for policy makers. I 
examine the plausibility of alternative channels, in particular that of product market 
competition, in this chapter, although the fact that my dataset is not a panel precludes a 
rigorous analysis of market entry and exit.  
The analysis in this chapter uses survey data compiled by the National Sample Survey Office 
(NSSO) through quinquennial surveys of informal manufacturing enterprises. It benefits 
from the rich cross-industry variation in India’s policy changes in the 1990s, particularly 
visible in the import tariff reductions that were enforced. The reform package of 1991 was 
an unanticipated event, which helps to obviate the usual concerns inherent in any analysis 
of the consequences of such measures. This chapter is the first to examine the impact of 
declines in both final goods and input tariffs on employment in informal enterprises in India. 
Its findings contribute to the literature by establishing that India’s delicensing and FDI 
reforms are associated with significant shifts in informal sector employment. 
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The results indicate that reductions in final goods and input tariffs are not associated with 
significant employment shifts at the informal enterprise level. However, on average and 
ceteris paribus, delicensing is associated with a statistically significant increase of 10.8 per 
cent in informal enterprise level employment in states with inflexible labour markets, while 
no corresponding significant change is registered in states with flexible labour markets. FDI 
reform, on the other hand, is associated with informal enterprise level employment rising 
by an average of 9.9 per cent only in states with flexible labour markets, ceteris paribus, with 
no corresponding significant change visible in states with inflexible labour markets. 
At a broader, three digit industry level, delicensing goes hand-in-hand with informal 
enterprise numbers rising by 32 per cent in states with inflexible labour markets, while FDI 
reform is associated with a corresponding increase of over 51 per cent in states with flexible 
labour markets. These increases are restricted to tiny, household only informal 
manufacturers as opposed to slightly larger enterprises that hire outside labour. In line with 
the enterprise level findings, no significance attaches to final goods reductions and input 
tariff declines. 
There is some evidence that the delicensing effect is attributable to increases in product market 
competition between formal and informal entities. Greater competition within the formal sector 
also appears to be a predictor of informal sector expansion in recently delicensed industries, 
possibly on account of structural shifts of the type predicted in Melitz (2003). The mechanism 
underlying the result associated with FDI liberalisation is more uncertain and could be one or a 
combination of competition or collaborative linkages between informal and formal 
manufacturers.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 undertakes a brief review 
of the literature. Section 3.3 describes the data and discusses the empirical methodology. 
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Main findings are presented in Section 3.4, with a range of robustness checks discussed in 
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Context 
The turn of the millennium witnessed an upsurge in academic interest in the impacts of tariff 
liberalisation programmes on firm level employment, both in terms of theoretical 
contributions and empirical work. The literature has largely focused on final goods tariff 
declines, with substantial ambiguity persisting as regards employment effects. When it 
comes to distinguishing between the formal and informal sectors, informality has commonly 
been modelled at the individual or employee level. This may be attributable to the fact that 
a majority of studies exploit micro data from Latin American economies, most prominently 
from Brazil, that permit the identification of worker level informality (see for instance 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Soares, 2005; Aleman-Castilla, 2006; Bosch et al, 2007; Fugazza 
and Fiess, 2010; and Paz, 2014). In the Indian context, given that informality is captured at 
the enterprise level rather than the worker level, the relevance of these studies is limited. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, economic liberalisation is perhaps unlikely to have directly 
affected employment in informal manufacturing enterprises in India. Nonetheless, to the 
extent that there are linkages between the formal and informal sectors, either on account 
of product market competition or through ‘collaborative’ supply chains, it is easy to imagine 
how a policy change that affects employment in formal firms might lead to changes in 
informal sector employment. For instance, if final goods tariff cuts and delicensing engender 
increased product market competition among formal firms in a given industry (along the 
lines discussed in Section 2.5.4), the least productive formal firms might exit the market over 
time, through a Melitz (2003) type market restructuring process. This could arguably be 
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followed by a rise in informality in that industry, as the informal sector picks up some of the 
‘slack’ in the labour market. This story could be expected to be stronger in industries that 
are also characterised by a greater degree of product market competition between formal 
and informal (as opposed to only among formal) operators, where the informal sector is 
more likely to function as a ‘shock absorber’ for a net employment loss in the formal sector.  
On the other hand, if the formal firms and informal enterprises in an industry are engaged 
in collaborative linkages, it could be argued that an observed increase in formal sector 
employment would be complemented by a larger informal sector in that industry, and vice 
versa. In this sense, although the direct impact of input tariff declines and FDI reform might 
be restricted to formal firms, there could be spillovers into employment in informal 
enterprises. Although input tariff declines, for example, apply to imported inputs in the first 
instance, they could trigger general equilibrium effects in an industry’s input supplying 
sectors and, over time, impose downward pressure on domestic input prices. In such a 
scenario, informal enterprise employment could respond to the input tariff reductions even 
if, as seems realistic, informal enterprises do not use sophisticated imported inputs and only 
source inputs locally. Along similar lines, if informal enterprises comprise a part of the supply 
chain of formal firms that are recipients of FDI inflows, informal sector employment may 
respond to FDI regime reform even while FDI flows only into a subset of formal firms. 
Further, any such policy spillovers into informality might also be expected to differ across 
states with more and less flexible labour markets. While informal enterprises themselves 
are not subject to the state level labour market regulations outlined in Section 2.3.3, the 
fact that the reforms often have different implications for formal firms in states with more 
and less flexible labour markets (following the analysis in Chapter 2) also makes labour 
market flexibility a point worth considering in this chapter. Further, as it has been 
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established that Indian states with less flexible labour markets were characterised by higher 
levels of informal sector output even in 1992 (Besley and Burgess, 2004), it is important to 
account for state level variations in labour market flexibility in the context of the current 
analysis. Along the lines of Chapter 2, the analysis in this chapter focuses on the net 
employment effects of each policy (albeit with an informal enterprise focus). With limited 
success, I also attempt to disentangle the mechanisms underlying the observed effects. 
The literature has implicitly tended to assume that formal and informal enterprises compete 
for gaining market share. However, as Munro (2011) documents, a scenario in which the 
formal and informal sectors complement each other may constitute a more realistic 
description of developing economies. Complementarities could exist between and within 
the formal and informal sectors and might arise, for instance, through supply-chain linkages 
or agglomeration driven externalities. As such, forward and backward linkages may have a 
crucial role to play in determining the extent to which tariff liberalisation affects firm level 
outcomes.    
As regards India’s trade reforms in particular, most studies have tended to focus on tariffs 
on final goods, or final goods tariffs. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, an increasing 
body of evidence suggests that declines in tariffs on intermediate inputs (input tariffs) have 
a greater positive impact on firm level productivity, relative to final goods tariffs. This 
evidence strengthens the case for examining both final goods and input tariff declines in a 
study of the implications of trade liberalisation for employment. The only study that appears 
to have assessed the implications of reductions in input tariffs for both formal and informal 
employment, however, appears to be that of Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011). This 
analysis exploits a rich worker flow dataset to establish that final goods and input tariff cuts 
in Brazil in the 1990s are not associated with significant shifts in informal employment. 
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Empirical analysis otherwise appears to have sidestepped the impacts of input tariff declines 
on informal employment. 
As stated in Section 2.2.1.2, Hasan et al (2012) find that Indian states with flexible labour 
markets are more likely to register employment growth in the post-liberalisation period, 
particularly in net exporter industries, relative to states with less flexible labour markets. 
However, this analysis is conducted at a fairly high level of industry aggregation, does not 
assess input tariff declines, and does not consider employment in formal and informal 
enterprises separately. In comparison, I am able to focus on informal enterprises using a 
more disaggregated industry classification as well as declines in final goods and input tariffs, 
in addition to domestic industrial policy reforms. This chapter is therefore an original 
contribution to the existing evidence base. 
3.3 Data and method 
3.3.1 Labour market data 
I use survey data on unorganised manufacturing firms compiled by the National Sample 
Survey Office (NSSO) in 1989-90, 1994-95 and 2000-01. The Factories Act of 1948 requires 
all Indian manufacturing firms that use electricity and employ 10 or more workers, as well 
as all manufacturing firms that do not use electricity and employ 20 or more workers, to 
register with the state government. The term ‘workers’ encompasses all paid and unpaid 
individuals, including household help where this is relevant, who are directly or indirectly 
associated with a firm’s operations. All other firms are unregistered and comprise the 
informal manufacturing sector4, which is the sampling frame of the NSSO surveys of 
                                                          
4 The terms ‘unorganised’ and ‘informal’ are, in the context of Indian firms, virtually synonymous. In addition to the 
proprietary and partnership based enterprises that constitute the informal sector, the unorganised sector also 
encompasses a small number of enterprises managed by cooperative societies, trusts, and private and public 
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unorganised manufacturing enterprises. In the baseline regressions in this chapter, 
employment is captured in terms of the total number of persons engaged. The baseline 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of firm level employment.  
The NSSO surveys approximately 1 per cent of all informal enterprises approximately every 
five years. It employs a stratified random sampling strategy for each survey, with the sample 
frame in each period updated on the basis of the sample frame used in the preceding 
Economic Census (EC). I use the inverse sampling probability based weights that accompany 
the survey data to weight observations in a manner that yields results that are applicable to 
the population of small informal enterprises. I observe informal enterprises in one pre-
reform period (1990) and two post-reform periods (1995 and 2001). As my data do not 
comprise a panel, I am unable to pinpoint the channels through which observed 
employment changes occur, but I discuss this issue to the extent possible. 
The pooled employment distribution for the population of informal manufacturers is 
presented in Figure 5(a). The average informal enterprise employs two individuals, a number 
that displayed remarkable consistency in the 1990s, both in states with flexible and states 
with inflexible labour markets (defined on the basis of the ‘FLEX 2’ measure discussed in 
Section 2.3.3), and only declined registered a very slight decline across the country in 2001, 
as seen in Figure 5(b). Further, over 95 per cent of informal enterprises employ less than 
five people. A little over 50 per cent of informal manufacturing jobs are accounted for by 
informal enterprises engaging one or two individuals.  
Close to 80 per cent of the informal enterprises in my dataset are small, household only 
enterprises, labelled ‘own account manufacturing enterprises’ or OAMEs in the NSSO 
                                                          
limited companies. As this latter category of enterprises accounts for less than 0.5 per cent of the sample of 
enterprises in each NSSO survey round (sample) used in the analysis for this chapter, and as it is arguably unlikely to 
face the same production or growth incentives as the informal sector, I exclude it from my analysis. 
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surveys. OAMEs are household based, informal manufacturing enterprises that do not hire 
any workers on a regular basis. In effect, OAMEs only employ unpaid members of the 
household(s) of their proprietor(s). The remaining, slightly larger informal enterprises in the 
dataset are labelled ‘non-directory manufacturing establishments’ or NDMEs by the NSSO. 
NDMEs are informal manufacturing enterprises that hire at least one and up to five workers 
(household and non-household workers) on a regular basis. In 1990, the NSSO did not survey 
relatively large informal enterprises employing more than six workers (household and hired 
workers) on a regular basis (labelled ‘directory manufacturing establishments’ or DMEs). As 
DMEs therefore do not feature in the only pre-reform data at my disposal and since they 
comprise less than ten per cent of informal enterprises surveyed in 1995 and 2001, I discard 
them from the dataset. However, I undertake a robustness check in which they are included 
in the data (for 1995 and 2001), which yields results that are similar to the baseline (Section 
3.5.2).  
Figure 5: Employment in informal manufacturing enterprises in India 
(a) Informal enterprise and employment shares by enterprise size (1990-2001)                                                          
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(b) Average number of persons engaged per informal enterprise (1990-2001)   
 
Source: NSSO survey data (1990, 1995, 2001)    As inverse sampling probability based multipliers have been used to 
aggregate the raw data, these distributions are representative of the population of informal enterprises. The measure 
of labour market flexibility used in Figure 5(b) is the ‘FLEX 2’ measure due to Hasan et al (2012) and is described in 
Section 2.3.3. 
The construction of the pooled informal enterprise level dataset poses a number of 
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classified as being a state with an inflexible labour market, following the discussion in 
Section 2.3.3) are, instead, assumed to be flexible labour markets (Section 3.5.2). As 
specified in Section 2.3.1, restricting the dataset to include only the sixteen states of interest 
and Delhi is not a major concern in the context of this analysis.  
I exclude informal enterprises that are reported to have been closed from my analysis. 
Further, I observe that a very small fraction (less than 1 per cent) of enterprises in each 
period appear to employ ten or more persons, the threshold above which units that use 
electricity attain formal (registered) status. I drop these enterprises from my dataset, but I 
undertake a robustness check to confirm that the alternative does not affect my baseline 
results (Section 3.5.2). Further, along the lines of the discussion in Section 2.3.1, I do not 
include enterprises that report zero or missing values for raw material use and/or physical 
product manufacturing in the baseline analysis. This is considerably more common in the 
informal sector vis-à-vis the formal sector, which indicates that informal enterprises may be 
more likely to engage solely in trading activity relative to formal firms, in spite of being 
classified as ‘manufacturing’ entities. A robustness check suggests that including these ‘non-
manufacturers’ in the analysis does not substantially affect the results (Section 3.5.2). 
3.3.2 Other data 
In addition to the labour market data described in Section 3.3.1, this analysis uses data on 
the Indian economic liberalisation programme of the 1990s and state level labour market 
flexibility indices. These data are discussed in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3.  
Table 18 provides summary employment statistics for OAMEs and NDMEs, for the sample as a 
whole and separately for states with flexible and inflexible labour markets, as defined using the 
‘FLEX 2’ measure. The average OAME engages two people, while three to four individuals are 
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engaged in the average NDME. Only minor differences appear in these numbers across the two 
groups of states. While both averages register declines in 2001 relative to 1990, these changes 
are very small and do not, prima facie, appear to be economically meaningful.  
The final column of Table 18 also shows that, on the whole, total weighted employment in 
the population represented by OAMEs and NDMEs increased over the 1990-2001 period, 
both in states with more flexible labour markets and less flexible labour markets. More 
precisely, the data are indicative of a substantial increase in aggregate employment in 
informal enterprises in all states in the 1990-1995 period, followed by a slight decline in the 
1995-2001 period. However, the 2001 figures are clearly higher than the corresponding 
1990 estimates in each case, with the exception of OAMEs in states with less flexible labour 
markets. Considered alongside the observed declines in average informal enterprise 
employment in this period, these data highlight that a more aggregated, industry level analysis 
of the impacts of the reforms on informal enterprise numbers and employment may be of 
particular relevance for this chapter. Following the strategy employed in Chapter 2, I also 
attempt to disentangle the implications of the varying policy shifts of the 1990s for employment 
in the informal sector at the ‘micro’ (enterprise) and ‘macro’ (industry) levels. 
Table 18: Summary statistics for employment in informal enterprises (1990-2001) 
 OAMEs     NDMEs    
Year N Mean St. 
dev. 
Weighted 
total* 
 N Mean St. 
dev. 
Weighted 
total* 
 
Overall 
1990 29661 2.12 1.10 12409060  11428 3.55 1.15 1836999 
1995 87410 2.18 1.12 15836887  19146 3.40 1.19 3554920 
2001 45305 1.81 0.94 12715694  16858 3.35 1.11 3029317 
Overall 162376 2.06 1.08 40961641  47432 3.42 1.15 8421235 
 
States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
1990 10868 2.11 1.08 3475971  4406 3.68 1.13 748955 
1995 35327 2.14 1.10 5136175  8744 3.55 1.20 1561064 
2001 18576 1.70 0.91 4299569  6560 3.43 1.12 1311631 
Overall 64771 2.01 1.06 12911715  19710 3.54 1.16 3621650 
 
States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
1990 18793 2.12 1.11 8933089  7022 3.46 1.15 1088044 
1995 52083 2.20 1.13 10700713  10402 3.28 1.16 1993856 
2001 26729 1.89 0.96 8416125  10298 3.30 1.10 1717685 
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Overall 97605 2.10 1.09 28049926  27722 3.33 1.14 4799585 
Source: NSSO data (1990, 1995, 2001) The data are unweighted and apply only to the sample of informal enterprises 
surveyed in each year. N: number of observations; St. dev.: standard deviation (the minimum and maximum numbers 
for each row in this table are 1 and 9 respectively)   * This refers to the total number of persons engaged in the population 
represented by the informal enterprises in the sample dataset, derived using the survey weights provided for each 
enterprise surveyed in the sample dataset. 
3.3.3 Method 
The baseline regressions undertaken in this chapter follow the methodology outlined for 
formal firms in Section 2.4. As this chapter focuses on informal enterprises that are, by most 
measures, microenterprises, I also explore whether the results yielded by the baseline 
specification hold when a Poisson count model is adopted. The dependent variable for the 
Poisson regressions is the actual number of individuals engaged in work in a given 
enterprises, as opposed to the natural logarithm of that number (which is used in the 
baseline specification). 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Baseline regressions: Firm level 
To begin, I assess whether the reforms are associated with statistically significant 
employment shifts at the firm level, irrespective of variations in regional labour market 
flexibility. In Table 19, I therefore run variations of equation (1) presented in Section 2.4. 
Neither output nor input tariff reductions are associated with significant employment 
changes in informal enterprises. However, I find that the delicensing reform is associated 
with a statistically significant increase in average informal enterprise level employment. This 
result is robust to controlling for FDI reform, which is not linked to significant informal 
employment changes. Specifically, controlling for final goods and input tariff declines, FDI 
liberalisation, and state, year and industry fixed effects, I find that delicensing is associated 
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with employment in the average informal enterprise rising by 7.6 per cent (Table 19, Column 
5)5. In this last specification, input tariff reductions are associated with a decrease in 
informal enterprise level employment, but this result is only weakly statistically significant.  
Table 19: Economic reforms and employment in informal enterprises (1990-2001): OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Final goods tariffs -0.011 -0.082 -0.090 -0.082 -0.091 
 (0.086) (0.108) (0.102) (0.109) (0.104) 
Input tariffs  0.473 0.550* 0.472 0.558* 
  (0.314) (0.314) (0.316) (0.317) 
Delicensing   0.068**  0.076*** 
   (0.026)  (0.028) 
FDI reform    0.019 0.041 
    (0.026) (0.026) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 195789 195789 195789 195789 
R-squared 0.160 0.161 0.162 0.161 0.162 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
In Table 20, I explore the extent to which state level differences in labour market flexibility 
have a bearing on the effects of the reforms, using alternative forms of the expanded 
baseline specification of equation (2) discussed in Section 2.4. I focus on the results that are 
statistically significant at the significance level of 0.05. First, I confirm that final goods and 
input tariff reductions are not associated with significant changes in employment in all 
states, with the weakly significant negative effect for input tariff declines, visible in Table 
19, being restricted to states with inflexible labour markets (Table 20, Row 3).  
The employment enhancing effect of delicensing, visible in Table 19, is restricted to states 
with inflexible labour markets in Table 20. More precisely, controlling for the other reforms, 
in states with inflexible labour markets, delicensing is associated with average informal 
enterprise employment rising by 10.8 per cent (Table 20, Column 6, Row 5). This result is 
                                                          
5 As specified in Section 2.3.2, all the tariffs are entered into the dataset in fractional form (for instance, a tariff of 
80 per cent is entered as 0.80). As a result, given that the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, we may 
interpret any coefficients attaching to the tariffs as proportional changes directly (without having to multiply them 
by 100). On the other hand, as the delicensing and FDI reform variables are indicator variables and cannot be 
rescaled in a manner similar to the tariffs, the coefficients that attach to them must be multiplied by 100 for 
appropriate interpretation (given the logarithmic form of the dependent variable). 
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statistically significant even at the 0.01 significance level. In states with flexible labour 
markets, however, the delicensing effect, although still positive, loses statistical significance 
given the p-value of 0.613 (Table 20, Column 6, ‘Row 5 + Row 6’).  
Interestingly, Table 20 also reveals that labour market flexibility appears to matter in terms 
of the response of average informal enterprise level employment to FDI reform. In states 
with inflexible labour markets, FDI liberalisation is not associated with statistically significant 
changes in informal enterprise level employment, on average and ceteris paribus (Table 20, 
Column 5, Row 7). Conversely, in states with flexible labour markets, FDI liberalisation is 
associated with employment in informal enterprises being significantly higher ceteris 
paribus, by an average of 9.9 per cent (Table 20, Column 5, ‘Row 7 + Row 8’).  
Table 20: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Final goods tariffs -0.030 -0.055 -0.030 -0.138 -0.137 -0.132 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.115) (0.118) (0.113) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.056 0.140** 0.076 0.143 0.147 0.151 
 (0.063) (0.058) (0.063) (0.098) (0.103) (0.097) 
Input tariffs    0.599* 0.538* 0.576* 
    (0.328) (0.323) (0.327) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2    -0.202 -0.022 -0.178 
    (0.172) (0.166) (0.168) 
Delicensing 0.098*** 0.072*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.077*** 0.108*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.070**  -0.078** -0.083**  -0.088** 
 (0.035)  (0.035) (0.037)  (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.039 0.022 0.019 0.042 0.024 0.024 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2  0.069* 0.082**  0.065 0.076* 
  (0.041) (0.041)  (0.041) (0.041) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.026 0.085 0.047 0.004 0.010 0.019 
Std Error 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.079 0.083 0.078 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.711 0.208 0.494 0.957 0.907 0.809 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4    0.397 0.516* 0.398 
Std Error    0.300 0.305 0.300 
p-value (combined effect = 0)    0.186 0.091 0.185 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.028  0.022 0.024  0.019 
Std Error 0.038  0.038 0.038  0.038 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.468  0.563 0.536  0.613 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8  0.090** 0.101**  0.090** 0.099** 
Std Error  0.043 0.043  0.043 0.043 
p-value (combined effect = 0)  0.036 0.018  0.036 0.021 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
87 
 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 195789 195789 195789 195789 195789 
R-squared 0.163 0.163 0.164 0.164 0.163 0.164 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, I use a Poisson count specification to explore whether the 
results presented in Table 19 and Table 20 are excessively reliant on the fact that I use the 
natural logarithm of employment to capture employment shifts in the tiny informal 
enterprises in my dataset. The results of this strategy, presented in Table 21 and Table 22, 
provide reassuring evidence that this is not the case. Indeed, the Poisson model yields 
findings that are very similar, in terms of direction and statistical significance, to the baseline 
results outlined above. 
Table 21: Economic reforms and employment in informal enterprises (1990-2001): Poisson 
estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Final goods tariffs 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Input tariffs  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Delicensing   0.060**  0.067** 
   (0.026)  (0.027) 
FDI reform    0.016 0.034 
    (0.027) (0.026) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 195789 195789 195789 195789 
Dependent variable: total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are 
clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table 22: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Poisson estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Final goods tariffs -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Input tariffs    0.005 0.004 0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2    -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Delicensing 0.087*** 0.064** 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.067** 0.094*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.063*  -0.072** -0.073**  -0.080** 
 (0.035)  (0.035) (0.037)  (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.033 0.014 0.012 0.035 0.015 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2  0.077** 0.090**  0.077** 0.086** 
  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.038) (0.038) 
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Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std Error 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.654 0.171 0.398 0.889 0.827 0.740 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4    0.003 0.004 0.003 
Std Error    0.003 0.003 0.003 
p-value (combined effect = 0)    0.269 0.144 0.251 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.024  0.017 0.019  0.014 
Std Error 0.036  0.036 0.035  0.035 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.504  0.635 0.580  0.682 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8  0.091** 0.102**  0.092** 0.100** 
Std Error  0.041 0.041  0.041 0.040 
p-value (combined effect = 0)  0.026 0.012  0.024 0.013 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 195789 195789 195789 195789 195789 
Dependent variable: total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in brackets, are 
clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
To summarise, my baseline results suggest that on the whole, employment in India’s 
informal manufacturing enterprises in the 1990s responded primarily to the delicensing and 
FDI reforms of that period, and did not register significant changes in response to the 
concurrent declines in final goods and input tariffs. Delicensing is associated with significant 
increases (no significant change) in average informal enterprise level employment in states 
with inflexible (flexible) labour markets, while FDI reform is associated with significant 
increases (no significant change) in average informal enterprise level employment in states 
with flexible (inflexible) labour markets. 
The distinction between small, household only enterprises (OAMEs) and slightly larger 
informal enterprises (NDMEs), outlined in Section 3.3.1, suggests that the baseline 
regressions should be separately undertaken for these two firm types. This is also relevant 
in light of the consideration that enterprise heterogeneity within the informal sector is likely 
to matter if the impact of the reforms on informal enterprises ‘spills over’ through the 
formal sector, as outlined in Section 3.1. Table 23 presents the findings of this exercise, using 
both the baseline OLS regression (2) and its Poisson counterpart. The employment 
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enhancing effect associated with delicensing in states with inflexible labour markets is 
robust for OAMEs, the tiny informal enterprises that dominate the informal sector, but is 
only weakly significant for the slightly larger NDMEs. Conversely, the baseline increase in 
average informal enterprise level employment linked to FDI reform holds primarily for 
NDMEs, with statistical significance weakening to over 11 per cent for OAMEs. 
Table 23: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Results by firm size (OAME/ NDME) 
 OLS estimates  Poisson estimates 
 Baseline 
(All 
enterprises) 
OAME NDME  Baseline 
(All 
enterprises) 
OAME NDME 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 -0.179 0.005  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.113) (0.133) (0.046)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Final goods tariffs * 
FLEX 2 
0.151 0.223* -0.029  0.001 0.002* -0.000 
 (0.097) (0.115) (0.059)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.712* -0.162  0.004 0.007* -0.003 
 (0.327) (0.366) (0.206)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.178 -0.376** 0.089  -0.001 -0.004* 0.001 
 (0.168) (0.191) (0.110)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.056*  0.094*** 0.106*** 0.040 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.029)  (0.030) (0.034) (0.027) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.088** -0.116*** -0.049  -0.080** -0.115*** -0.031 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.032)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.028) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.048 0.036  0.014 0.038 0.035 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.029)  (0.028) (0.032) (0.026) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.076* 0.026 0.055**  0.086** 0.034 0.048** 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.024)  (0.038) (0.048) (0.023) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 0.044 -0.025  0.000 0.001 -0.000 
Std Error 0.078 0.101 0.051  0.001 0.001 0.000 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.809 0.667 0.626  0.740 0.539 0.583 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 0.336 -0.073  0.003 0.003 -0.002 
Std Error 0.300 0.330 0.220  0.003 0.003 0.002 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.185 0.308 0.740  0.251 0.355 0.426 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 -0.001 0.008  0.014 -0.009 0.009 
Std Error 0.038 0.038 0.029  0.035 0.036 0.026 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.613 0.989 0.795  0.682 0.804 0.736 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** 0.074 0.091***  0.100** 0.072 0.083*** 
Std Error 0.043 0.047 0.031  0.040 0.049 0.029 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.021 0.114 0.004  0.013 0.143 0.004 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 152178 43611  195789 152178 43611 
R-squared 0.164 0.191 0.128     
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged (Columns 1, 2, 3) and total number of 
persons engaged (Columns 4, 5, 6)   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the state-
industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
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3.4.2 Industry level results 
As several informal enterprises employ one or two persons and the vast majority do not 
employ more than four individuals (Section 3.3.1), the statistically significant effects 
attaching to the delicensing and FDI reforms discussed in Section 3.4.1 do not appear to be 
of particular economic relevance. For instance, the results indicate that in states with 
flexible labour markets, the average informal enterprise in an FDI liberalised industry grows 
by approximately 10 per cent in employment terms. Assuming for convenience that the 
average informal enterprise in these states employs two persons, this translates to an 
increase of 0.2 persons; alternatively, on average and ceteris paribus, among every ten 
informal enterprises employing two persons, one is predicted to hire two additional 
individuals in response to FDI liberalisation. This suggests that the ‘extensive margins’ of 
industry level employment and enterprise numbers, analysed for the formal sector in 
Chapter 2, may be a more meaningful consideration for the informal sector. In this section, 
I discuss results yielded by industry level regressions for the informal manufacturing sector, 
following the strategy outlined in Section 2.4. 
Baseline results of this analysis are presented in Table 24, with the first three columns 
focusing on industry level employment in informal enterprises as a whole and in OAMEs and 
NDMEs and the final three columns focusing on the number of enterprises for these three 
groups. As regards employment, I find that over the 1990-2001 period, delicensing is 
associated with a statistically significant increase of 41 per cent in average informal industry 
size in states with inflexible labour markets, ceteris paribus. This increase is entirely 
attributable to increased industry level employment in OAMEs (Panel C, Table 24). 
Furthermore, over the 1990-2001 period, FDI reform is associated with a significant average 
increase of approximately 55 per cent in industry level OAME employment in states with 
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flexible labour markets (Panel B, Table 24), ceteris paribus. In line with the enterprise level 
results discussed in Section 3.4.1, no significance attaches to the reductions in final goods 
and input tariffs.  
When I consider the implications of the reforms for informal enterprise numbers (Columns 
4 to 6, Table 24), I find that input tariff declines are associated with significant increases in 
the number of OAMEs in a pan-Indian context (Panel A, Table 24). Further analysis suggests 
that these increases are restricted to states with inflexible labour markets, with significance 
weakening to the 10 per cent level (Panel C, Table 24). Again, for the period in question 
(1990-2001), delicensing is associated with a significant increase of approximately 32 per 
cent in OAME numbers in states with inflexible labour markets, and FDI liberalisation 
precedes a significant increment of 51.5 per cent in OAME numbers in states with flexible 
labour markets.  
Table 24: Economic reforms and informal sector employment: Industry level effects (1990-2001) 
 ln (emp) ln (emp) 
OAMEs 
ln (emp) 
NDMEs 
ln (ent) ln (ent) 
OAMEs 
ln (ent) 
NDMEs 
A: All states 
 (1) (2) (3)    
Final goods tariffs 0.079 0.255 -0.176 0.202 0.333 -0.197 
 (0.239) (0.329) (0.319) (0.255) (0.292) (0.326) 
Input tariffs -2.294 -2.760 0.546 -3.083** -3.423** 0.845 
 (1.412) (1.685) (1.276) (1.475) (1.615) (1.401) 
Delicensing 0.274** 0.290** -0.018 0.184 0.188 -0.042 
 (0.121) (0.139) (0.149) (0.130) (0.139) (0.168) 
FDI reform 0.186 0.226* -0.088 0.178 0.199 -0.108 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.188) (0.137) (0.138) (0.218) 
Observations 378 355 361 378 355 361 
R-squared 0.120 0.133 0.069 0.112 0.117 0.073 
    
B: States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1)    
Final goods tariffs 0.329 0.792 -0.015 0.428 0.782 -0.145 
 (0.393) (0.505) (0.452) (0.416) (0.480) (0.359) 
Input tariffs -2.183 -2.503 -1.828 -1.605 -1.768 -0.737 
 (1.850) (2.442) (1.944) (1.893) (2.275) (1.802) 
Delicensing -0.030 -0.051 -0.072 -0.064 -0.073 -0.059 
 (0.143) (0.175) (0.167) (0.147) (0.155) (0.175) 
FDI reform 0.413*** 0.553*** 0.086 0.423** 0.515*** 0.031 
 (0.137) (0.157) (0.188) (0.169) (0.184) (0.197) 
Observations 327 302 315 327 302 315 
R-squared 0.130 0.182 0.051 0.132 0.173 0.045 
       
C: States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0)    
Final goods tariffs 0.102 0.252 -0.358 0.237 0.332 -0.292 
 (0.359) (0.487) (0.340) (0.351) (0.416) (0.408) 
Input tariffs -2.460 -3.082 2.635* -3.946* -4.372* 2.418 
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 (2.029) (2.469) (1.588) (2.038) (2.295) (1.881) 
Delicensing 0.414*** 0.440** -0.028 0.312** 0.319** -0.082 
 (0.155) (0.177) (0.169) (0.147) (0.159) (0.197) 
FDI reform 0.150 0.179 -0.186 0.142 0.150 -0.170 
 (0.125) (0.141) (0.205) (0.129) (0.139) (0.241) 
Observations 357 327 333 357 327 333 
R-squared 0.137 0.159 0.043 0.147 0.156 0.039 
Dependent variable: ln (emp) = natural logarithm of employment or ln (ent) = natural logarithm of number of enterprises   
All regressions include a constant and industry and year fixed effects, and are weighted by pre-reform (1990) levels of 
the dependent variable. Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.              ***: Significant at 1%   
**: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
These shifts in the number of OAMEs and industry level employment in OAMEs associated 
with the delicensing and FDI reforms are both statistically significant and economically 
meaningful. In essence, controlling for industry and time fixed effects, delicensing and FDI 
liberalisation go hand-in-hand with a sizeable expansion of informal manufacturing 
industries in the 1990s. Interestingly, no significance attaches to any reform variable in the 
context of NDMEs in Table 24, both in terms of industry level employment in these larger 
informal enterprises and in terms of their numbers. As both the delicensing and FDI reform 
instruments were targeted at relatively large formal firms (following the discussion in 
Section 1.2), it is probable that any informal sector impacts linked to these reforms arise on 
account of product market competition or collaborative linkages between formal firms and 
informal enterprises (Section 3.1). The data are better suited to an analysis of whether the 
observed effects are attributable to differences in the extent to which product markets are 
competitive. This motivates the following subsection. 
3.4.3 Analysis of mechanisms 
As discussed in Section 2.5.3, the reforms of the 1990s are likely to have engendered 
increases in product market competition in Indian manufacturing. While these shifts are of 
greater relevance for formal firms given the more direct effects of the reforms on the formal 
sector, there may have been spillovers into the informal sector. A number of hypotheses 
may be proposed to describe the potential implications of competition between informal 
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enterprises and formal firms. For instance, following the evidence presented in Section 
2.5.4, employment in formal firms in industries characterised by lower levels of pre-reform 
competition was less responsive to the reforms. It might follow that these industries may 
have been less affected by the reforms in a direct sense and may therefore have witnessed 
fewer spillovers into the informal sector.  
An alternative view might posit that less competitive formal sector industries may have 
registered more, rather than fewer, shifts in employment in informal enterprises, with the 
informal sector functioning as a ‘shock absorber’ in the post-reform period. This hypothesis 
could be in consonance with the reforms engendering Melitz (2003) type structural shifts 
within less competitive industries, with the least productive formal firms forced to exit their 
markets. Moreover, any spillovers into the informal sector may have different implications 
for OAMEs and NDMEs, with the latter being larger informal units and therefore arguably 
more likely to compete with smaller formal firms as opposed to the purely household based 
OAMEs. 
One difficulty that arises in this context is a lack of data on competition between informal 
enterprises and formal firms. In 2001, the NSSO introduced a survey question regarding 
competition from larger firms being a problem that had been encountered by informal units, 
but no similar indicator is present in the survey data for 1990 and 1995. In light of this 
constraint, I hypothesise that competition between informal and formal market players is 
more likely to exist in industries characterised by a smaller gulf between informal and formal 
firm size. To test this hypothesis, I compute the ratio of average formal firm employment to 
average informal enterprise employment (the ‘F-I ratio’) in the pre-reform period (1990) for 
each three digit industry. This ratio varies considerably across industries, with a median of 
19.5 and a mean of 39.3. Intuitively, industries with a lower ‘F-I’ ratio are perhaps more 
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likely to witness competition between formal and informal operators, whereas industries 
with a higher ‘F-I’ ratio might be expected to be less likely to be competitive in this sense 
and perhaps more likely to feature ‘collaboration’ between the formal and informal sectors 
(in terms of supply chain linkages or agglomeration externalities).  
Table 25 presents results separately for informal enterprises operating in three digit 
industries characterised by relatively low and high pre-reform (1990) levels of this ‘F-I’ ratio, 
with Columns 2, 3 and 4 representing industries with a ratio below the first quartile, below 
the median and exceeding the median respectively. The results are striking: my baseline 
estimates are strengthened, in magnitude and significance, for industries with lower ‘F-I’ 
ratios, most visibly for industries where this ratio is below the first quartile (Column 2, Table 
25). Conversely, for industries characterised by higher ‘F-I’ ratios, the baseline results lose 
significance (Column 4, Table 25). This might be viewed as evidence in favour of the reforms 
generating spillovers in the informal sector on account of competition between formal and 
informal operators.  
Table 25: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Analysis based on the ratio of average formal firm employment to average informal 
enterprise employment (‘F-I ratio’) in 1990 
 Baseline (All 
enterprises) 
Industry F-I 
ratio below first 
quartile in 1990  
(‘most 
competitive’) 
Industry F-I 
ratio below 
median in 1990  
(‘more 
competitive’) 
Industry F-I 
ratio above 
median in 1990  
(‘less 
competitive’) 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 0.014 -0.013 -0.335 
 (0.113) (0.151) (0.076) (0.207) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.151 0.055 0.005 0.387** 
 (0.097) (0.192) (0.106) (0.167) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.958* 0.524 0.798 
 (0.327) (0.559) (0.324) (0.556) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.178 -0.189 -0.050 -0.359 
 (0.168) (0.292) (0.204) (0.299) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.140*** 0.102*** 0.026 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.030) (0.065) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.088** -0.114* -0.091** -0.016 
 (0.037) (0.064) (0.046) (0.055) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.005 0.014 0.044 
 (0.028) (0.043) (0.027) (0.085) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.076* 0.174*** 0.099** 0.042 
 (0.041) (0.049) (0.040) (0.079) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs  
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 0.069 -0.008 0.053 
Std Error 0.078 0.160 0.081 0.126 
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p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.809 0.669 0.925 0.677 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs  
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 0.769 0.474 0.439 
Std Error 0.300 0.573 0.319 0.574 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.185 0.180 0.137 0.445 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing  
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 0.026 0.010 0.010 
Std Error 0.038 0.073 0.047 0.066 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.613 0.721 0.827 0.885 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform  
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** 0.179*** 0.113*** 0.086 
Std Error 0.043 0.058 0.043 0.077 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.021 0.002 0.009 0.265 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 63997 133303 62486 
R-squared 0.164 0.091 0.115 0.199 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
In Table 26, I present industry level findings corresponding to the industry groups analysed 
in Table 25. This yields a slightly more nuanced result: while the baseline results are in 
general more robust for more competitive industries (as characterised by lower ‘F-I’ ratios 
in 1990), the positive baseline association between FDI reform and informal enterprise 
numbers in states with flexible labour markets is restricted to industries with higher pre-
reform ‘F-I’ ratios.  
Table 26: Economic reforms and informal sector employment: Industry level effects for enterprise 
numbers (1990-2001) based on the ratio of average formal firm employment to average informal 
enterprise employment (‘F-I ratio’) in 1990 
A: All states Dependent variable: ln (number of informal enterprises in three digit 
industry) 
 All industries Industries with F-I ratio 
below median in 1990  
(‘more competitive’) 
Industries with F-I ratio 
above median in 1990  
(‘less competitive’) 
Final goods tariffs 0.202 0.292 0.554 
 (0.255) (0.519) (0.349) 
Input tariffs -3.083** -4.730* 0.567 
 (1.475) (2.407) (2.466) 
Delicensing 0.184 0.253* 0.151 
 (0.130) (0.134) (0.319) 
FDI reform 0.178 0.128 0.326 
 (0.137) (0.106) (0.286) 
Observations 378 195 183 
R-squared 0.112 0.326 0.029 
 
B: States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
Final goods tariffs 0.428 0.346 1.302* 
 (0.416) (0.516) (0.665) 
Input tariffs -1.605 -2.950 -2.697 
 (1.893) (2.461) (3.691) 
Delicensing -0.064 0.053 -0.399 
 (0.147) (0.150) (0.440) 
FDI reform 0.423** 0.097 0.849** 
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 (0.169) (0.190) (0.322) 
Observations 327 168 159 
R-squared 0.132 0.258 0.159 
    
C: States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
Final goods tariffs 0.237 0.880 0.160 
 (0.351) (0.588) (0.470) 
Input tariffs -3.946* -7.118*** 2.196 
 (2.038) (2.627) (3.917) 
Delicensing 0.312** 0.279* 0.509 
 (0.147) (0.146) (0.357) 
FDI reform 0.142 0.201* -0.188 
 (0.129) (0.115) (0.443) 
Observations 357 198 159 
R-squared 0.147 0.323 0.057 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of informal enterprises at the three digit industry level. All regressions 
include a constant and industry and year fixed effects, and are weighted by pre-reform (1990) levels of the dependent 
variable. Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   
*: Significant at 10% 
The four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in each three digit industry in the formal sector, as 
outlined in Section 2.5.4, is an alternative prism through which to view the implications of 
shifts in product market competition. Providing as it does a measure of competition within 
the formal sector, the CR4 also serves as a barometer of industry consolidation. As the CR4 
declined in most (90 per cent) of formal industries in the 1990-1995 period, it is possible 
that industries that had higher CR4 figures (and were therefore less competitive) prior to 
the reforms may have been more vulnerable to the increases in product market competition 
in the 1990s. As such, the informal sector may have expanded in these industries, following 
the exit of less productive formal firms from the market. 
This hypothesis is examined in Table 27 and Table 28, which present enterprise and industry 
level results for informal manufacturing in industries with higher and lower formal sector 
CR4 in 1990. At the enterprise level (Table 27), the delicensing effect holds for both groups 
of industries, while the FDI effect is robust only in industries featuring a higher degree of 
formal sector competition in 1990 (as captured by lower CR4 estimates). Conversely, at the 
industry level, all the baseline results concerning informal sector expansion in response to 
the delicensing and FDI reforms hold only for industries with higher CR4 figures in 1990 
(Table 28). This supports the view that economically meaningful structural shifts in the post-
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reform informal sector may have been driven by an evolving competitive landscape in the 
formal sector.  
Table 27: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Analysis based on formal sector four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in 1990 (the proportion of 
formal industry level output accounted for by the four largest formal firms in 1990) 
 Baseline (All 
enterprises) 
Enterprises in industries 
with formal CR4 above 
median in 1990 
(less competitive  
formal sector) 
Enterprises in industries 
with formal CR4 below 
median in 1990 
(more competitive  
formal sector) 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 -0.200 -0.109 
 (0.113) (0.200) (0.073) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.151 0.165 0.167* 
 (0.097) (0.184) (0.087) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.460 0.184 
 (0.327) (0.498) (0.409) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.178 -0.246 -0.121 
 (0.168) (0.298) (0.184) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.079** 0.092** 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.043) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.088** -0.108** -0.018 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.082 0.070** 
 (0.028) (0.140) (0.032) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.076* -0.123 0.099** 
 (0.041) (0.144) (0.042) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 -0.036 0.058 
Std Error 0.078 0.148 0.070 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.809 0.810 0.408 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 0.215 0.063 
Std Error 0.300 0.439 0.428 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.185 0.625 0.883 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 -0.029 0.074* 
Std Error 0.038 0.056 0.040 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.613 0.609 0.064 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** -0.041 0.170*** 
Std Error 0.043 0.231 0.048 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.021 0.859 0.000 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 88512 107277 
R-squared 0.164 0.122 0.206 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
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Table 28: Economic reforms and informal sector employment: Industry level effects for enterprise 
numbers (1990-2001) based on formal sector four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in 1990 (the proportion of 
formal industry level output accounted for by the four largest formal firms in 1990) 
A: All states Dependent variable: ln (number of informal enterprises in three digit industry) 
 All industries Industries with formal CR4 
above median in 1990 
(less competitive  
formal sector) 
Industries with formal CR4 
below median in 1990 
(more competitive  
formal sector) 
Final goods tariffs 0.202 0.244 0.128 
 (0.255) (0.198) (0.429) 
Input tariffs -3.083** -3.367*** 0.711 
 (1.475) (0.809) (1.829) 
Delicensing 0.184 0.405*** -0.201 
 (0.130) (0.099) (0.250) 
FDI reform 0.178 0.687* -0.077 
 (0.137) (0.356) (0.227) 
Observations 378 153 225 
R-squared 0.112 0.491 0.086 
 
B: States with flexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 1) 
Final goods tariffs 0.428 1.221** -0.207 
 (0.416) (0.480) (0.503) 
Input tariffs -1.605 -5.504** 2.090 
 (1.893) (2.441) (1.420) 
Delicensing -0.064 0.215* -0.533** 
 (0.147) (0.121) (0.252) 
FDI reform 0.423** 0.284*** 0.303 
 (0.169) (0.080) (0.293) 
Observations 327 132 195 
R-squared 0.132 0.463 0.119 
    
C: States with inflexible labour markets (FLEX 2 = 0) 
Final goods tariffs 0.237 -0.019 0.521 
 (0.351) (0.169) (0.578) 
Input tariffs -3.946* -2.908*** -0.056 
 (2.038) (0.390) (2.896) 
Delicensing 0.312** 0.451*** 0.090 
 (0.147) (0.140) (0.200) 
FDI reform 0.142 0.433 -0.103 
 (0.129) (0.686) (0.191) 
Observations 357 138 219 
R-squared 0.147 0.482 0.121 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of informal enterprises at the three digit industry level. All regressions 
include a constant and industry and year fixed effects, and are weighted by pre-reform (1990) levels of the dependent 
variable. Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   
*: Significant at 10% 
In summary, the evidence is broadly indicative of competition between formal and informal 
manufacturers, as also within the formal sector, being a mechanism underlying the 
implications of liberalisation, in particular the delicensing reform, for the informal sector. 
While the possibility of the results also deriving in part from collaborative linkages between 
informal and formal units cannot be ruled out, a rigorous examination of the same is beyond 
the scope of the current study and data. 
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3.5 Further analysis and robustness checks 
3.5.1 Endogeneity of tariff liberalisation policy 
As explained in Section 1.2, the tariff declines that were phased in during the initial years of 
reform (1991-1997) were arguably an exogenous event, although tariff policy endogeneity 
might be an issue in the post-1997 period, when the pressure to adhere to externally 
imposed guidelines had waned. Although my dataset focuses on employment shifts in the 
1990-2001 period and is therefore arguably largely immune to this concern, I explore 
whether tariff endogeneity poses problems for my results in a number of ways, along the 
lines of the formal sector analysis in Section 2.6.2. 
In Table 29, I regress final goods and input tariffs on lagged industry level employment (in 
logarithmic and absolute terms) and lagged industry employment shares for the informal 
sector in alternative specifications, including year and industry fixed effects throughout. The 
time lags used vary over one to three years. In all instances, there is no evidence of any 
association between informal industry employment levels and tariff rates in later years. 
Table 29: Tariff endogeneity check – regression of tariffs on lagged informal industry employment 
Period (dependent variable) t+1 t+2 t+3 
 
Dependent variable: Final goods tariffs 
ln (Informal employment) -0.016464 -0.005122 0.011626 
 (0.032074) (0.006116) (0.013230) 
Absolute informal employment -0.000000 -0.000000* 0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Share of informal employment -1.356834* -0.149030* 0.265656 
 (0.619153) (0.072600) (0.200149) 
 
Dependent variable: Input tariffs 
ln (Informal employment) -0.012172 0.006663 0.004303 
 (0.009350) (0.009607) (0.008805) 
Absolute informal employment -0.000000*** 0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Share of informal employment -0.429763*** 0.350535* 0.249852 
 (0.079884) (0.148239) (0.133476) 
The independent variables are measured in period t. All specifications include year and industry fixed effects. Standard 
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant 
at 10% 
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Next, I run separate regressions of the changes in final goods and input tariffs on the lagged 
changes in informal industry level employment, including period and industry fixed effects 
throughout. As evidenced in Table 30, there is no significant association between changes 
in informal employment and tariff changes in subsequent periods. Following Topalova and 
Khandelwal’s (2011) formal sector analysis, I also confirm that the period-to-period final 
goods and input tariff changes are not correlated with pre-existing informal industry 
employment levels (Table 30). 
Table 30: Tariff endogeneity check – regression of changes in tariffs on lagged changes in informal 
employment (industry level) 
Period (dependent variable) t+1 t+2 t+3 
 
Dependent variable: Change in final goods tariffs 
Change in ln (informal employment) -0.045614 -0.017347 0.002004 
 (0.030015) (0.010375) (0.008687) 
ln (informal employment) -0.057060 -0.018306 0.003901 
 (0.048998) (0.017325) (0.014173) 
Change in absolute informal employment -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Absolute informal employment -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
 
Dependent variable: Change in input tariffs 
Change in ln (informal employment) -0.021023* 0.007370 0.006683 
 (0.008914) (0.010543) (0.007722) 
ln (informal employment) -0.034354* 0.007437 0.008454 
 (0.013446) (0.019235) (0.014563) 
Change in absolute informal employment -0.000000*** 0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Absolute informal employment -0.000000*** 0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
The independent variables are measured in period t. All specifications include period and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   
*: Significant at 10% 
Furthermore, I drop two industries that were highly protected in the pre-reform period, yet 
were subjected to visibly low tariff declines relative to other industries with comparably high 
tariff rates in the 1991-1997 period6. In Section 2.3.2, Figure 1(a) suggests that some 
endogeneity may have seeped into tariff policy as regards these two industries even in the 
face of the IMF backed reforms of 1991, given that the high degree of tariff protection 
                                                          
6 These industries are the wine manufacturing industry and the distillation, rectification and blending of spirits 
industry. See Figure 1(a). 
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enjoyed by these industries in the pre-reform period was relaxed to a lesser extent in the 
reform years relative to other industries with comparably high pre-reform tariffs. Column 2 
of Table 31 reveals that the omission of these outliers leaves the baseline results (re-
presented in Column 1 of Table 31 for convenience) virtually unchanged in terms of both 
magnitude and significance.  
3.5.2 Additional checks 
To assess whether my results are influenced by state level characteristics other than the 
flexibility of labour market regulation, I run a regression in which I add state-year interaction 
fixed effects to my baseline specification. The results, presented in Column 3 of Table 31, 
indicate that the baseline results are similar in magnitude and significance following the 
addition of these interactions. This suggests that the baseline statistical significance of the 
interplay between the reforms and labour market flexibility is retained after accounting for 
other state level trends. Interestingly, controlling for state-year trends, input tariff declines 
are associated with a significant decrease in informal enterprise level employment, on 
average and ceteris paribus, in states with inflexible labour markets. As informal enterprises 
rarely use imported inputs, I interpret this as being a spillover effect driven by the possible 
general equilibrium price shifts engineered by reduced imported input prices (following the 
discussion in Section 3.2). The concurrent currency devaluation means that such shifts are 
all but impossible to trace in contemporaneous price index data. 
Table 31: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Tariff endogeneity check – Dropping outlier industries (Wine manufacturing and the 
distillation, rectification and blending of spirits) and adding state-year interaction fixed effects 
 Baseline (All 
enterprises) 
Dropping outlier 
industries 
Adding state-year 
interactions 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 -0.133 -0.131 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.106) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.151 0.155 0.152* 
 (0.097) (0.100) (0.092) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.577* 0.745** 
 (0.327) (0.328) (0.310) 
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Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.178 -0.184 -0.908*** 
 (0.168) (0.171) (0.298) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.092*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.088** -0.088** -0.061* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.023 0.022 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.076* 0.076* 0.081** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs  
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 0.022 0.021 
Std Error 0.078 0.079 0.073 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.809 0.785 0.770 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs  
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 0.393 -0.163 
Std Error 0.300 0.301 0.328 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.185 0.192 0.620 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing  
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 0.019 0.031 
Std Error 0.038 0.038 0.036 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.613 0.616 0.385 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform  
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** 0.099** 0.103** 
Std Error 0.043 0.043 0.040 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.021 0.021 0.010 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE No No Yes 
Observations 195789 195724 195789 
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.169 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE': fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Along the lines of Table 15, Column 2 of Table 32 attempts to control for the age, in terms 
of years of operation, of the informal enterprises in my dataset. The limitation of this 
attempt is that over 40 per cent of the enterprises in the dataset do not provide estimates 
of the duration for which they have operated. Nonetheless, for enterprises providing these 
estimates, the baseline figures are strengthened in magnitude and significance after 
controlling for enterprise age. Furthermore, the results also hold if the baseline measure of 
state level labour market flexibility (‘FLEX 2’) is replaced by either the ‘FLEX 1’ measure or 
the ‘FLEX 3’ measure, both outlined in Section 2.3.3 (Column 3 and Column 4, Table 32). 
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Table 32: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Robustness checks – Accounting for enterprise age and alternative measures of labour 
market flexibility 
 Baseline (All 
enterprises) 
Controlling for 
enterprise age 
(where reported) 
FLEX 1 instead of 
FLEX 2 
FLEX 3 instead of 
FLEX 2 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 -0.259*** -0.091 -0.058 
 (0.113) (0.099) (0.117) (0.077) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 0.151 0.186* 0.030 -0.088 
 (0.097) (0.101) (0.110) (0.133) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.985*** 0.537 0.548* 
 (0.327) (0.333) (0.328) (0.299) 
Input tariffs * FLEX -0.178 -0.518** 0.022 0.042 
 (0.168) (0.251) (0.187) (0.206) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.126*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 
 (0.030) (0.041) (0.030) (0.030) 
Delicensing * FLEX -0.088** -0.107** -0.027 -0.029 
 (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.022 0.026 0.052* 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) (0.028) 
FDI reform * FLEX 0.076* 0.095** 0.077* -0.036 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.038) 
Enterprise age  0.003***   
  (0.001)   
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 -0.074 -0.061 -0.146 
Std Error 0.078 0.087 0.097 0.158 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.809 0.397 0.529 0.357 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 0.467 0.559* 0.590 
Std Error 0.300 0.349 0.316 0.364 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.185 0.181 0.077 0.106 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 0.019 0.057 0.058 
Std Error 0.038 0.046 0.043 0.041 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.613 0.682 0.181 0.151 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** 0.117** 0.103** 0.016 
Std Error 0.043 0.047 0.041 0.039 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.690 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 115543 195789 195789 
R-squared 0.164 0.160 0.163 0.163 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard 
errors, in brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   The measure of labour market flexibility used in Columns 
1 and 2 is the ‘FLEX 2’ measure, while Columns 3 and 4 use alternative measures, as specified in the column headings. 
***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
In the baseline results discussed in Section 3.5.1, as well as in the findings presented in this 
section, the reform measures have been lagged by two years. In Table 33, I examine the 
extent to which the baseline figures in Column 6 of Table 20 are affected if a one year or 
three year lag is used instead of a two-year lag. Table 33 suggests that these modifications 
yield figures that are similar in magnitude and significance to the baseline numbers. The 
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exception is the employment enhancing effect associated with FDI reform in states with 
flexible labour markets, which loses significance when a one year lag is used, although it is 
significant when a three year lag is used. This suggests that the effect of FDI reform is likely 
to be a relatively slower, longer lasting impact. Conversely, the weak baseline significance 
attaching to input tariff declines is strengthened if the time lag is reduced to one year, but 
disappears for a three year lag, which is suggestive of a less lasting effect. 
Table 33: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Robustness checks – Modifying the baseline reform time lag and excluding individual 
post-reform cross-sections 
 Baseline (All enterprises) Time lag: 1 year Time lag: 3 years 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 -0.114 -0.179 
 (0.113) (0.101) (0.110) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.151 0.082 0.151 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.093) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.850*** 0.543 
 (0.327) (0.276) (0.337) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.178 -0.087 -0.173 
 (0.168) (0.220) (0.154) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.091*** 0.109*** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.088** -0.078** -0.092** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.035 0.019 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.076* 0.007 0.075* 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 -0.032 -0.028 
Std Error 0.078 0.083 0.075 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.809 0.704 0.710 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 0.763*** 0.370 
Std Error 0.300 0.292 0.318 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.185 0.009 0.244 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 0.014 0.017 
Std Error 0.038 0.037 0.037 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.613 0.715 0.657 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** 0.042 0.094** 
Std Error 0.043 0.042 0.042 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.021 0.317 0.027 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 195789 195789 
R-squared 0.164 0.165 0.164 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE': fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10%  
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The results of the supplementary checks outlined in Section 3.3.1 are presented in the 
Appendix. Column 2 of Table A6 shows that retaining DMEs, the large informal enterprises 
that are excluded from the main analysis as they do not appear in the 1990 data (Section 
3.3.1), has little impact on the baseline results. Column 3 of Table A6 indicates that changing 
the ‘FLEX 2’ indicator value for Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir from 0 to 1 (along the lines of 
Section 2.6.3) does not affect the key findings. Further, Column 4 of Table A6 highlights that 
the baseline findings are virtually unchanged if the small proportion of informal enterprises 
employing ten or more individuals, omitted in the main analysis, are retained. Column 5 of 
Table A6 confirms that the inclusion of informal enterprises reporting zero or missing values 
for raw material usage and/or physical product manufacturing has no material impact on 
the baseline, while Column 6 of Table A6 suggests that this also applies to the use of input 
tariffs deriving only from final goods tariffs for manufacturing industries. In addition, 
following Aghion et al (2008), I explore whether dropping individual states from my 
regressions has an impact on my results and conclude that the baseline numbers are robust 
to this check (Tables A7, A8 and A9). 
3.6 Concluding comments 
This chapter exploits the initiation of a quasi-exogenous round of tariff liberalisation and 
concurrent domestic policy reform to examine employment changes in small, unregistered 
(informal) Indian manufacturing enterprises in the 1990s. It also analyses the extent to 
which differences in state level labour market flexibility influence these changes. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on informal manufacturers in this 
context, which is vital given that these firms account for a lion’s share of employment in 
Indian manufacturing.  
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The results point to India’s delicensing and FDI reforms being associated with significant 
shifts in informal sector employment. On average and ceteris paribus, delicensing (FDI 
reform) is associated with a statistically significant increase (increase) in employment in 
informal enterprises in states with inflexible (flexible) labour markets. More importantly, at 
a broader industry level, delicensing (FDI) reform is also a predictor of significant and, from 
an economic perspective, more meaningful increases in informal enterprise numbers in 
states with inflexible (flexible) labour markets. Further, the swingeing import tariff 
reductions undertaken in India as part of the reform initiative of the 1990s rarely drive 
significant changes in informal sector employment, which is perhaps attributable to the fact 
that informal enterprises rarely engage in international trade. 
Further analysis on the mechanisms driving these effects is suggestive of the implications of 
delicensing being considerably more prominent in industries with a higher propensity 
towards competing formal and informal operators, as also greater degrees of intra-formal 
sector competition. For FDI liberalisation, enterprise level findings also hold particularly for 
these two sets of ‘more competitive’ industries, but industry level shifts appear to be 
restricted to industries characterised by less competition in both instances. In light of the 
findings of the formal sector analysis (summarised in Section 2.7), these insights are 
indicative of competition more clearly being a mechanism underpinning the impact of 
delicensing as a driver of formal and informal sector employment shifts, visible in states with 
inflexible labour markets. As regards FDI reform, there is more room to speculate that, while 
the degree of competition within the formal sector matters, supply chain linkages or 
agglomeration based ‘collaboration’ between formal and informal players might also have 
a bearing on employment effects, primarily in states with flexible labour markets. This may 
be a fertile avenue for future research, particularly in instances where more refined data on 
FDI are available. 
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As policy makers in developing economies tend to emphasise increases in formal 
employment as a key goal of economic liberalisation, the findings of this chapter are of 
general interest. They contribute to the growing literature examining the role of interactions 
between the Indian reform programme and variations in domestic state level institutional 
characteristics in driving post-reform economic outcomes. The results highlight that an 
analysis of the implications of market reform for firm level employment is incomplete unless 
variations in regional labour market flexibility are accounted for. In a developing country 
setting characterised by a substantial informal sector, my findings strongly suggest that 
informal enterprises merit at least as much analysis as the formal sector. Data permitting, 
further research is eminently desirable, in particular on the linkages between the formal and 
informal sectors and the mechanisms underlying the impacts analysed in this study. 
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Chapter 4: Opening the Floodgates: India’s Small Scale Dereservation Reform 
and Employment in Informal Manufacturing Enterprises 
4.1 Introduction 
Should small enterprises benefit from public sector protection and promotion, relative to 
larger competitors? This question has provoked much debate among development 
economists. The informal sector, typically characterised by small enterprises and accounting 
for a lion’s share of economic activity in much of Asia and Africa (see for instance La Porta 
and Schleifer, 2008; Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011; and Heintz, 2012), merits special 
attention in this context. By definition, informal employment and output are outside the 
purview of government regulation. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, regulation targeting 
the formal sector often has important implications for the informal sector, as the twin forces 
of competition and collaboration often shape outcomes for businesses operating in both 
sectors. Policies targeted at promoting the growth of smaller enterprises in the formal 
sector could therefore affect outcomes for informal enterprises. This is of particular 
relevance for India, where informal enterprises have long accounted for 99 per cent of firms 
and 80 per cent of employment in the manufacturing sector. 
India offers unique territory for an examination of the effectiveness of policy aimed at 
shielding small businesses from the pressures of product market competition. As described 
in Section 1.3, since the 1960s, the Indian government progressively reserved a number of 
manufactured products for production in small scale industries (‘SSI reservation’). Martin et 
al (2017) note that by 1996, over 1000 products, amounting to approximately 20 per cent 
of the universe of manufactured goods, had been reserved for small enterprises. However, 
following the comprehensive economic reform programme unleashed in India following an 
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economic crisis in 1990 (Section 1.2), policymakers began to question the benefits of SSI 
reservation and whether, in a longer run likely to feature rapid modernisation and 
technological progress, the policy would be enforceable.  
Eventually, in the late 1990s, the government decided to ‘dereserve’ the hitherto SSI 
reserved products. This dereservation was undertaken in phases over a fourteen year period 
(1997-2010), and there is no evidence that products were systematically dereserved on the 
basis of pre-existing industry characteristics or trends. The dereservation reform therefore 
serves as a natural experiment for an analysis of the implications of eliminating barriers to 
entry in product markets that had, for fairly long periods, been the preserve of small 
businesses.   
The current analysis focuses on the implications of this dismantling of India’s SSI reservation 
policy (‘SSI dereservation’), discussed in Section 1.3, for employment in informal 
manufacturing enterprises in the country in the 1995-2006 period. As emphasised by Martin 
et al (2017), the Indian reforms of the early and mid-1990s, which took centre stage in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, had largely run their course by 1997. There was no major product 
or industry level reform other than SSI dereservation in Indian manufacturing in the post-
1997 years, which largely obviates the potentially thorny question of disentangling the 
effect of the dereservation policy from those of major concurrent policy shifts. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study focusing on the informal sector in the context of this 
reform. The formal sector was the primary focal point of SSI dereservation, as the definition 
of a ‘small business’ was set at a level that divided the formal sector into small and large 
businesses that were and (largely) were not permitted to produce SSI reserved products. 
Nonetheless, in consonance with the discussion pertaining to the reforms of the early 1990s 
in Section 3.1, the initiation of SSI dereservation may have led to changes in informal sector 
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employment, on account of changes in the product market competitive landscape or 
through supply chain linkages and other forms of collaboration between formal and 
informal operators. I discuss evidence regarding these mechanisms in Section 4.5. 
Overall, at the enterprise level, there is no statistically significant shift in informal enterprise 
employment attaching to dereservation in the 1995-2006 period, although enterprises in 
‘still reserved’ product markets are consistently significantly larger than other enterprises. 
However, I find that larger informal manufacturers (‘establishments’) producing dereserved 
products employ on average a statistically significant 7 per cent more people relative to 
establishments manufacturing items that were never reserved, with no corresponding 
significance visible for OAMEs. This result appears to be driven by competition between 
establishments and formal firms, and is possibly linked to some extent with backward 
linkages (input sourcing) in establishments (but not forward linkages, in terms of output 
sales).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the context. 
Section 4.3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 
present the results and a discussion of potential mechanisms. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Context 
Table 34 lists the proportions of products that were never SSI reserved in each broad 
industry category, along with the proportions that were reserved in 1995 and that remained 
reserved in 2001, 2006 and 2010. While reserved products existed in every industry group 
in 1995, the share of reserved products varied considerably across categories, ranging from 
3 per cent of basic metal and alloy industry products to 37 per cent of leather industry 
products. Further, dereservation was initiated across industry groups in the 1997-1999 
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period and gained momentum in the post-2000 period, with no obvious pattern of industry 
selection even at a broad industry level (Figure 2, Section 1.3), which facilitates parameter 
identification in this study. 
Table 34: SSI dereservation – breakdown of products by broad industry category 
  Proportions: 
Industry category Number of 
products 
 Never 
reserved 
 Reserved 
(1995) 
 Reserved 
(2001) 
Reserved 
(2006) 
 Reserved 
(2010) 
Food products 371 0.86 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.02 
Beverages, tobacco and related 
products 
39 0.95 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Textiles and textile products 
(including wearing apparel) 
459 0.85 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Wood and wood products, 
furnitures and fixtures 
116 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.06 
Paper and paper products and 
printing, publishing and allied 
industries 
160 0.82 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.02 
Leather and products of 
leather, fur substitutes of 
leather 
131 0.63 0.37 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Basic chemicals and chemical 
products (except products of 
petroleum and coal) 
1,250 0.92 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.01 
Rubber, plastic, petroleum and 
coal products; processing of 
nuclear fuels 
387 0.82 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.00 
Non-metallic mineral products 191 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.01 
Basic metal and alloy industries 297 0.97 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 
Metal products and parts, 
except machinery and 
equipment 
265 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.04 
Machinery and equipment 
other than transport 
equipment 
952 0.94 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.00 
Transport equipment and parts 216 0.88 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.00 
Other manufacturing industries 366 0.87 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.00 
TOTAL 5,200 0.88 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Government of India data on SSI dereservation (available at 
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/)  
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Martin et al (2017) explore the impact of the dereservation reform on formal manufacturing 
enterprises. They conclude that while the reform led to reduced employment in smaller 
enterprises that had previously benefited from being in reserved product markets, this 
effect was outweighed by increased employment in larger enterprises that were able to 
enter the dereserved product spaces, with a positive net productivity effect. Their findings 
also suggest that the reservation policy had imposed growth constraints on a subset of 
formal firms. This is in line with the results of a simulation exercise undertaken by Garcia-
Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014), which suggests that the removal of the reservation policy 
would yield output and productivity increases in the manufacturing sector. Further, Tewari 
and Wilde (2014) find that the dereservation reform is associated with increased product 
scope and productivity in the formal sector, particularly for multi-product firms.  
The current study, which focuses on informal enterprises, complements this body of existing 
research on the dereservation reform and formal firms. Its analysis is founded upon data 
compiled by India’s Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation in its periodic 
surveys of unorganised enterprises in India, almost all of which can be categorised as 
‘informal’ enterprises (Section 3.3.1). This chapter aims to identify whether outcomes for 
informal enterprises in product spaces that had been dereserved by a given point in time 
differ relative to those for informal enterprises in product spaces that were never reserved, 
as well as relative to those for informal enterprises manufacturing products that were 
reserved (or, in other words, were yet to be dereserved) at the same point in time.   
As specified in Section 1.3, the threshold for a ‘small business’ in 1996 was defined in terms 
of fixed assets (plant and machinery) not exceeding a level of Rs. 10 million. It is worth 
emphasising that given this definition, practically all informal enterprises in India, defined 
as proprietary or partnership enterprises that employ less than ten workers (or less than 
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twenty workers without using electricity), qualify as ‘small’ enterprises. Summary 
information on plant and machinery for the enterprises in my dataset is discussed in Section 
4.3.1.  
This chapter explores the implications of the removal of SSI reservation for a segment of the 
economy that comprises entirely of ‘small’ enterprises. Any effects that I observe may 
operate through the channels of increased competition (with larger enterprises entering 
hitherto reserved product markets after dereservation) or linkages between informal 
enterprises and the formal sector (by way of supply side linkages or agglomeration effects, 
as proposed by Munro, 2011). As emphasised above, endogeneity is unlikely to pose a threat 
to my results, more so given that the timing of dereservation is very unlikely to have been 
based on trends in informal sector outcomes, as opposed to shifts in formal industries, for 
which data are compiled on a more regular (annual) basis. I present some summary statistics 
in support of this view in Section 4.3.1. 
4.3 Data and Method 
4.3.1 Data 
I use enterprise level data primarily for the 1995-2006 period, compiled by India’s National 
Sample Survey Office (NSSO) in its periodic surveys of unorganised enterprises. The surveys 
were undertaken in the financial years 1994-1995, 2000-2001 and 2005-06 and cover all the 
states of India.7 In robustness analysis, I also use enterprise level survey data for 1989-1990 
(Section 4.6).  I do not use the 1989-1990 data in my baseline analysis as they do not provide 
district identifiers, which form an important component of my baseline identification 
                                                          
7 Unlike the analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this study does not revolve around variations in state level labour 
market flexibility, so I do not exclude observations on this basis. 
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strategy. Further, as the SSI dereservation policy was product specific, I exclude informal 
enterprises that do not report product codes, or report zero production values. As discussed 
in Section 3.3.1, these enterprises are likely to be engaged only in trading activity, as 
opposed to actual manufacturing. The analysis presented in this chapter, therefore, applies 
only to informal enterprises that manufacture physical products. 
For simplicity, I will refer to each survey using only the second year in question (for instance, 
I will refer to the 1994-1995 survey as the ‘1995’ survey). The surveys cover all 
manufacturing enterprises that employ less than ten workers (or less than twenty workers 
without using electricity). Each survey employs a stratified sampling design, with the primary 
sampling units (‘first stage units’) being villages or urban blocks and the final stage units 
being enterprises. The 2006 survey departed somewhat from the usual procedure by 
introducing a ‘list frame’, through which all relatively large urban enterprises were surveyed, 
with a separate ‘area frame’ focusing on the usual sampling for smaller urban enterprises 
and for all rural enterprises. While the enterprises surveyed in each period account for a 
small fraction (approximately 1 to 5 per cent) of the population (with the exception of the 
list frame in 2006), each survey provides economic census based weights that facilitate 
aggregation and analysis applicable to the population of informal manufacturers.  
Following the analysis in Section 3.3.1, I exclude a small number of enterprises that report 
having ten or more employees. This is particularly relevant in the context of this chapter, as 
the ‘list frame’ adopted in the 2006 survey oversamples larger informal enterprises in urban 
areas and could therefore induce artificial rightward skewness in the employment 
distribution for 2006, relative to the 1995 and 2001 distributions, if this adjustment is not 
made. On the whole, the employment distribution of informal enterprises employing less 
than ten persons in the 1990-2006 period is remarkably stable over time (Figure 6), with a 
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majority of informal enterprises engaging only one or two people, in line with the discussion 
in Section 3.3.1. However, towards the right tail of the distribution, a steady increase is 
visible in terms of the proportion of informal enterprises employing six to nine persons, as 
well as overall employment in this category. 
Figure 6: Informal sector employment distribution (1990-2006) 
    
Source: NSSO data (1990, 1995, 2001, 2006)    As inverse sampling probability based multipliers have been used to 
aggregate the raw data, these distributions are representative of the population of informal enterprises. 
As specified in Section 4.2, all of the informal enterprises in the dataset qualify as ‘small’ 
businesses from the context of SSI dereservation, given the definition of the fixed assets of 
a small business not exceeding Rs. 10 million in 1996. While only a third of the enterprises 
surveyed in the 1995-2006 period provide data on plant and machinery, these data reveal 
that the average informal enterprise owned plant and machinery worth approximately Rs. 
58,000, with the median amounting to 6,500 and the third quartile falling at Rs. 32,000. Only 
five informal manufacturers (out of a total of over 140,000 in the dataset) report this figure 
to be in excess of Rs. 10 million and all of these (five) enterprises were surveyed in 2006, so 
that the effective threshold would have increased in line with inflation in any case. This 
suggests that informal enterprises producing hitherto reserved products were not 
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constrained from increasing investment in capital while the reservation policy was in place, 
a concern which is relevant for analyses focused on the formal sector. 
At the enterprise level, while I do not have panel data, I benefit from having repeated cross-
sections that represent the universe of informal and formal manufacturers. I use the weights 
provided in my regressions to obtain results that apply to the population of manufacturers. 
At the district level, I use these weights to construct a panel dataset. To explore potential 
linkages between the informal and formal sectors, I also use data from the Annual Survey of 
Industries (ASI), which records outcomes for formal firms and provides weights that are 
similar to the informal enterprise survey weights provided by the NSSO. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the NSSO distinguishes between ‘own account manufacturing 
enterprises’ (OAMEs), which are run purely by household labour, and ‘establishments’, 
which employ at least one hired worker on a ‘fairly regular basis’. Establishments are 
classified as being ‘non-directory’ (NDMEs) or ‘directory’ (DMEs), with the former employing 
less than six workers and the latter employing six or more workers. While DMEs were 
excluded from the baseline analysis in Chapter 3, on account of their not having been 
covered in the 1990 informal enterprise survey, they are not excluded from the baseline 
analysis in this chapter, as DMEs were surveyed in the 1995, 2001 and 2006 NSSO surveys.  
Over 80 per cent of informal manufacturing enterprises are OAMEs. OAMEs account for 
higher proportions of the rural informal manufacturing sector relative to establishments. On 
average, an informal manufacturing enterprise employs two to three workers. The average 
OAME employs 2.1 workers, whereas the average establishment employs 4.4 workers. As 
illustrated in Table 35, approximately 82 per cent of informal enterprises are classified as 
operating in ‘never reserved’ product markets. Establishments are somewhat more likely to 
report producing hitherto reserved products relative to OAMEs. Average OAME 
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employment in the 1995-2006 period appears to have declined slightly. On the other hand, 
employment in the average establishment increased in the same period, in particular in 
dereserved and still reserved product markets. This trend is visible in Figure 7, which plots 
the change in average employment (1990-2006) for all informal enterprises as a whole and 
separately for informal enterprises producing products that were never reserved and those 
producing the hitherto reserved products (that were dereserved in the post-1996 period). 
The 1990-1995 change in average employment is roughly parallel for all three categories, 
which suggests that endogeneity is unlikely to be a concern for the current analysis. The 
slight increase visible across categories in this period is attributable to a slight change in 
survey sampling methods adopted by the NSSO, on account of which directory 
establishments, the largest informal enterprise type, were surveyed from 1995 onwards, 
after having been omitted from the 1990 survey. 
Table 35: Summary statistics by SSI reservation status: population of informal enterprises (1995, 2001, 2006) 
 Proportion of enterprises Number of 
enterprises 
 Average employment 
 1995 2001 2006 Total  1995 2001 2006 Overall 
All enterprises: 
         
Never reserved 0.83 0.81 0.82 12,034,059  2.40 2.38 2.42 2.40 
Dereserved  0.07 0.08 690,594   2.38 2.33 2.36 
Reserved 0.17 0.12 0.10 1,952,868  2.64 2.91 3.45 2.89 
Overall    14,677,521  2.45 2.44 2.51 2.46 
OAMEs: 
         
Never reserved 0.85 0.83 0.86 10,410,441  2.21 2.04 2.00 2.10 
Dereserved  0.08 0.09 613,827   2.25 1.96 2.11 
Reserved 0.15 0.09 0.06 1,295,288  2.15 1.94 2.04 2.07 
Overall    12,319,556  2.21 2.05 2.00 2.10 
Establishments: 
         
Never reserved 0.65 0.71 0.69 1,623,620  4.21 4.37 4.38 4.33 
Dereserved  0.03 0.06 76,767   4.01 4.44 4.29 
Reserved 0.35 0.25 0.25 657,580  4.20 4.70 4.65 4.29 
Overall    2,357,967  4.21 4.44 4.45 4.38 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSSO survey data for 1995, 2001 and 2006 (CPN and ASICC product codes 
used to determine SSI reservation status; as inverse sampling probability based multipliers have been used to aggregate 
the raw data, these distributions are representative of the population of informal enterprises) 
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Figure 7: Average employment in informal enterprises (1990-2006): Overall and by SSI 
dereservation status 
  
Source: NSSO data (1990, 1995, 2001, 2006)    As inverse sampling probability based multipliers have been used to 
aggregate the raw data, these distributions are representative of the population of informal enterprises. 
On the whole, OAMEs appear to be less likely to expand relative to establishments. The 2006 
survey reveals that over 70 per cent of manufacturing OAMEs experienced stagnation or 
decline over the preceding three years, while only 18 per cent expanded. On the other hand, 
55-60 per cent of establishments reported perceptions of stagnation or decline over the 
same period, while over 23 per cent expanded. The share of establishments that report 
being relatively young (12 per cent report having operated for less than three years) exceeds 
that of OAMEs (6 per cent). 
4.3.2 Methodology 
4.3.2.1 Enterprise level analysis 
The 1995, 2001 and 2006 surveys provide product level data on informal manufacturers. 
The 1995 survey uses the Common Product Nomenclature (CPN) of 1988, while the 2001 
and 2006 surveys provide Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) Commodity Codes, or ASICC 
codes. The product codes used by the Government of India in its notifications on 
dereservation are distinct from both the CPN and the ASICC codes. I therefore set up a 
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concordance between the CPN codes and the dereservation codes. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to undertake this exercise, and consequently this 
concordance is a contribution to the literature.  
In addition, I match the ASICC codes and the dereservation codes based on product and 
industry descriptions, comparing my matches with the concordance set up by Martin et al 
(2017) to ensure consistency. As discussed in Section 1.3, the list of reserved products 
accounted for approximately 20 per cent of all manufacturing products in 1996 if the 
dereservation product codes are used. Using the ASICC codes, which are slightly more 
aggregated than the dereservation codes (a total of 5,200 ASICC codes may be mapped to 
6,475 dereservation codes), this figure declines to 12 per cent, as shown in Table 34 (Section 
4.2). In this manner, I obtain a firm level dataset with information on reservation status for 
each product produced by every firm in 1995, 2001 and 2006. This facilitates an enterprise 
level baseline analysis, with the estimated equation being 
𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑡  =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑡                                               (3)                                                                             
where lnempijkmt is the natural logarithm of the total number of persons engaged in 
enterprise i producing product j in three digit industry k and district m at time t; DERESjkt-1 is 
a categorical variable capturing whether enterprise i operates in a reserved, dereserved or 
never reserved product space (for product j in industry k at the point t-1); and δt, δk and δm 
are year, industry and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district-
industry level. The reference category for DERESjkt-1 is that of enterprises manufacturing 
products that were never SSI reserved. The other categories are defined by whether 
enterprises reporting manufacturing products that were reserved or dereserved at the time 
of survey. Alternative specifications introduce separate categories demarcating whether the 
dereservation had occurred in the 1997-1999 period or in the 2001-2005 period. In total, 
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the DERESjkt-1 variable comprises up to three categories from the following set: dereserved, 
still reserved, dereserved in the 1997-1999 period, and dereserved in the 2001-2005 period. 
As the employment data fit a Poisson distribution well, I also use a count dependent variable 
(the total number of persons engaged) in an alternative specification that uses a Poisson 
(count) regression. 
Over two-thirds of the enterprises in my dataset produce only one product. For the 
remainder, which are multi-product enterprises, I assign every enterprise to the relevant 
(de)reservation category if it reports manufacturing at least one (de)reserved product and 
to the relevant ‘never reserved’ category otherwise. Further, I follow Tewari and Wilde 
(2014) in considering an enterprise to operate in a ‘never reserved’ space if it reports having 
operated for less than three years and being a manufacturer of a product that was 
dereserved at least three years prior to the survey period. The justification for this is that 
from the perspective of such an enterprise, the product in question would effectively never 
have been reserved. 
4.3.2.2 District level analysis 
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, I construct a district level panel dataset using the district codes 
and survey weights attached to enterprise level observations in the 1995, 2001 and 2006 
surveys. To explore the implications of dereservation for informal sector employment at the 
district level, I employ the strategy adopted by Martin et al (2017). This approach involves 
the use of long differencing, with exposure to dereservation captured by a variable termed 
‘FrDeres’: 
𝐹𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑡 =
∑ (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,1995𝑑𝑝 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑡)𝑝
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,1995𝑑
                                                                (4) 
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In other words, exposure to dereservation in district d at time t is measured by aggregating, 
over all products, employment associated with every product p manufactured in a given 
district in 1995, multiplied by a dummy variable equalling one if product p had been 
dereserved by time t (‘Derespt’), divided by total employment in district d in 1995. For this 
analysis, a small number of districts not featuring at least ten observations in each cross-
section (after weighting the data) are omitted. The regressions of interest employ a panel 
fixed effects approach: 
∆ln 𝑦𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∆𝐹𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾 ∆𝐹𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑑𝑡 +  𝛿𝑋𝑑2001 + 𝜆𝑑 + 𝜋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑑𝑡                          (5)                       
where ln(ydt) is the natural logarithm of district level employment or enterprise numbers, 
FrDeresdt is district d’s dereservation exposure estimate for time t, FrDeresNeidt is the 
corresponding estimate for the districts neighbouring district d, λd and πt are district and 
period fixed effects; and Xd2001 denotes a set of district level control variables for 2001, 
obtained from the 2001 census and, as regards state level labour market flexibility, the ‘FLEX 
2’ variable described in Section 2.3.3. Controlling for dereservation exposure in 
neighbouring districts helps to address the possibility of spatial spillover effects. The census 
based control variables include district level literacy rates, the share of Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes in each district’s population (a demographic control variable) and the 
proportions of each district’s working age population (15-64) engaged in major alternative 
economic activities (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transport, trade and services, with 
construction being the base group). This closely follows the district level analysis of Martin 
et al (2017), along the lines of which I also use district level employment in 1995 to weight 
these regressions. This ensures that the analysis yields estimates that account for 
differences in initial district size.  
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The identification strategy is underpinned by the argument that, notwithstanding the 
apparent randomness in the timing of dereservation across product lines, cross-district 
variation in the exposure to dereservation in the pre-reform period (1995) is likely to 
circumvent endogeneity concerns. In addition, as Martin et al (2017) suggest, the 
dereservation reform may be thought of as having been an exogenous shift at the district 
level, which provides further protection from endogeneity issues. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Enterprise level findings 
At the enterprise level, results corresponding to the simplest specification corresponding to 
equation (3) are reported in Table 36. For the 1995-2006 period, relative to informal 
manufacturers of products that were never reserved, dereservation is not associated with 
statistically significant changes in average employment. However, enterprises operating in 
product spaces that are ‘still reserved’ (in other words, product spaces that had yet to be 
dereserved at the time of surveying) are significantly larger than their ‘never reserved’ 
counterparts, with the differential amounting to almost 12 per cent after the inclusion of 
year, district and industry fixed effects (Table 36, Column 4). These findings are virtually 
unchanged in magnitude and significance when I run an alternative Poisson (count) 
regression (Table 36, Column 5). 
Table 36: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1995-2006): I 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson 
Still reserved 0.141*** 0.104*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.131*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Dereserved 0.015 0.043 0.059 0.065 0.053 
 (0.034) (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) 
Observations 140059 140059 140059 140059 140059 
R-squared 0.132 0.143 0.229 0.230  
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
District FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged (total number of persons engaged) for OLS 
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(Poisson) regression   'FE' denotes fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level.    
***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Further, in Table 37, I examine whether the timing of dereservation might matter for 
informal enterprise employment. Specifically, I introduce two dereservation categories to 
distinguish between products that were dereserved up to 1999 (‘Dereserved 1997-1999’) 
and products that were dereserved in the 2001-2005 period (‘Dereserved 2001-2005’). The 
results are largely unchanged relative to Table 36, although weak significance attaches to 
the positive coefficient corresponding to the early period dereservation category (Table 37, 
Column 4, ‘Dereserved 1997-1999’).  
Table 37: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1995-2006): II 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson 
Still reserved 0.141*** 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.115*** 0.130*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Dereserved 1997-1999 0.051 0.061 0.084* 0.091* 0.073 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) 
Dereserved 2001-2005 -0.156*** -0.039 -0.048 -0.047 -0.031 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.046) (0.047) (0.052) 
Observations 140059 140059 140059 140059 140059 
R-squared 0.133 0.143 0.230 0.230  
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
District FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged (total number of persons engaged) for OLS 
(Poisson) regression   'FE' denotes fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level.    
***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
I proceed to explore the extent to which these broad enterprise level findings differ for 
OAMEs and establishments (Table 38 and Table 39). Interestingly, this analysis highlights 
that dereservation is associated with a significant rise in employment in establishments, but 
not in OAMEs. In precise terms, for the 1995-2006 period, establishments producing 
recently dereserved products are approximately 7 per cent larger, in employment terms, in 
comparison with establishments producing products that were never reserved (Table 38, 
Column 3). This result appears to be driven by the early period dereservation category rather 
than establishments operating in product spaces dereserved in 2001-2005 (Table 39, 
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Column 3). Moreover, the significance of the positive coefficient attaching to the ‘still 
reserved’ indicator in Table 36 and Table 37 is robust only for establishments. 
Table 38: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1995-2006, enterprise type): I 
 OLS    Poisson   
 All OAMEs Establishments  All OAMEs Establishments 
Still reserved 0.116*** 0.033 0.106***  0.131*** 0.019 0.100*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.014)  (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) 
Dereserved 0.065 0.052 0.069**  0.053 0.029 0.061** 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.032)  (0.045) (0.059) (0.030) 
Observations 140059 97849 42210  140059 97849 42210 
R-squared 0.230 0.201 0.274     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged (total number of persons engaged) for OLS 
(Poisson) regression   'FE' denotes fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level.    
***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table 39: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises 1995-2006, enterprise type): II 
 OLS    Poisson   
 All OAMEs Establishments  All OAMEs Establishments 
Still reserved 0.115*** 0.032 0.106***  0.130*** 0.019 0.100*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.014)  (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) 
Dereserved 
1997-1999 
0.091* 0.077 0.074**  0.073 0.052 0.063* 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.037)  (0.052) (0.066) (0.037) 
Dereserved 
2001-2005 
-0.047 -0.078* 0.060  -0.031 -0.120** 0.059 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.056)  (0.052) (0.047) (0.050) 
Observations 140059 97849 42210  140059 97849 42210 
R-squared 0.230 0.201 0.274     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged (total number of persons engaged) for OLS 
(Poisson) regression   'FE' denotes fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level.    
***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
The economic significance of the result for establishments is limited, as the average 
establishment employs between 4 and 5 persons (Section 4.3.1). Effectively, an employment 
differential of 7 per cent therefore translates roughly to 0.3 persons. In other words, on 
average and ceteris paribus, in response to the dereservation reform over the 1995-2006 
period, one in three establishments producing at least one recently dereserved product 
employed one additional person, in comparison with establishments manufacturing only 
items that were never reserved. Nonetheless, the statistical significance is noteworthy and 
indicates that this differential may have increased by 2011, when dereservation had been 
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extended to all but a small number of products. Although the NSSO surveyed manufacturing 
enterprises in 2011, product code data were not compiled in this exercise, on account of 
which I am unable to include the 2011 survey round in my analysis. 
4.4.2 District level findings 
Table 40 presents the results yielded by estimating equation (5). Controlling for district and 
year fixed effects and the additional variables outlined in Section 4.3.2.2, I find that 
increased exposure to dereservation (captured by the ‘FrDeres’ variable) is not associated 
with statistically significant changes in employment in, and the number of, informal 
enterprises at the district level. This applies to OAMEs as well as establishments. 
Throughout, I obtain coefficients that are positive but statistically insignificant. This also 
holds for exposure to dereservation in neighbouring districts, which is indicative of the 
absence of significant spatial or migration driven effects in response to dereservation, at 
least up to 2006. Any effect that dereservation may have had on informal manufacturers 
therefore appears to have been fairly localised. 
Table 40: SSI dereservation and district level outcomes in the informal sector: panel fixed effects (1995-2006) 
 All enterprises  OAMEs  Establishments 
 ∆ ln (emp) ∆ ln (ent)  ∆ ln (emp) ∆ ln (ent)  ∆ ln (emp) ∆ ln (ent) 
∆ FrDeres (own district) 1.828 1.463  2.471 1.655  0.073 0.376 
 (2.000) (1.741)  (2.539) (1.992)  (1.024) (1.007) 
∆ FrDeres (neighbours) -2.458 -2.135  -2.982 -2.262  -0.167 -0.616 
 (3.300) (2.949)  (3.976) (3.312)  (1.498) (1.439) 
FLEX 2 -0.805 -0.980  -1.654 -1.573  0.712 0.744 
 (1.282) (0.939)  (1.581) (1.267)  (1.425) (1.084) 
Literacy rate (2001) -10.906 -7.387  -8.152 -6.167  -9.885 -7.615 
 (9.809) (7.907)  (12.334) (9.582)  (11.897) (9.277) 
SC/ST % (2001) 1.125 -1.407  -3.934 -4.562  8.292 7.092 
 (4.609) (3.209)  (5.216) (4.387)  (6.098) (4.310) 
2001 census:  
proportion of working age 
population engaged inz: 
        
         
Agriculture -186.854 -171.594*  -201.604 -185.214  -92.486 -77.045 
 (116.586) (89.462)  (136.621) (117.096)  (182.983) (148.720) 
Mining -232.929 -215.778*  -250.237 -235.105  -101.967 -84.063 
 (150.831) (115.854)  (179.616) (151.993)  (229.266) (186.064) 
Manufacturing -179.110 -157.540  -198.004 -171.750  -77.842 -60.811 
 (132.359) (103.629)  (159.775) (130.533)  (177.696) (143.614) 
Trade -283.299 -281.294*  -357.333 -339.024*  -91.501 -78.584 
 (193.770) (147.999)  (226.604) (192.524)  (287.335) (233.593) 
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Transport -6.850 8.843  19.542 42.896  -91.048 -85.398 
 (93.156) (61.784)  (121.503) (95.095)  (86.226) (65.735) 
Services -236.451 -217.344*  -227.066 -221.382  -129.829 -107.610 
 (146.429) (111.817)  (172.333) (150.085)  (245.304) (200.458) 
Observations 834 834  831 831  767 767 
R-squared 0.228 0.222  0.249 0.232  0.281 0.280 
Dependent variable:   ∆ ln (emp) = change in natural logarithm of employment   or   ∆ ln (ent) = change in natural 
logarithm of number of enterprises        Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   All regressions 
include a constant and district and year fixed effects.   ‘SC/ST %’ denotes the share of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes in a given district’s population in 2001.   z The base category is construction.              ***: Significant at 1%   
**: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
To ensure that the findings presented in Table 40 are not unduly skewed by the fact that the 
‘FrDeres’ measure equals zero for all districts in 1995 (the pre-reform year), I rerun the 
specification having excluded the data for 1995. These results are presented in Table 41 and 
are not materially different, in terms of the findings relating to dereservation exposure, from 
those in Table 40. 
Table 41: SSI dereservation and district level outcomes in the informal sector: panel fixed effects (2001-2006) 
 All enterprises  OAMEs  Establishments 
 ∆ ln (emp) ∆ ln (ent)  ∆ ln (emp) ∆ ln (ent)  ∆ ln (emp) ∆ ln (ent) 
∆ FrDeres (own district) -0.714 -0.912  -0.604 -0.953  -0.478 -0.153 
 (0.744) (0.836)  (0.885) (0.909)  (0.662) (0.632) 
∆ FrDeres (neighbours) -0.869 -0.320  -0.358 -0.180  -0.869 -1.091 
 (1.168) (1.144)  (1.286) (1.224)  (1.783) (1.611) 
FLEX 2 -0.093 -0.275*  -0.427** -0.456***  0.218 0.217 
 (0.156) (0.144)  (0.184) (0.165)  (0.272) (0.246) 
Literacy rate (2001) -1.275 -1.364*  -1.898** -1.745**  0.290 -0.113 
 (0.803) (0.780)  (0.871) (0.841)  (1.420) (1.224) 
SC/ST % (2001) 2.233* 1.925**  2.148* 1.841*  0.933 1.082 
 (1.168) (0.969)  (1.146) (0.954)  (0.889) (0.794) 
2001 census:  
proportion of working age 
population engaged inz: 
        
         
Agriculture -3.390 0.629  -6.255 1.087  -1.721 -2.013 
 (4.430) (4.942)  (6.458) (6.111)  (6.679) (5.625) 
Mining -2.919 1.203  -7.214 1.036  1.014 -0.910 
 (9.597) (9.509)  (11.185) (10.384)  (10.354) (8.242) 
Manufacturing -0.910 3.773  -2.090 5.576  -2.644 -3.318 
 (4.357) (4.876)  (6.602) (6.184)  (6.869) (5.726) 
Trade -11.111 -10.265  -21.190** -15.033*  3.613 3.034 
 (7.640) (7.666)  (9.949) (9.034)  (6.444) (5.694) 
Transport 1.667 11.140  -0.584 14.305  3.281 4.558 
 (7.786) (8.716)  (11.603) (10.970)  (13.154) (11.782) 
Services -0.078 4.238  -1.355 5.547  -3.827 -4.186 
 (4.667) (5.167)  (6.860) (6.479)  (8.204) (6.801) 
Observations 417 417  415 415  381 381 
R-squared 0.187 0.205  0.254 0.241  0.036 0.034 
Dependent variable:   ∆ ln (emp) = change in natural logarithm of employment   or   ∆ ln (ent) = change in natural 
logarithm of number of enterprises        Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   All regressions 
include a constant and district and year fixed effects.   ‘SC/ST %’ denotes the share of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes in a given district’s population in 2001.   z The base category is construction.              ***: Significant at 1%   
**: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
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4.5 Potential mechanisms 
The definition of ‘small scale industry’ (SSI) discussed in Section 1.3 covers the entirety of 
the informal manufacturing sector. On the other hand, formal (registered) manufacturing 
firms may be classified as having or having not been ‘small’ from the perspective of the 
initiation of dereservation. As such, it is vital to observe that any changes in informal 
enterprise outcomes associated with dereservation are likely to have arisen through 
linkages between the formal and informal sectors. Perhaps most evidently, these linkages 
may take the form of competition between formal and informal operators in hitherto 
reserved product markets, and changes therein following the initiation of dereservation. 
Moreover, as outlined in Section 3.4.3, an evolving competitive landscape within the formal 
sector may also have implications for informality. An alternative argument, following Munro 
(2011), favours the existence of collaboration between the two sectors, owing to supply side 
linkages or agglomeration externalities. I proceed to analyse the extent to which the data 
support either or both of these channels. 
4.5.1 The competition channel 
Over time, the dereservation policy promoted an increase in the presence of larger formal 
firms in product spaces that were hitherto reserved for smaller players (both formal and 
informal). As a first test of whether the enterprise level effects might differ in this regard, I 
run equation (3) separately for two sets of enterprises, defined by whether the pre-reform 
(1995) four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in each three digit industry exceeded (did not 
exceed) the median, implying a lower (higher) degree of pre-reform competition in the 
formal sector. This follows the analysis undertaken for the effects of the earlier 1990s 
reforms in Section 3.4.3, which benefited from the fact that the data on the 1990s reforms 
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is industry and time variant. The ‘treatment’ of the SSI dereservation policy fell at the 
product level rather than the industry level, which renders industry level categories less 
precise in this context, as there are numerous products within each three digit industry. As 
a result, I cannot undertake industry level analysis in this context, but pre-reform cross-
industry variations in the degree of product market competition may still be employed for 
the enterprise level regressions. 
The results of the exercise founded upon CR4 ratios are presented in Table 42. The baseline 
result linking dereservation to increased employment in the average establishment is 
robust, and indeed strengthened, for industries that were more competitive (with CR4 ratios 
below the median) in 1995 (Table 42, Column 6). Significance is lost for less competitive 
industries (with CR4 ratios exceeding the median in 1995: Table 42, Column 5). On the other 
hand, employment in OAMEs producing at least one dereserved product registers is 
significantly smaller in less competitive industries, but is not significantly different in more 
competitive industries. 
Table 42: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1995-2006): Analysis based on formal 
sector four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in 1995 (the proportion of formal industry level output accounted 
for by the four largest formal firms in 1995) 
 OAMEs  Establishments 
 All Industry level 
CR4 above 
median in 
1995 
 (less 
competitive 
formal sector) 
Industry level 
CR4 below 
median in 
1995 
 (more 
competitive 
formal sector) 
 All Industry level 
CR4 above 
median in 
1995  
(less 
competitive 
formal sector) 
Industry level 
CR4 below 
median in 
1995 
 (more 
competitive 
formal sector) 
Still reserved 0.033 -0.031 0.062*  0.106*** 0.054** 0.121*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.034)  (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) 
Dereserved 0.052 -0.130** 0.079  0.069** 0.012 0.096** 
 (0.047) (0.064) (0.062)  (0.032) (0.054) (0.038) 
Observations 97849 64432 33417  42210 14478 27732 
R-squared 0.201 0.223 0.257  0.274 0.331 0.295 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%  **: Significant at 5%  *: Significant at 10% 
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This may relate to the findings of Martin et al (2017), who conclude that dereservation led 
to a decrease in the number of small formal firms following increased competition due to 
the entry of larger operators. Viewed from this perspective, the estimates in Table 42 
suggest that there may have been a rise in average employment in larger informal 
enterprises (establishments) in industries which had lower CR4 ratios and were, 
consequently, relatively more competitive in 1995. In less competitive industries where 
higher market shares were already accounted for by large formal firms prior to 
dereservation, this effect is perhaps more likely to have been muted. 
Further following the analysis in Section 3.4.3, I consider whether the baseline finding for 
establishments differs across industries characterised by the ratio of pre-reform (1995) 
average formal firm employment to average informal enterprise employment (the ‘F-I ratio’) 
exceeding and not exceeding the median (Table 43). Again, the intuitive case for this 
bifurcation of the dataset is that competition between formal and informal operators is 
arguably more likely to arise in industries with a lower average differential between formal 
and informal business size. The ‘F-I ratio’ serves as a proxy for this differential. In line with 
the results presented in Table 42, the positive and significant baseline coefficient attaching 
to employment in establishments in dereserved markets is restricted to more competitive 
industries in Table 43 (characterised as having lower ‘F-I ratios’ in 1995). 
Table 43: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1995-2006): Analysis based on the 
ratio of average formal firm employment to average informal enterprise employment (‘F-I ratio’) 
in 1995 
 OAMEs  Establishments 
 All Industry 
level F-I 
ratio above 
median in 
1995 
 (less 
competitive) 
Industry 
level F-I 
ratio below 
median in 
1995 
 (more 
competitive) 
 All Industry 
level F-I 
ratio above 
median in 
1995 
 (less 
competitive) 
Industry 
level F-I 
ratio below 
median in 
1995 
 (more 
competitive) 
Still reserved 0.033 -0.005 0.044  0.106*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.027)  (0.014) (0.030) (0.015) 
Dereserved 0.052 -0.052 0.094  0.069** 0.053 0.082** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.059)  (0.032) (0.057) (0.038) 
Observations 97849 25827 72022  42210 15353 26857 
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R-squared 0.201 0.298 0.202  0.274 0.356 0.274 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%  **: Significant at 5%  *: Significant at 10% 
A measure of competition deriving from firm specific perceptions of competitiveness might 
shed additional light in this context. In terms of the NSSO surveys used in the current study, 
the only evidence on competition effects is rooted in a question appearing in the 2001 and 
2006 NSSO surveys, which queries whether ‘competition from larger units’ was a problem 
encountered by informal enterprises surveyed in the preceding year. On the whole, 16 per 
cent of informal enterprises cited this as having been an issue from their perspective. The 
proportion of firms reporting this issue increased from 13 per cent in 2001 to over 20 per 
cent in 2006. While establishments were somewhat more likely to report the issue relative 
to OAMEs, the proportions of both types of informal enterprise raising the issue had 
increased in 2006, relative to 2001.  
Having rerun my enterprise level regressions separately for enterprises that do not cite 
competition from larger firms as having been a problem and for those that do, I obtain the 
results compiled in Table 44. This reveals that the positive and significant baseline 
dereservation effect for establishments is driven by establishments that cite competition 
with larger operators as being a problem, which is in line with the findings discussed above. 
In summary, there is some evidence in favour of product market competition having been a 
mechanism through which dereservation may have affected informal sector employment. 
However, in the absence of enterprise level panel data on informal manufacturers, I 
interpret these results with some caution. 
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Table 44: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises – competition with larger firms as a 
problem 
 All enterprises (1995-
2006) 
‘Competition from 
larger units’ was not 
cited as being a problem 
(2001, 2006) 
‘Competition from 
larger units’ was cited as 
being a problem (2001, 
2006) 
ALL INFORMAL 
ENTERPRISES 
   
Still reserved 0.116*** 0.130*** 0.217*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.034) 
Dereserved 0.065 0.067 0.036 
 (0.042) (0.054) (0.037) 
Observations 140059 64011 12267 
R-squared 0.230 0.277 0.392 
OAMEs    
Still reserved 0.033 0.009 0.098*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.034) 
Dereserved 0.052 0.066 -0.005 
 (0.047) (0.061) (0.043) 
Observations 97849 40413 6214 
R-squared 0.201 0.232 0.413 
ESTABLISHMENTS    
Still reserved 0.106*** 0.134*** 0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.028) 
Dereserved 0.069** 0.047 0.164*** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.055) 
Observations 42210 23598 6053 
R-squared 0.274 0.311 0.417 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%  **: Significant at 5%  *: Significant at 10% 
4.5.2 Other linkages between informal enterprises and the wider economy 
To examine the existence of supply chain linkages between formal and informal market 
players and their implications for my results, I further examine the descriptive statistics of 
the NSSO surveys. The 2001 and 2006 surveys included questions on whether enterprises 
undertook any work on a contract basis and whether they bought at least part of their input 
from, and sold at least part of their output to, another enterprise or a contractor. As only a 
little over 8 per cent of the enterprises in my dataset report working on a contract basis, 
there is insufficient power for a regression to tease out differential effects linked to the 
dereservation reform for this variable. However, 25 per cent of enterprises state that they 
purchased at least part of their input from another enterprise or a contractor and 43 per 
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cent of enterprises report that at least part of their produce was sold to another enterprise 
or a contractor. While it is not clear that the counterparty in each case is a formal business, 
given that informal enterprises are unlikely to be part of sophisticated supply chains, the 
probability of the counterparty being formal is arguably high, particularly where enterprises 
report selling output to another enterprise or a contractor. 
In Table 45, I present the estimates yielded by regressions underpinned by these linkage 
centric survey questions. As regards establishments, the baseline positive employment 
effect associated with dereservation is robust for the subsample that does not report selling 
any produce to another enterprise or a contractor, but loses significance for the subsample 
that does report doing so. Conversely, significance is retained for establishments that report 
procuring at least part of their input from another enterprise or a contractor, but is lost for 
other establishments. In the context of the dereservation reform, this suggests that 
backward linkages might matter more in terms of the response of employment in 
establishments, rather than forward linkages. Interestingly, a strongly (weakly) significant 
positive coefficient attaches to the dereservation indicator for OAMEs that report not 
buying any input from (not selling any output to) another enterprise or a contractor, which 
is indicative of these tiny, household only informal manufacturers being less linked with the 
wider economy relative to establishments.  
Table 45: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises – linkages with other enterprises 
 All enterprises 
(1995-2006) 
No input 
purchased from 
another 
enterprise/ 
contractor 
(2001, 2006) 
At least some 
input 
purchased 
from another 
enterprise/ 
contractor 
(2001, 2006) 
No output sold 
to another 
enterprise/ 
contractor 
(2001, 2006) 
At least some 
output sold to 
another 
enterprise/ 
contractor 
(2001, 2006) 
ALL INFORMAL 
ENTERPRISES 
     
Still reserved 0.116*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.118*** 0.163*** 
 (0.018) (0.035) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) 
Dereserved 0.065 0.170*** 0.050 0.082* 0.033 
 (0.042) (0.055) (0.043) (0.042) (0.072) 
Observations 140059 18810 57468 42899 33379 
R-squared 0.230 0.376 0.284 0.251 0.382 
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OAMEs      
Still reserved 0.033 0.103*** -0.009 0.023 0.017 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.030) (0.024) (0.048) 
Dereserved 0.052 0.156** 0.037 0.081* 0.010 
 (0.047) (0.063) (0.051) (0.046) (0.094) 
Observations 97849 14903 31724 30162 16465 
R-squared 0.201 0.335 0.243 0.260 0.321 
ESTABLISHMENT
S 
     
Still reserved 0.106*** 0.059 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.111*** 
 (0.014) (0.041) (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) 
Dereserved 0.069** 0.030 0.083** 0.074** 0.066 
 (0.032) (0.063) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) 
Observations 42210 3907 25744 12737 16914 
R-squared 0.274 0.590 0.283 0.340 0.292 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%  **: Significant at 5%  *: Significant at 10% 
4.6 Robustness 
Figure 7 suggests that there was no significant difference in the trend in pre-reform (1990-
1995) employment in informal enterprises producing products that were never reserved, 
vis-à-vis those producing reserved products. Nonetheless, to account for any variation in 
this trend across product or industry categories, I incorporate data from the 1990 NSSO 
survey (Table 46). As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the 1990 survey data do not provide district 
codes, so I use state fixed effects instead of district fixed effects to undertake this check. 
The coefficients attaching to dereservation for establishments are similar in magnitude to 
my baseline estimates for both the OLS and the Poisson count regressions, although 
statistical significance is undermined to some extent. This may be on account of the 
estimates being less precise relative to the baseline, with state fixed effects replacing the 
district fixed effects used in the baseline.  
Table 46: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1990-2006, state fixed effects) 
 OLS    Poisson   
 All OAMEs Establishments  All OAMEs Establishments 
Still reserved 0.105*** 0.041 0.101***  0.119*** 0.031 0.095*** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.016)  (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) 
Dereserved 0.028 0.023 0.057*  0.017 0.003 0.051 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.034)  (0.028) (0.037) (0.032) 
Observations 181696 128375 53321  181696 128375 53321 
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R-squared 0.167 0.135 0.207     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%  **: Significant at 5%  *: Significant at 10% 
As discussed in Section 4.2, Tewari and Wilde (2014) document that dereservation resulted 
in productivity increments in the formal sector, with relatively large multi-product firms 
benefiting in particular from the dismantling of the constraint on their product scope. In this 
context, it is possible that the baseline employment effects that I observe for establishments 
in the informal sector is accentuated for establishments producing more than one product, 
which account for approximately one-third of the establishments in the dataset. Table 47 is 
supportive of this hypothesis, with the baseline result being strengthened in magnitude and 
significance for multi-product establishments, and losing significance (although it continues 
to be positive) for single product establishments. 
Table 47: SSI dereservation and employment in informal enterprises (1995-2006) – single product and multi-
product enterprises 
 All enterprises Single product 
enterprises 
Multi-product 
enterprises 
ALL INFORMAL 
ENTERPRISES 
   
Still reserved 0.116*** 0.130*** 0.066*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
Dereserved 0.065 0.036 0.073* 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.038) 
Observations 140059 101334 38725 
R-squared 0.230 0.250 0.305 
OAMEs    
Still reserved 0.033 0.019 0.019 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) 
Dereserved 0.052 0.028 0.064 
 (0.047) (0.058) (0.044) 
Observations 97849 73349 24500 
R-squared 0.201 0.219 0.288 
ESTABLISHMENTS    
Still reserved 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.073*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) 
Dereserved 0.069** 0.024 0.123*** 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.041) 
Observations 42210 27985 14225 
R-squared 0.274 0.280 0.377 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged; 'FE': fixed effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the district-industry level. ***: Significant at 1%  **: Significant at 5%  *: Significant at 10% 
135 
 
Along the lines of the district level analysis discussed in Section 4.4.2, I also undertake a 
robustness check at the industry level. As discussed in Martin et al (2017), industries are 
imperfect units for analysis of the impacts of SSI dereservation, as most three digit industries 
comprise a number of products, only some of which were SSI reserved and, for this subset, 
dereservation was often implemented at different points in time in the post-1997 period. In 
addition, an industry level specification cannot control for the district level variables 
obtained from the census, as outlined in Section 4.3.2.2. Nonetheless, as Table A10 in the 
Appendix shows, the industry level results (which use levels rather than changes of the left 
hand side and right hand side variables, to maximise the sample size) are in line with the 
district level findings. In other words, pre-reform exposure to dereservation is not 
associated with significant changes in informal employment or enterprise numbers at the 
industry level (the industry level ‘FrDeres’ variable is constructed in a manner corresponding 
exactly to that outlined for the district level ‘FrDeres’ measure in Section 4.3.2.2). 
4.7 Concluding comments 
This study assesses the implications of India’s SSI dereservation reform of the 1997-2010 
period on informal manufacturing enterprises. While the literature has made major strides 
in understanding the impact of this reform on formal firms, this is likely to be the first 
attempt that is focused on informal enterprises, which account for a great majority of 
businesses and a smaller but still sizeable majority of employment in Indian manufacturing. 
Overall, at the enterprise level, there is no statistically significant shift in informal enterprise 
employment attaching to dereservation in the 1995-2006 period, although enterprises in 
‘still reserved’ product markets are consistently significantly larger than other enterprises. 
However, I find that establishments producing dereserved products are approximately 7 per 
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cent larger, in employment terms, relative to establishments manufacturing items that were 
never reserved, with no corresponding significance visible for OAMEs. A supplementary 
analysis at the district level indicates that a higher, pre-reform (1995) district level exposure 
to dereservation is not linked to significant shifts in informal employment and informal 
enterprise numbers in the 1995-2006 period.  
Further examination of the mechanisms underlying the baseline result for establishments 
indicates that this result is restricted to industries that are more likely to be characterised 
by greater competition between establishments and formal firms. It may be argued that 
these industries may have been more vulnerable to Melitz (2003) type shifts, such that the 
competitive pressures unleashed by dereservation may have led to the least unproductive 
formal firms exiting the market, followed by greater employment in informal enterprises. In 
line with intuition, these pressures appear to have played a lesser role in industries 
characterised by large formal incumbents accounting for substantial market shares in the 
pre-dereservation period. As regards supply chain effects, the limited evidence that is 
obtained indicates that backward linkages (input sourcing from other businesses) may be 
more relevant in comparison with forward linkages (output sales to other businesses) in the 
context of establishments. However, this latter channel may be fruitful ground for future 
research. 
The findings of this study have a number of policy implications. They are complementary to 
the findings of Martin et al (2017), which highlight the positive employment effects of the 
dereservation reform for the formal sector. They highlight the persistence of the duality 
inherent in the Indian economy, with informal activity flourishing in tandem with strides 
made in terms of formal sector growth. Further assessment of the constraints faced by 
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informal manufacturers and the extent to which they may be accentuated or alleviated by 
policies targeted at SSI promotion remains a priority. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis examines the implications of a major series of economic reforms, undertaken in 
India in the 1990-2006 period, on employment in the manufacturing sector. Unlike most 
existing studies in the area, it undertakes separate analyses for formal firms and informal 
enterprises in manufacturing industries. In light of the fact that this duality is a trait that is 
inherent in, and pervades all major manufacturing industry groups across, the Indian 
economy, this is a distinguishing feature of this analysis and a contribution to the literature. 
To the best of my knowledge, this thesis also comprises the first comprehensive study of the 
firm or enterprise level employment effects of the Indian reforms. In this sense, it 
complements a rich body of existing work that analyses other firm level outcomes, primarily 
productivity shifts, in the post-reform era. 
The results of this exercise are striking in many ways. Perhaps most prominently, I find that 
the swingeing reductions in final goods tariffs that the Indian government undertook in the 
1990s are not associated with comprehensive, statistically significant changes in 
employment, both at a ‘micro’ (firm or enterprise) level and a ‘macro’ (industry) level. 
Rather, changes in average employment are driven by declines in tariffs on imported inputs, 
which may have made inputs cheaper more widely through general equilibrium effects in 
the post-reform period, and industrial policy reform in the guise of delicensing and FDI 
liberalisation. 
The effects associated with lower input tariffs are restricted to the formal sector. As informal 
enterprises rarely engage directly in international trade, this is perhaps unsurprising. Also in 
line with intuition, declining input tariffs go hand-in-hand with increases in formal firm 
employment, on average and ceteris paribus, in all states. This applies to directly hired 
employees, as opposed to casual or ‘contract’ workers. At a broader, industry level, 
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declining input tariffs are not associated with significant shifts in employment and firm 
numbers. This suggests that lower input tariffs are unlikely to have led to significant levels 
of market entry and exit in India’s formal sector in the 1990s, although this cannot be 
rigorously established given the unavailability of firm level panel data for this period. 
The delicensing reform, initiated in 1986 for a minority of industries and in 1991 for much 
of the remainder of the manufacturing sector, is associated with significant employment 
shifts not only in the formal sector but also in the informal sector. As opposed to input tariff 
declines, delicensing has more substantial implications for industry level outcomes, as 
opposed to firm or enterprise level employment. In the formal sector, delicensing is 
associated with significantly increased formal firm numbers and no significant informal 
sector expansion in states with flexible labour markets. On the other hand, in states with 
inflexible labour markets, delicensing is associated with an expansion of the informal sector, 
on account of a significant increase in the number of informal enterprises, with no 
corresponding significant increase in formal firm numbers. As these effects tend to be 
restricted to industries characterised as being more competitive, it is possible that they are 
underpinned by Melitz (2003) type structural shifts in the formal sector in the post-reform 
period, which ‘spill over’ into informal sector expansion in states with inflexible labour 
markets. 
As regards FDI liberalisation, my findings are more nuanced. At the ‘micro’ level, in states 
with flexible (inflexible) labour markets, FDI reform is followed by increases (reductions) in 
employment in formal firms. Importantly, the increase visible in states with flexible labour 
markets applies to both directly hired (more permanent) employees as well as casual or 
‘contract’ labour, whereas the decrease recorded in states with inflexible labour markets is 
confined to directly hired employees. At the same time, in states with flexible labour 
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markets, FDI reform is linked to a significant, albeit economically trivial, rise in employment 
at the informal enterprise level. At the industry level, FDI reform is associated with a 
significant and economically relevant increase (no significant change) in the number of 
informal enterprises in states with flexible (inflexible) labour markets. Together, these 
findings indicate that while regions with flexible labour markets are more likely to benefit 
from increased employment in the wake of liberalising FDI regulation (as opposed to regions 
with less flexible labour markets), this increase could be reflected in an expansion of formal 
as well as informal employment. Secondary analysis is suggestive of the effects associating 
with FDI liberalisation being driven by a combination of product market competition within 
the formal sector and collaborative or value chain based linkages between formal and 
informal businesses. This continues to be an avenue for future investigation, particularly in 
contexts where data pertaining to FDI magnitudes and supply chain linkages are 
considerably richer. 
In the post-1997 period, the reforms initiated in 1991 lost traction, with the economy having 
recovered somewhat from the balance-of-payments crisis of 1990 and the sense of urgency 
for reform that was visible in the early 1990s having abated. In this period, attention shifted 
to the policy of SSI reservation, which for long had seen a selection of manufactured 
products largely reserved for production by small businesses. This policy was dismantled 
progressively in the post-1997 period, with the momentum of the ‘SSI dereservation’ 
increasing in 2001 and thereafter. Recent work by Martin et al (2017) and others has linked 
SSI dereservation to increased net productivity and employment in the formal sector. I 
explore the implications of dereservation for employment in informal enterprises in the 
1995-2006 period. 
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On the whole, the results of this analysis suggest that dereservation had no appreciable or 
statistically significant effect on employment in informal enterprises, on average and ceteris 
paribus. The only effect of significance is restricted to establishments, which are a little 
larger than the OAMEs (solely household based units typically comprising just two workers) 
that dominate the informal sector. On average, employment in an establishment producing 
recently dereserved products exceeds that in an establishment producing only products that 
were never reserved by a statistically significant 7 per cent. This finding is not accompanied 
by variation in dereservation intensity being linked to statistically significant changes in 
informal employment or enterprise numbers at a more aggregated district level. In other 
words, there is little evidence that the ‘extensive margin’ of informality underwent major 
shifts in response to dereservation, at least up to 2006. 
This baseline result is restricted to establishments, in particular multi-product 
establishments, operating in industries that are more likely to be characterised by greater 
competition between establishments and formal firms, which may have led to changes in 
product market structure in the medium term. Industries characterised by large formal 
incumbents accounting for more substantial market shares in the pre-dereservation period 
appear to have been somewhat more insulated from these changes. Other regressions 
suggest that the baseline finding is more likely to be driven by backward linkages (input 
sourcing) as opposed to forward linkages (output sales) for establishments. However, this 
remains a hypothesis that merits greater attention in future research. 
Table 48 offers a synopsis of the key findings of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
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Table 48: Summary of results 
Policy/ Reform Impact* on firm/ enterprise level 
employment 
Impact* on industry/ district level 
number of firms/ enterprises 
Reductions in final goods 
tariffs (1991-1997) 
 
 
Formal: No significant impact 
 
Informal: No significant impact 
Formal: No significant impact 
 
Informal: No significant impact 
Declines in input tariffs** 
(1991-1997) 
 
 
Formal: + (flex), + (inflex) 
 
Informal: No significant impact 
Formal: No significant impact 
 
Informal: No significant impact 
Delicensing 
(1985, 1991-1997) 
 
 
 
 
Formal: No significant impact 
 
 
Informal: no significant impact (flex), 
+ (inflex) 
Formal: + (flex),  
no significant impact (inflex) 
 
Informal: no significant impact (flex),  
+ (inflex) 
FDI liberalization 
(1991-1997) 
 
 
 
 
Formal: + (flex), 
- (inflex) 
 
Informal: + (flex), 
no significant impact (inflex) 
Formal: No significant impact 
 
 
Informal: + (flex),  
no significant impact (inflex) 
SSI dereservation*** 
(1997-2006) 
 
Informal: + (only for establishments) Informal: No significant impact 
Source: Author’s conclusions in this thesis   “+” represents an increase and “-“ represents a decrease.   “flex” denotes 
states with flexible labour markets and “inflex” denotes states with inflexible labour markets (defined using the 
‘FLEX 2’ indicator of state level labour market flexibility).   * On average and ceteris paribus     ** The input tariff 
declines were an implicit result of the reductions in final goods tariffs that were undertaken by the Indian government 
in the 1990s, as opposed to being a policy instrument per se.     *** In this thesis, the implications of SSI dereservation 
for employment have been analysed only for the informal sector. 
The findings of this thesis have a number of policy implications. They add a drop to the 
burgeoning sea of studies emphasising the relevance of variations in domestic institutional 
frameworks to evaluations of the implications of economic liberalisation, in particular in 
large developing economies. They also underline the relevance of separate analyses of 
public policy implications for formal firms and informal enterprises. While the Indian 
government has a strong tradition in the compilation of microdata on a regular basis, this 
thesis also highlight several limitations in data quality and availability, in particular for 
informal enterprises. Perhaps the most prominent of these limitations relates to the 
absence of panel data for informal enterprises in India. The initiation of panel data 
compilation in this regard appears to be highly desirable on a fairly regular basis, if not on 
an annual basis along the lines of the ASI for formal firms. In the interim, there is a strong 
argument for a greater weight to be placed on the collection of data that would facilitate 
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rigorous analysis of competition and collaboration within and between businesses operating 
in the formal and informal sectors.  
More broadly, for both academics and policymakers, better understanding the factors that 
motivate enterprises to operate informally in widely varying contexts, in addition to the 
drivers of transition from informality to the formal sector, continues to be a vital concern in 
today’s rapidly growing and evolving developing economies. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Additional robustness checks – I 
 Baseline Change in 
‘FLEX 2’ 
value for 
Delhi and 
Jammu & 
Kashmir (0 
to 1) 
Excluding 
firms with 
fewer than 
ten paid 
employees 
Including firms 
reporting zero 
or no value for 
raw material 
use/ physical 
products 
Using input tariffs 
based on final 
goods tariffs for 
manufacturing 
industries only 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 -0.018 0.059 -0.007 -0.130* 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.054) (0.075) (0.076) 
Final goods tariffs * 
FLEX 2 
0.132 0.122 0.039 0.118 0.199* 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.084) (0.114) (0.115) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.703*** -0.656*** -0.720*** -0.059 
 (0.211) (0.218) (0.191) (0.215) (0.187) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.021 0.056 0.189 0.028 -0.162 
 (0.216) (0.222) (0.193) (0.216) (0.149) 
Delicensing 0.084 0.089 0.072 0.081 0.073 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.048) (0.061) (0.063) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.098 -0.099 -0.048 -0.086 -0.119 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.067) (0.085) (0.087) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.103** -0.080** -0.107** -0.090* 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.035) (0.046) (0.047) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.208*** 0.178*** 0.140*** 0.206*** 0.192*** 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.051) (0.067) (0.068) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs   
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.104* 0.098** 0.111* 0.069 
Std Error 0.063 0.061 0.046 0.062 0.062 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.078 0.088 0.035 0.075 0.268 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs   
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.646*** -0.468*** -0.692*** -0.221 
Std Error 0.199 0.195 0.181 0.202 0.176 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.001 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.209 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing   
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 -0.010 0.025 -0.005 -0.046 
Std Error 0.036 0.034 0.029 0.038 0.039 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.707 0.781 0.400 0.896 0.238 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform   
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.075** 0.060** 0.099** 0.102*** 
Std Error 0.039 0.038 0.027 0.039 0.039 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.017 0.047 0.027 0.011 0.010 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 160883 131147 163921 160883 
R-squared 0.205 0.205 0.201 0.203 0.205 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
150 
 
Table A2: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Additional robustness checks – II 
 Baseline 
(All firms) 
Consumer 
goods 
industries 
Basic/ 
Capital/ 
Intermediate 
goods 
industries 
Single 
product 
firms 
Multi-
product 
firms 
Fully 
private 
Not fully 
private 
Final goods 
tariffs 
-0.020 0.031 -0.010 0.042 0.035 -0.070 0.078 
 (0.075) (0.083) (0.080) (0.057) (0.089) (0.077) (0.126) 
Final goods 
tariffs * FLEX 2 
0.132 0.073 0.198 -0.033 0.140 0.178 0.037 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.136) (0.076) (0.142) (0.121) (0.143) 
Input tariffs -0.680*** -0.667** -0.623** -0.407 -1.317*** -0.537*** -0.554 
 (0.211) (0.295) (0.265) (0.248) (0.265) (0.206) (0.472) 
Input tariffs * 
FLEX 2 
0.021 -0.022 -0.460* -0.141 0.417 -0.070 -0.080 
 (0.216) (0.298) (0.244) (0.233) (0.272) (0.211) (0.348) 
Delicensing 0.084 0.183* -0.095* 0.148 0.011 0.100 -0.063 
 (0.061) (0.096) (0.051) (0.095) (0.051) (0.066) (0.076) 
Delicensing * 
FLEX 2 
-0.098 -0.189 0.068 -0.253* -0.004 -0.099 0.011 
 (0.083) (0.128) (0.067) (0.140) (0.059) (0.089) (0.081) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.136** 0.015 -0.049 -0.092* -0.108** 0.185** 
 (0.045) (0.067) (0.046) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.093) 
FDI reform * 
FLEX 2 
0.208*** 0.338*** -0.043 0.006 0.281*** 0.218*** -0.278** 
 (0.067) (0.097) (0.046) (0.056) (0.075) (0.068) (0.127) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111 0.104 0.188* 0.010 0.174** 0.108 0.115 
Std Error 0.063 0.070 0.098 0.060 0.083 0.067 0.106 
p-value 
(combined 
effect = 0) 
0.078 0.139 0.056 0.874 0.035 0.106 0.279 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.659*** -0.689** -1.083*** -0.548** -0.900*** -0.606*** -0.634 
Std Error 0.199 0.279 0.305 0.249 0.236 0.201 0.496 
p-value 
(combined 
effect = 0) 
0.001 0.014 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.003 0.202 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 -0.006 -0.027 -0.105* 0.007 0.001 -0.052 
Std Error 0.036 0.050 0.041 0.061 0.040 0.038 0.081 
p-value 
(combined 
effect = 0) 
0.707 0.901 0.503 0.087 0.854 0.981 0.523 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.093** 0.202*** -0.028 -0.042 0.189*** 0.110*** -0.093 
Std Error 0.039 0.058 0.041 0.042 0.048 0.040 0.095 
p-value 
(combined 
effect = 0) 
0.017 0.000 0.497 0.310 0.000 0.006 0.328 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160883 96947 63936 59164 83640 150347 10536 
R-squared 0.205 0.236 0.146 0.198 0.243 0.189 0.400 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
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Table A3: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Excluding individual states (I) 
Excluding: 
 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
Punjab Haryana Delhi Rajasthan Uttar 
Pradesh 
Final goods tariffs -0.020 0.043 0.007 -0.028 -0.034 -0.042 
 (0.076) (0.066) (0.079) (0.079) (0.075) (0.090) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.131 0.029 0.083 0.135 0.147 0.153 
 (0.116) (0.093) (0.117) (0.119) (0.117) (0.130) 
Input tariffs -0.676*** -0.685*** -0.717*** -0.714*** -0.605*** -0.620*** 
 (0.212) (0.211) (0.217) (0.218) (0.212) (0.239) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.017 0.045 0.102 0.047 -0.042 -0.062 
 (0.218) (0.206) (0.218) (0.223) (0.221) (0.238) 
Delicensing 0.084 0.070 0.084 0.094 0.082 0.114* 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.061) (0.068) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.097 -0.084 -0.092 -0.102 -0.104 -0.116 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) 
FDI reform -0.115** -0.095* -0.129*** -0.109** -0.109** -0.121** 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.057) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.206*** 0.153** 0.221*** 0.202*** 0.198*** 0.216*** 
 (0.067) (0.062) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.079) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.111* 0.072 0.091 0.107* 0.113* 0.110* 
Std Error 0.063 0.055 0.062 0.063 0.066 0.065 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.081 0.188 0.145 0.090 0.085 0.087 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.658*** -0.641*** -0.615*** -0.666*** -0.646*** -0.682*** 
Std Error 0.200 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.207 0.207 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.014 -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.022 -0.002 
Std Error 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.033 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.702 0.711 0.831 0.818 0.557 0.961 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.091** 0.058* 0.092** 0.092** 0.089** 0.094** 
Std Error 0.039 0.034 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.039 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.019 0.083 0.018 0.018 0.027 0.016 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 160075 151784 154624 155381 154261 144998 
R-squared 0.206 0.212 0.208 0.208 0.207 0.198 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table A4: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Excluding individual states (II) 
Excluding: Bihar Assam West 
Bengal 
Orissa Madhya 
Pradesh 
Gujarat 
Final goods tariffs -0.016 -0.033 -0.064 -0.027 -0.036 -0.038 
 (0.080) (0.076) (0.087) (0.079) (0.081) (0.072) 
Final goods tariffs * 
FLEX 2 
0.147 0.154 0.182 0.137 0.149 0.117 
 (0.119) (0.115) (0.127) (0.118) (0.121) (0.119) 
Input tariffs -0.754*** -0.685*** -0.690*** -0.653*** -0.643*** -0.591*** 
 (0.216) (0.213) (0.225) (0.216) (0.223) (0.214) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.018 -0.016 -0.005 0.016 0.038 0.125 
 (0.221) (0.215) (0.228) (0.219) (0.223) (0.224) 
Delicensing 0.091 0.098 0.090 0.077 0.095 0.084 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.067) (0.063) (0.065) (0.061) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.091 -0.117 -0.098 -0.088 -0.110 -0.107 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.087) (0.084) (0.087) (0.088) 
FDI reform -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.124** -0.126*** -0.133*** -0.128*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.046) (0.049) (0.043) 
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FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.239*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.237*** 0.252*** 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.073) (0.068) (0.071) (0.070) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.130** 0.121* 0.118* 0.110* 0.113* 0.079 
Std Error 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.071 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.040 0.057 0.066 0.081 0.081 0.263 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.736*** -0.701*** -0.695*** -0.637*** -0.606*** -0.467** 
Std Error 0.201 0.201 0.204 0.201 0.205 0.204 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.023 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.000 -0.018 -0.008 -0.011 -0.015 -0.023 
Std Error 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.041 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.997 0.605 0.827 0.752 0.674 0.575 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.106*** 0.091** 0.091** 0.094** 0.104*** 0.125*** 
Std Error 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.044 
p-value (combined effect 
= 0) 
0.006 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.008 0.004 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156478 157852 153119 157954 154757 144400 
R-squared 0.206 0.198 0.207 0.203 0.207 0.207 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table A5: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in formal firms (1990-
1997): Excluding individual states (III) 
Excluding: Maharashtra Andhra 
Pradesh 
Karnataka Kerala Tamil Nadu 
Final goods tariffs -0.013 -0.011 -0.016 -0.033 -0.004 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.075) (0.078) (0.066) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.133 0.161 0.133 0.143 0.128 
 (0.124) (0.118) (0.119) (0.117) (0.104) 
Input tariffs -0.713*** -0.751*** -0.716*** -0.609*** -0.569*** 
 (0.216) (0.213) (0.214) (0.212) (0.195) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 0.126 0.023 0.037 -0.004 -0.250 
 (0.237) (0.220) (0.225) (0.215) (0.215) 
Delicensing 0.077 0.013 0.098 0.096 0.084 
 (0.066) (0.050) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.101 -0.026 -0.107 -0.123 -0.115 
 (0.098) (0.071) (0.087) (0.080) (0.091) 
FDI reform -0.089** -0.113*** -0.110** -0.084** -0.096** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.218*** 0.185*** 0.204*** 0.161** 0.162** 
 (0.072) (0.067) (0.068) (0.064) (0.067) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.120 0.149** 0.117* 0.110* 0.124* 
Std Error 0.077 0.068 0.068 0.063 0.067 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.119 0.028 0.085 0.081 0.065 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 -0.587*** -0.728*** -0.679*** -0.613*** -0.819*** 
Std Error 0.221 0.208 0.209 0.192 0.227 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.025 -0.012 -0.010 -0.028 -0.031 
Std Error 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.045 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.583 0.730 0.803 0.423 0.494 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.129*** 0.072* 0.095** 0.077** 0.066 
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Std Error 0.047 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.045 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.006 0.082 0.020 0.048 0.142 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 138989 146228 151390 153984 137854 
R-squared 0.213 0.210 0.206 0.204 0.209 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of number of paid employees   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table A6: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Additional robustness checks 
 Baseline With 
DMEs for 
1995 and 
2001 
Change in 
‘FLEX 2’ 
value for 
Delhi and 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
(0 to 1) 
Including 
enterprises 
with ten or 
more 
persons 
engaged 
Including 
enterprises 
reporting 
zero or no 
value for 
raw material 
use/ 
physical 
products 
Using input 
tariffs based 
on final goods 
tariffs for 
manufacturing 
industries 
only 
Final goods tariffs -0.132 -0.128 -0.137 -0.124 -0.172* -0.119 
 (0.113) (0.106) (0.115) (0.112) (0.090) (0.126) 
Final goods tariffs * 
FLEX 2 
0.151 0.174* 0.156 0.151 0.158 0.111 
 (0.097) (0.104) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.109) 
Input tariffs 0.576* 0.185 0.583* 0.558* 0.517* 0.444 
 (0.327) (0.349) (0.327) (0.329) (0.278) (0.339) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.178 -0.222 -0.179 -0.161 -0.139 -0.051 
 (0.168) (0.195) (0.165) (0.168) (0.172) (0.119) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.057** 0.095*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.088** -0.061 -0.079** -0.081** -0.047 -0.081** 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
FDI reform 0.024 0.053* 0.022 0.025 -0.000 0.029 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.076* 0.160*** 0.079** 0.074* 0.070** 0.077* 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.040) (0.041) (0.034) (0.041) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.019 0.046 0.018 0.028 -0.014 -0.008 
Std Error 0.078 0.085 0.077 0.078 0.075 0.084 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.809 0.589 0.810 0.721 0.853 0.924 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.398 -0.037 0.404 0.397 0.378 0.393 
Std Error 0.300 0.338 0.297 0.304 0.249 0.299 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.185 0.914 0.173 0.191 0.128 0.188 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.019 0.052 0.026 0.027 0.010 0.014 
Std Error 0.038 0.041 0.037 0.038 0.035 0.039 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.613 0.207 0.487 0.480 0.773 0.709 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.099** 0.213*** 0.101** 0.099** 0.070** 0.106 
Std Error 0.043 0.051 0.042 0.043 0.030 0.043 
p-value (combined 
effect = 0) 
0.021 0.000 0.016 0.022 0.018 0.014 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195789 216456 195789 196001 316755 195789 
R-squared 0.164 0.189 0.164 0.163 0.174 0.164 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, 
in brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
154 
 
Table A7: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Excluding individual states (I) 
Excluding: Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam Bihar Gujarat Haryana Karnataka 
Final goods tariffs -0.148 -0.128 -0.156 -0.122 -0.136 -0.127 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.125) (0.116) (0.114) (0.116) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.201** 0.134 0.167 0.117 0.159 0.169* 
 (0.101) (0.098) (0.105) (0.100) (0.098) (0.098) 
Input tariffs 0.652* 0.559* 0.589* 0.557* 0.578* 0.473 
 (0.338) (0.337) (0.350) (0.336) (0.330) (0.328) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.182 -0.143 -0.247 -0.121 -0.187 -0.209 
 (0.185) (0.170) (0.174) (0.173) (0.168) (0.174) 
Delicensing 0.099*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.109*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.059 -0.086** -0.098** -0.086** -0.088** -0.105*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.012 0.027 0.033 0.024 0.025 0.028 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.062 0.068* 0.070* 0.063 0.074* 0.071* 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.054 0.006 0.011 -0.005 0.023 0.042 
Std Error 0.084 0.079 0.079 0.082 0.079 0.079 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.524 0.943 0.889 0.954 0.769 0.598 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.470 0.416 0.342 0.436 0.391 0.264 
Std Error 0.303 0.306 0.313 0.310 0.302 0.306 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.122 0.174 0.275 0.161 0.196 0.390 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.040 0.020 0.010 0.019 0.020 0.004 
Std Error 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.037 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.314 0.600 0.790 0.635 0.604 0.921 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.074 0.095** 0.103** 0.088* 0.099** 0.099** 
Std Error 0.048 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.043 0.045 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.120 0.027 0.018 0.054 0.022 0.026 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 175093 190029 177854 188617 192790 188039 
R-squared 0.165 0.167 0.163 0.160 0.164 0.161 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, 
in brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table A8: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Excluding individual states (II) 
Excluding: Kerala Madhya 
Pradesh 
Maharashtra Orissa Punjab Rajasthan 
Final goods tariffs -0.140 -0.151 -0.119 -0.132 -0.135 -0.120 
 (0.118) (0.115) (0.117) (0.119) (0.117) (0.116) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.162 0.177* 0.114 0.156 0.155 0.150 
 (0.100) (0.098) (0.107) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
Input tariffs 0.541 0.556* 0.611* 0.438 0.569* 0.565* 
 (0.336) (0.330) (0.341) (0.344) (0.334) (0.334) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.164 -0.229 -0.158 -0.152 -0.180 -0.165 
 (0.172) (0.167) (0.183) (0.177) (0.170) (0.172) 
Delicensing 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.081** -0.093** -0.083** -0.082** -0.088** -0.080** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) 
FDI reform 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.032 0.023 0.022 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.086** 0.080* 0.102*** 0.087** 0.078* 0.081* 
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 (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 0.022 0.026 -0.005 0.024 0.020 0.030 
Std Error 0.079 0.079 0.095 0.080 0.079 0.081 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.779 0.744 0.954 0.769 0.801 0.717 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.377 0.327 0.453 0.286 0.388 0.400 
Std Error 0.305 0.305 0.322 0.316 0.304 0.308 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.217 0.283 0.160 0.366 0.202 0.194 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 0.027 0.020 0.024 0.032 0.020 0.026 
Std Error 0.038 0.039 0.043 0.039 0.038 0.041 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.487 0.612 0.586 0.411 0.608 0.528 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.109** 0.102** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.100** 0.103** 
Std Error 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.046 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.012 0.017 0.002 0.006 0.020 0.024 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 187903 184167 181312 184632 189682 187722 
R-squared 0.159 0.166 0.164 0.167 0.163 0.165 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, 
in brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table A9: Economic reforms, labour market flexibility and employment in informal enterprises 
(1990-2001): Excluding individual states (III) 
Excluding: Tamil 
Nadu 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
West 
Bengal 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
Delhi 
Final goods tariffs -0.141 -0.025 -0.152 -0.135 -0.134 
 (0.113) (0.071) (0.131) (0.115) (0.114) 
Final goods tariffs * FLEX 2 0.140 0.106 0.106 0.157 0.150 
 (0.098) (0.087) (0.108) (0.098) (0.098) 
Input tariffs 0.838** 0.331 0.654* 0.588* 0.572* 
 (0.327) (0.304) (0.362) (0.328) (0.330) 
Input tariffs * FLEX 2 -0.220 -0.135 -0.117 -0.194 -0.171 
 (0.164) (0.169) (0.180) (0.168) (0.169) 
Delicensing 0.109*** 0.098*** 0.123*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Delicensing * FLEX 2 -0.121*** -0.079** -0.100*** -0.086** -0.087** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
FDI reform 0.020 0.034 -0.022 0.021 0.024 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) 
FDI reform * FLEX 2 0.092** 0.050 0.088** 0.084** 0.076* 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in final goods tariffs 
Row 1 + Row 2 -0.001 0.081 -0.045 0.022 0.016 
Std Error 0.085 0.069 0.079 0.079 0.079 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.990 0.245 0.568 0.779 0.836 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of changes in input tariffs 
Row 3 + Row 4 0.618** 0.196 0.536 0.394 0.401 
Std Error 0.316 0.291 0.329 0.301 0.302 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.050 0.500 0.103 0.190 0.185 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of delicensing 
Row 5 + Row 6 -0.013 0.019 0.023 0.017 0.020 
Std Error 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.038 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.733 0.621 0.558 0.648 0.598 
Flexible labour markets: Effects of FDI reform 
Row 7 + Row 8 0.112** 0.084* 0.066 0.106** 0.100** 
Std Error 0.048 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.043 
p-value (combined effect = 0) 0.019 0.051 0.110 0.015 0.020 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 173377 173033 171913 192443 194018 
R-squared 0.163 0.168 0.181 0.165 0.164 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of total number of persons engaged   'FE' denotes fixed effects.   Standard errors, 
in brackets, are clustered at the state-industry level.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
Table A10: SSI dereservation and industry level outcomes in the informal sector: panel fixed effects 
 All enterprises OAMEs Establishments 
1995-2006: ln (emp) ln (ent) ln (emp) ln (ent) ln (emp) ln (ent) 
FrDeres (industry level) 0.669* 0.652 0.859* 0.729 0.177 0.271 
 (0.355) (0.405) (0.459) (0.464) (0.243) (0.305) 
Observations 420 420 375 375 401 401 
R-squared 0.302 0.310 0.424 0.368 0.015 0.023 
 
2001-2006: 
      
FrDeres (industry level) 0.113 0.047 0.049 -0.006 0.087 0.109 
 (0.180) (0.226) (0.298) (0.283) (0.181) (0.194) 
Observations 280 280 244 244 267 267 
R-squared 0.276 0.299 0.370 0.340 0.023 0.039 
Dependent variable:   ln (emp) = natural logarithm of employment   or   ln (ent) = natural logarithm of number of 
enterprises        Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity.   All regressions include a constant 
and industry and year fixed effects.   ***: Significant at 1%   **: Significant at 5%   *: Significant at 10% 
